

Islam

in the Public Sphere

The Politics of Identity & The Future of Democracy in Indonesia

Editors:

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Introduction by the Director of CSRC

As a research institution for religion and culture within the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, the publication of this book is very significant to our ongoing efforts to support the constructive role of Islam in the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. These efforts have been pursued through various research and advocacy activities, which although dealing with different issues, all address one great goal: strengthening the capacity of the Muslim community to support democratization, and to strengthen civil society and good governance.

With the support of KAS in Germany, in 2010 CSRC conducted research in 10 Provinces under the title “Islamization of the Public Sphere: Muslim Identity and Negotiating the Future of Democracy”. The research combined quantitative and qualitative approaches, and aimed to understand the expression of Islam in the public sphere of the Reformasi era, including its background, the factors involved and the media used. The study also aimed to assess the extent to which the appearance of Islamic symbols in the public sphere affects democracy in Indonesia. More specifically, the question this research asked was: With its concepts of an Islamic State, the formalization of Islamic shariah and the use of ultra-exclusive Islamic identity in the public sphere, has political Islam been successful in dominating the consciousness and the political orientation of the majority Muslim

community?

The findings of this study indicate that regardless of occurrences of radicalism involving a group of hardline Muslims which have vividly colored the political public sphere in the past decade, the character of the majority of Indonesian Muslims remains tolerant, culturally attuned, and pluralist. These findings are encouraging. However, at the same time, consolidation of democracy in Indonesia requires still greater and deeper cultural capital: that is a stock of critical cultural and moral responsibility to create clean government, anti-corruption, and the resolution of political conflict by peaceful, dignified means. At the same time, the preservation of cultural Islam still requires the awareness and involvement of all stakeholders: government, civil society, and campus communities.

With the winds of democratization sweeping Arab countries today, we are optimistic that constitutional reforms in the Muslim world will deliver a brighter future for harmonious and productive relations between the Islamic world and the West, based on enhanced mutual respect and understanding.

This work would not have been possible without the contribution and hard work of all parties. I would like to give my thanks and appreciation to the following people. First of all, to Amelia Fauzia as director of the research project, and Sukron Kamil who became the team leader for the duration of the research. Similarly to fellow researchers: Andi Agung Prihatna, Irfan Abubakar, Ridwan al-Makassary, Rita Pranawati, Sri Hidayati, Sholehudin A. Aziz, Muchtadlirin, Idris Hemay, and Abdullah Sajad. The fruit of their creative work provided the draft research reports which are now to be found in this book. I also cannot fail to thank the CSRC staff who directly or indirectly contributed to the publication of this book, Efrida Yasni, Sylvia Nurman, and Nurul Qomariah.

On this occasion I would also like to thank Winfried Weck and Noorhaidi Hasan, who worked with me in successfully editing the draft research reports that now appear here. My thanks also to David Henton who translated this work into English so that it can be read by a broader public. And of course I cannot overlook the thanks due to Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat and Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra, MA for the guidance and expertise they offer CSRC. The advice and

encouragement they both provide always gives spirit and illumination to us here at CSRC. Lastly I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to Winfried Weck, KAS Representative in Indonesia. Without his willingness and good faith in supporting the research and its publication, this book would not appear as it does today. May the understanding and cooperation that exists between KAS and CSRC provide the maximum benefit for broader humanitarian goals. That is our hope!

Ciputat, May 2011

Irfan Abubakar
Director - CSRC

Preface of KAS Representative

When the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) of the State Islamic University Jakarta first mentioned the idea of a countrywide survey of the religious orientations of Indonesia's Muslim population, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung immediately expressed its interest and support. Why, the reader might ask, was a German political foundation, with links to Germany's ruling Christian Democrats, interested in the internal developments of a foreign people and their political behavior?

After the holocaust, Germany carried a heavy historical burden, and its relationship with the international Jewish Community was extremely difficult. Against this background, in the 1970s the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung began cooperation with the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the largest Jewish organization in the United States, through an exchange program that still exists. This commitment became KAS' first step into the field of interreligious dialogue, which is now an important pillar of its international activities and worldwide reputation. This extended into the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, when intellectual discussion and exchange of positions became possible between the orthodox churches of Eastern Europe and the Catholic and Protestant churches of Western Europe. KAS served as initiator, organizer, and moderator of this important dialogue program. Finally, the interreligious dialogue entered a new stage after the catastrophic events of 9/11, when the assump-

tions Samuel Huntington made in his *Clash of Civilizations* seemed to be suddenly and tragically confirmed. Although there had already been several individual religious dialogue programs in Muslim countries, mainly organized by KAS, 9/11 can be seen as triggering an even more focussed, concentrated and organized form of this interreligious dialogue between the “Muslim world” and the “Western World”

Talking about these different “Worlds” not only means talking about religious concepts, but even more about political cultures and ways of organizing the coexistence of one or all of the peoples who form a nation and, in consequence, of all peoples and nations worldwide. Specifically, following the collapse of communism, democratic systems were implemented in many Central and Eastern European countries, bringing hope for a period of stability and peace under the so called *New World Order*. Then the events of 9/11 occurred, and the Western world saw the sudden appearance of a world religion that is going *amok* as a collective threat that has not yet been overcome. After the recent events that have sent shock waves through several Arab nations, the Western hemisphere now detects glimpses of hope that democracy might be implemented in parts of the world which, until now, have steadfastly resisted it; right into the heartlands of the Islamic hemisphere. Why does the Western World perceive democracy as the only right and just form of political system? Is it, as often voiced by radical Muslims, because democracy, along with the rule of law and protection of human rights, is a Western concept and, once implemented worldwide, would mean that the West will rule and dominate the world, including the Islamic countries?

There is a better and historically proven explanation. Democracies do not fight each other in combat, and they do not wage wars against each other. Except for the Civil War in the United States 1861-65, in the history of mankind there is not a single example of a war between two democracies. To the contrary, the European Unification Process clearly demonstrates how the nations within a extremely diversified region, which had been a war zone for hundreds of years, overcame their traditional enmities, and how a whole continent is being pacified by the main reason that the European Union is a club made up exclusively of democracies. Democracy comes in various technical forms; presidential or parliamentary systems, ma-

jority voting or proportional representation. But it is not only technical democracy that brings peace to nations.

Democracy is special for reasons beyond these technical aspects. Democracy's special nature comes from its value orientation. There is no real democracy without respect for human dignity based on liberty, the defence of the human rights based on equality, human welfare through a market economy based on freedom of action, support for the weaker members of society based on solidarity, and the rule of law based on justice.


Therefore, for the Germans the support of democracy all around the world is, in the first place a peace project, as a result of a historic "homework done, lessons learned" process. In other words, it is an expression of our political culture. In second place, but nevertheless important, Germany is an export oriented nation, and one of the most important requirements for fruitful worldwide trade is a peaceful environment. Thus, Germany also has an economic interest in the support of democracy. We have learnt from German and European history of the 20th century that extremism in whatever form is fatal for the peaceful coexistence of the people within a nation and between nations, because extremism and democracy are mutually exclusive. This is the main reason why the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung supports peace and democracy, and fights extremism all around the world.

In the second decade of *Reformasi*, Indonesia is well on the way to deepening its democratic achievements and making its democracy irreversible. The huge majority of Indonesian citizens have become very much used to the political liberties brought by the democratic system. These same liberties also gives space to radical and extreme political, religious, and cultural ideas. As long as a democratic system can rely on its inherent self defence mechanisms, these developments should not become reason for concern. But when extremist positions and actions become a threat to the democratic system and the constitution, then extremism becomes a threat of the peaceful coexistence of the different religions and peoples within a nation like Indonesia. This is because extremism denies the individual free choice in the way they live their own lives. Extremism will always dominate the public as well as the private sphere within a society.

After observing the developments of the past years within Muslim Indonesia, CSRC and KAS together perceived the need to launch a substantial research on the actual state of Islam in the public sphere, and to publish the results in both Bahasa Indonesia and English. As member of the G20 and having the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia not only is a regional but also a global player. Thus the peaceful development and stability of the Republic of Indonesia is not only in its own interest, but also in the interest of the international community of nations.

Winfried Weck
Jakarta, May 2011

Editor's Foreword

 The presence of Islam in the public sphere over the last decade demands attention, not only because Islam has been associated with various occurrences of violence and radicalism and even acts of terrorism, but also because its presence has surged at a time when democracy in Indonesia is gaining momentum. Islam appears in the public sphere with a variety of expressions and orientations. Beyond its ideological and political facets, Islam colours the public sphere with cultural symbols: head scarves, soap opera on television, films, works of literature, and Islamic books. Islamic texts and symbols are increasingly read and viewed through the internet, turning Islam into part of what could be called a “virtual religion”. In short, the penetration of Islamic symbols in an increasingly democratic public sphere has produced a variety of Islamic-labeled expressions, identities, organizations and institutions, and has continued to grow in breadth and depth.

At first glance the expansion of Islam in Indonesia's public sphere during the ongoing process of democratization seems paradoxical. However, on closer examination the prominence of Islam's identities and symbols has actually been made possible by democracy itself. In contrast to the secularist assumption that religion's only place is in the private domain, democracy in fact requires a narrowing of the divide between the private and the public. Even private issues, such as mar-

riage, divorce, custody and parent/child relations, can become an important discourse in the “political arena” which involves issues of gender justice and human rights. Moreover, democracy facilitates the struggle for existence and legitimacy by more and more community groups in the public sphere. Religious groups extol their own identity, and strive to influence the public discourse and orientation of modern public life according to the perspectives of religion.

But the reality of religious diversity presents its own problems. It not only involves issues at the forefront of the public sphere, but also enables contestation and negotiation between religious groups with different ideological and political orientations. These are precisely the issues confronted by the expression of Islam in the public sphere. Although all Muslim groups are alike in making Islam their theological foundation, they differ in their interpretation of how the relationship between Islam and politics should be built. On the one hand, there are groups who claim Islam as the basis of political life, while acknowledging the context of religious plurality. On the other hand, a good number of groups reject the ideology of political Islam and chose Islam as a cultural identity, interwoven and in harmony with other identities such as economic status, social grouping, and national identity. The relationship between the public sphere and Islam therefore involves contestation between these two orientations: political Islam and cultural Islam.

How this contestation is played out in the public sphere is the key issue discussed in this book. It is the result of research by CSRC in 2010, which sought to gauge Muslim public opinion nationally in order to capture the posture and dynamics of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto public sphere. A number of considerations make the appearance of this book important. Firstly, it attempts to answer the questions and concerns which preoccupy some pro-democracy circles, that the prominent presence of Islamic symbols in the public sphere represents a threat to the future of democracy in this country. The results of research in this book show that although the Islamist group’s efforts are quite effective in promoting Islam through the various media available, the majority of Muslims tend towards an Islam which is ethically and culturally adaptive to societal dynamics and socio-economic development. For them, achieving the essence of Islam does

not necessitate establishing an Islamic nation, or State formalization of shariah law. They also reject the path of violence used by radical Islamist groups in the fight for Islamic values in public life.

Secondly, this work attempts to show the extent to which the dynamics of Islam in public life can interact positively with the democratic process in this country. This study shows that the development of Indonesian Islam today, as with public-oriented religions in general, not only gives inspiration, but also, to borrow a phrase from Jürgen Habermas, strives to learn and adjust itself to the public rationality demanded by the processes of democratic politics. To present this public discourse, eminent leaders of Islamic organizations such as the Shafi'i Maarif, M. Dien Syamsuddin, Hasyim Muzadi and Said Agil Siraj, to mention a only few names from Muhammadiyah and NU, make greater use of logical argument and critique. To influence public opinion they no longer merely quote verses from the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, for example, but use common idioms that are open for discussion. Articulation of ideas, concepts and possibly interests inspired by Islamic values can be read, questioned and even critically disputed by others in the public sphere. Correspondingly, at the level of the general public, there is a strong tendency to accept the political expression of Islam in the public sphere with restrictions, as shown by the research findings in this book (p. 64). These people agreed with articulation of Islam at the political level, but this should be with consideration for three conditions: respect for dissent, respect for religious and cultural diversity, and the requirement that it be non-discriminatory.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the dynamics of the relationship between Islam still retain tensions between religion and a democratic public sphere. These tensions are shown by the efforts of some groups to make Islam an alternative State ideology, so that (theoretically at least) Islam is located in confrontation with national norms and the State's "unity in diversity", and with the existence of other religious and cultural identities which have the same rights in the shared public sphere. Ideological Islamic groups tend to bypass the three principles above, because for them Islam should be the catalyst to assess the differences and diversity of religions and cultures. Similarly, they may shackle differences of opinion by their tendency to

absolutism, and even their willingness to use violence as a means to achieve their desired goals.

Thirdly, although they reject democracy as practiced in Indonesia today, most of them do not make Islamist-oriented ideology their main reason for this rejection. Rather than this, they see corruption and political strife as deficits that democracy has brought to Indonesia. Clearly the issue of implementing Islamic shariah proclaimed by Islamists, for example, exists more as their discursive strategy to protest against lame legal, political and economic systems. In the context of the development of democracy in this country, findings from this study may be a kind of reflection that the threat to democracy lies not in anti-democratic ideology, but in democratic practices that are remote from the values of democracy itself. For most people, both in cities and in far flung outposts, democracy should mean adequate well-being, security, and peace. However they witness the irony that politics in a democratic framework today seem to be riddled with political strife and corruption. It is not unlikely that the failure of political party elites to overcome the interminable problems of corruption and political conflict will increasingly affect the image of democracy itself.

These research findings reinforce the thesis of some political experts in modern Islam, such as Asef Bayat, who have said that the future of democracy in the Muslim world is not determined by the issue of Islam's compatibility with democracy, but by the capacity of Muslims to run democracy.

...the realization of democratic ideals in Muslim societies has less to do with the "essence" of Islam than with the intellectual conviction and political capacity of Muslims... The question of democratic polity is then one of political struggle rather than religious scripture, even though religious is often deployed to legitimize or to resist political domination.¹

This book is the result of editing the final draft of the findings and analysis compiled by the researchers. The editors were tasked with synchronizing and giving cohesion to that compilation. Editing the writings of a number of researchers, each with their own differ-

ent writing style, is a challenging task. Moreover, the limited time available for editing this book meant that it was no easy intellectual undertaking. However, enthusiasm for completing this work was increasingly inspired by realization of the book's importance in enriching the public discourse about the dynamics of contemporary Islam and democracy in Indonesia.

In editing this book, we were much assisted by several people who worked tirelessly. We take this opportunity to express our high appreciation and gratitude to Andi Agung Prihatna, who willingly and carefully reviewed the chapter "Describing the Research Findings", especially reviewing the tables and charts, thus improving the existing unity and coherence. We would also like to thank David Henton, the AVI volunteer working with CSRC since 2009, who freely gave constructive inputs to improve the final manuscript of this book. Likewise Idris Hemay deserves thanks for helping to prepare additional data from research results, and also Mohamad Nabil who helped proof-read the final manuscript of this book. Our thanks are also due to Muchtadlirin, who not only undertook the layout of the original text, but also provided critical input for the improvement of this book.

Above all, this book would not have been possible without the creative work of our researcher colleagues and the compilers of the initial manuscript of this book. Sukron Kamil and Amelia Fauzia are especially worthy of our appreciation and thanks, particularly for compiling the final draft report of this research. Thanks are also due to this book's researchers and compilers: Andi Agung Prihatna, Irfan Abubakar, Ridwan al-Makassary, Sri Hidayati, Rita Pranawati, Sholehudin A. Aziz, Muchtadlirin, Idris Hemay and Abdullah Sajad. We would also like to thank Saul Allen (of the University of Michigan, USA) and Dick van der Meij for their patient and painstaking editorial assistance and comments.

Finally, the research findings in this book provide a positive signal that the prominent presence of Islamic symbols in the public sphere is not a threat to democratic pluralism and the future of this nation. However, at the same time, the finding that 19.9 per cent of Muslims have an Islamist orientation demonstrates a significant ideological Islamist presence in Indonesia. Moreover, exposure to information about and the symbols of political Islam displayed in various media reaches

30-40 per cent of the Muslim community, although this does not necessarily succeed in forming their political views. Strengthening the capacity of political actors in developing a culture of democracy in Indonesia is the key to preserving Islam's moderate and inclusive face in the future.

Ciputat, 5 May 2011

Winfried Weck
Noorhaidi Hasan
Irfan Abubakar

Endnotes

¹ Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. xvii.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The promotion of Islam in the public sphere since the dawn of *Reformasi* has involved a contest between the Islamic orientations of political Islam (Islamism) and cultural Islam, a contest largely won by those oriented towards the latter. The majority of Muslims (80 per cent), having been exposed to a variety of Islamic information through a diversity of media, tend to take Islam as part of an expression of ethics and culture, while the remaining 20 per cent want Islam to comprise a holistic political ideology. Among those categorized as Islamist, only a small number are actively involved in supporting the ideology of political Islam (5 per cent).

However, although their numbers represent a small percentage of the Islamist Muslims, the political discourse of Islamism that has developed in various media is quite strong. This study shows that 4 out of 10 Muslims in Indonesia claim exposure to the ideology of political Islam in the public sphere. Furthermore, the promotion of Islam in the public sphere can only encourage the strengthening of Islamist tendencies. This research demonstrates that compared with the cultural Islam orientation, Islamists tend to be more interested in,

and obtain more information about, Islamic values from the mass media.

Can Islamist tendencies in the public sphere threaten democracy? The answer, apparently, is no! This is because the majority of Muslims (87 per cent) expressed agreement with democracy, while only a handful rejected it (13 per cent). The majority of both the Islamist and Islamic cultural groups support the practice of democracy now prevailing in Indonesia. Those who reject it do so not solely for ideological reasons, but more importantly because of the assumption that democracy has spawned the practice of money politics which contributes to the proliferation of corruption that has plagued Indonesia. Another reason is that democracy is considered to have failed in its promise to deliver peace and harmony, instead leading to chaos and strife.

These conclusions are the main findings of CSRC's (Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, UIN Jakarta) research, entitled "Islamization of the Public Sphere: Muslim Identity and Negotiating the Future of Democracy in Indonesia." Research was conducted during 2010 in 10 cities and was primarily motivated by three interrelated factors. First, the burgeoning phenomenon of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere that has come with the development of mass media in the era of *Reformasi*; secondly, the prominence of identity politics among Muslims, which presupposes contestation between the expression of cultural and political Islam in the public sphere; thirdly, the emergence of Islam in the public sphere within the context of the democratization occurring since the fall of New Order authoritarianism. These factors will be further examined below.

Islamic Expression in the Public Sphere

Islam's presence in the public sphere in general can be seen as the spread of Islam's values, teachings and symbols to the community by utilizing the public sphere, that is spaces or domains, whether real or virtual, which are used jointly by citizens to communicate and negotiate a variety of ideas and interests, including the views and interests of religion.¹ Using the perspective of Jürgen Habermas, the exposure and discursive presence of Islam in the public sphere contain a political dimension in which various social forces publicly ar-

ticulate their interests to the State.²

The rise of Islam in the public sphere, especially during the *Reformasi* period, is shown by a number of prominent indications. In the political field, this phenomenon is marked by the birth of Islamic political parties which actively echo and re-echo new appeals to Islamism, and the emergence of militant Islamic movements like the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). In the economic field there is an expansion of Islamic banks and other shariah financial institutions. In the field of culture there is the flourishing publication of Islamically themed books which were prohibited under the New Order; widespread use of the *jilbab* (head scarf), and the development of a film industry that adopts Islamic themes, such as the film *Ayat-Ayat Cinta*.

The public sphere is realized through a variety of mass media – print, electronic, Internet media – in tandem with rapid advances in information technology and communications. Various markers of “Islam-ness” appear in the public sphere and can easily be seen through television, radio, newspapers, internet websites and the outdoor media such as banners, billboards and stickers. Modern mass media certainly enriches but does not necessarily replace traditional and long standing media which exist alongside it, such as religious study groups in public places and mosques and women’s devotional gatherings. These events often use loudspeakers which can be heard even by non-Muslims.

Historically, the above signs are an integral part of the process of Islamization that has long existed in Indonesia and is now, according to Islamic historian M.C. Ricklefs, going through a process of strengthening and deepening of meaning.³ The situation today, however, can not be seen apart from the agenda of Islamization in the preceding period, which built momentum just when the New Order regime adopted a policy of political de-Islamization.

Islamic forces at that time urged society along the path of the *da’wah* (active proselytization) movement. As a result, as Robert Hefner has said, this strategy was able to change previously syncretic Javanist (*Islamic abangan*) regions into ones that were more *santri*, or orthodox. In this phase, he suggests, the Islamization of Javanese *abangan* syncretism took a very different path from that

taken under the Old Order. According to Hefner's research, the Pasuruan region, which before the 1970's was a Javanist Islamic center, experienced extensive "santrification" after the mid-1980s.⁴

Alongside this, during the New Order, Islamization was significant at the level of State policy. In the midst of the de-Islamization of politics, through various forms of public policy, the New Order regime partially accommodated the interests of certain Muslims in relation to religious issues. In this regard Law No. 1 of 1974 can be cited, which endorsed the validity of marriage based on religion, particularly Islam; Law No. 7 of 1989 which granted religious courts the right to handle certain civil matters for Muslims only, namely marriage, inheritance, wills, grants, endowments, and alms; Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991 on the Compilation of Islamic Law, encompassing Islamic laws relating to marriage, inheritance, and endowments; and finally Law No. 7 of 1992 which allowed the operation of banks that implement Shariah and Law No. 10 of 1998 which provided direction for conventional banks to open Islamic branches, or even convert themselves into fully Islamic banks.

The splendor of Islamic expression in the public sphere is part of a global phenomenon in which religions have benefited from advances in information technology. With the ability to "discover technology", religious actors strove to offer the public religious views, beliefs, and alternative identities.⁵ According to Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors, religion has not only colored the public sphere, but has even succeeded in transforming it into something that was previously dominated by secular discourse.⁶ This shows that the presence of religion, including Islam, in the public sphere should be seen not merely as part of public aspirations, but also as a salient social identity. In reality, modern politics is not only a site for discussion, debate, and consensus, as proposed by Habermas, but has also become an arena for negotiating political interests and power. Thus, the modern public sphere necessitates diverse forms of expression and contestation of identity politics.⁷ These include the expression and contestation of Islamic identity between a purely culturally oriented Islam (cultural Islam) and the orientation which emphasizes the necessity of Islam as political ideology (political Islam or Islamism).

In the last ten years, Indonesia's Islamic identity has been

strengthened by the wave of Islamization. This strengthening of identity can be seen in the increasing frequency with which the words “Islam” or “Muslim” are associated with many things of a profane nature. For example, the terms “Islamic community”, “Muslim dress”, “Islamic school”, “Islamic medicine”, “Islamic books”, and “Islamic economy” have become widely known. Along with this process of Islamization, growing numbers of groups use the terms ‘Islamicity’ or “Islamic-ness” (*ke-Islam-an*), usually translated as “Islamic”, to refer to the extent of a thing’s Islamic identity.⁸

Islamic identity is not single and static, but multiple and changing. A Pakistani Muslim discussed this in his writing entitled “Muslimness – Shifting Boundaries.”⁹ The essential question here (and also for sociologists and anthropologists) is who can be said to be Muslim. Is a Muslim someone born of Muslim parents, someone who has recited the Shahada – the Muslim declaration of faith in the oneness of God and the status of Muhammad as his Prophet – or a person who observes the five pillars of Islam: declares the faith, performs the prayers, pays *zakat* alms, fasts during Ramadan, and (if possible) makes the pilgrimage to Mecca? Expert anthropologists and sociologists agree that Muslims are people who recognize themselves as having the religion of Islam. This is also the standard used by theologians and experts in religious law. Therefore, following this, scholars categorize Muslims into two groups; devout or pious Muslims (also called the white or *santri* group) and the less devout or nominal Muslims (also called the red or *abangan*).¹⁰

Apart from the categories of *santri* and *abangan*, another well known categorization of Indonesian Muslims distinguishes between traditional and modern Islam, usually called traditionalist and modernist groups. These last two categories emerged from a different context. The *santri* and *abangan* categories arose when the *santri* group was still in the minority, in the period, in Ricklefs’s words, when conflict, reconciliation and adaptation in Indonesian Islam were still in progress. In Java this process shaped the synthesis of Javanese mysticism. Meanwhile, when Islam had spread to all corners of the country and Islamic identity became the most important strand for its people, where the five pillars of Islam were practiced,¹¹ the categorization of Islamic groups moved to a higher level, that of traditional and modern

Islam.

The traditionalist and modernist groups have emerged since the end of the 19th century, with the coming of the movement for modernism and the purification of Islam. When modernist organizations were founded, like Muhammadiyah (1912), the groups which advocated traditionalism repented in 1926 by founding Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). These two organizations originated from the santri group, and they both formed strong institutional forms of community social organizations (*ormas*).

This phenomenon shows that religious identity can lead to the formation of religious institutions. These institutions and groups struggle to bring about social change, and subsequently turn into social religious movements.¹² Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are the two of the biggest religious organizations in Indonesia, or even in the world. Each of them claims to have members or sympathizers numbering approximately 35 to 45 million people. They both claim to be proselytizing organizations and they work in socio-religious fields, but certainly not as political organizations.

Religious identity is very closely associated with political and social movements. This is not only because religious identity can affect how people vote, but because religious awareness is usually followed by a personal mandate to bring about change. Thus it is not surprising if most social movements have a basis in religious values, including in the United States.¹³ Hence, apart from the two religious organizations NU dan Muhammadiyah noted above, other Islamic organizations or institutions have emerged in Indonesia, from those which are active in the socio-religious area and education (for example *Jamiat Khair*), to:

- Youth and student associations, like *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* and *Ikatan Remaja Masjid– IRMAS*)
- Philanthropic bodies and Islamic charities, like *Lembaga Amil Zakat* and *Yayasan Wakaf*, and
- Sufist associations like *Tarekat Naqshabandiyah* and many other *tarekat*.

Other similar associations that have emerged recently include:

- Islamic study groups, like women's *majlis taklim* groups and *Majlis Zikir*,

- Islamic study groups at schools (*Rohani Islam –Rohis*),
- Non Governmental Organizations advocating issues such as Islam and gender, like *Rahima*,
- Islamic women's societies, like *Persatuan Wanita Islam – PWI*,
- Islamic intellectual associations, like *ICMI – Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*,

and also

- trans-national religious associations like *Jamaah Tabligh*, and
- religious organizations of a political nature like *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia – HTI*, and *Front Pembela Islam – FPI*.

This list would be much longer if Islamic-based political parties were included, such as *Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)* and *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)*.

The phenomenon of the emergence of Islam in the political sphere is not a new story, but has existed since the beginning of Indonesia's independence. Clearly, political Islam is a phenomenon that appears repeatedly, including under the New Order.¹⁴ This impulse has been even stronger since the time of *Reformasi*. Islamic and Muslim identity have become something commonly displayed in the public sphere. All this is evidence that quite massive socio-political religious change has taken place in Indonesia, contributing to the fact of Islam's more tangible entry into the political arena.

1. Cultural Islam

The strengthening of Islamic political identity inevitably goes hand in hand with a growing Muslim acceptance of modernism. When Islamist organizations expand, organizations voicing liberalism also become stronger. A strengthening of Arabism is taking place, but the trend of accepting Western culture is not waning. For example, while there are more and more mosques, there is also a mushrooming of shopping centers (malls) and of Western culture such as exhibited by restaurants, fashion and cinema. When prayer rooms (*musholla*) appear in elite shopping centers, what are we to make of it? Is this evidence of political Islam, or is it the hegemony of the Western consumer culture facing Islam? The phenomenon and symbols of Islam cannot be seen as unidimensional. The jilbab is one example. Wichelen argued that at least two symbols emerge from "jilbabization": firstly

the ideological jilbab, and secondly the modern, stylish jilbab.¹⁵ These are conceptual poles set apart in their different understandings of Islam.

From the above discussion, we can see that an Islamic phenomenon exists that can still be considered to stand as Muslim culture and identity interlinked with personal lifestyle. This category of cultural Muslims can be distinguished from Muslims whose Islamic identity leads to ideologizing Islam at the State level. The first category of Muslim communities is often called cultural Islam, and although it represents a variant of Islam that is not Islamist, it is not a category that stands diametrically opposed to political Islam or Islamism. The view that sees Islam more as cultural identity was termed *Muslimness* by Greg Fealy, and among its characteristics is a tendency to be modern, multi-cultural, pluralist, and not radical.¹⁶

In Indonesia, the cultural Islam that avoided explicitly ideologizing Islam was able to grow under the New Order regime and until now, at the least, still endures. A political situation that discouraged the growth of political Islam contributed to the rise of the cultural Islam movement, with the birth of a new intellectualism and activism. Starting in the 1970s, this movement sought to develop a form of Islam that gave more attention to its substance than its form. Its task was in three main areas related to; the renewal of religious thought, an attitude of professionalism as a technocrat or a bureaucrat, and widespread social transformation.

The first of these, considered that the root issues of political rigidity was outside the field of practical activity and was actually theologically based, and so this movement undertook the renewal of religious thinking. From this movement's perspective, political Islam had experienced great difficulty in trying to synthesize fundamental theological/philosophical basics within the political realities of the archipelago. Its advocates were judged as unbending and almost dogmatic in practical considerations. This resulted in the unbridgeable gap of their rejection – at least in the view of the New Order government – of the national ideology of Pancasila. As an alternative, the basic idea of the reform movement was comparable to something raised by Soekarno in 1930, namely the importance of “rejuvenating” interpretations of Islam (the Qur'an and Sunnah). This, they explained,

did not mean a change in the eternal teachings of Islam. People's understanding of doctrine is relative, and therefore it is doctrinal interpretations that should be changed so that Islam remains relevant to all situations.

Some leading figures appeared to be pushing the wagon of Islamic reform. They were, among others, (1) Nurcholish Madjid, well known for his concept of desacralization, or freeing ourselves from the tendency to treat profane things as if they were transcendental. For him, questions of State, party and ideology are not sacred, and the Qur'an does not provide a detailed guide to life. In this context he pronounced his famous slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No"; (2) Abdurrahman Wahid contributed with the concept of the indigenization of Islam.¹⁷ In his view, Islam is a complementary factor in the social life, culture, and politics of Indonesia. Because the Indonesian archipelago is heterogeneous, attempts to locate Islam as its sole coloring would only make it a divisive factor. This does not mean that Muslims have no right to fill their national and civic life with its teachings. They have the same right to do this as have other religious groups. Abdurrahman Wahid proposed taking local situations into account in understanding the teachings of Islam not to divorce it from its cultural roots, but to maintain its unique characteristics in an indigenous form. (3) Munawir Sjadzali¹⁸ with the concept of a renewal of the teachings of Islam, referring to Umar bin Khattab's concept of *istishlah* (for the greater public welfare) methodology.¹⁹ The goal of this was Islamic doctrine articulated in accordance with Indonesia's situation and conditions.

Following from the vision of earlier leaders of Islamic reform movements, these reformists saw no need to locate Islam as the foundation of the State. What was important was that Muslims could practice their faith properly, and for them Pancasila already guaranteed this right. Following Dahlan Ranuwihardjo's thesis in the 1950s and with reference to the theological justifications of the new intellectualism discussed above, in the 1970s many Islamic thinkers and activists had the opportunity to join the existing bureaucracy and work as professionals. They were, among others, H.S. Mintaredja, Sulastomo, Hartono Mardjono, Akbar Tanjung, Ridwan Saidi, Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Bustanil Arifin, Omar Tusin, Sya'adilah Murshid, and

Mar'ie Muhammad.

The third area of this movement, social transformation, had a populist agenda and led to the formation of a community with strong links to the State. Its followers represented part of the critical school of thought, and around 1979 they used the framework of dependency theory. Their main concern lay in the transformation of society to develop it into one which was egalitarian and emancipatory. They invited Muslims in particular to understand politics in a broad sense as including programs and strategies in varying fields of struggle, rather than only as practical politics and partisan ideas within parliament as the exclusive arena. As well as this, they sought a more inclusive redefinition of Islam's goals. In the 1970s, this third aspect of the movement was driven by Sudjoko Prasodjo, Dawam Rahardjo, and later followed by Adi Sasono. They arranged a number of activities that were closely related to community development programs. From here the idea of a "people-based economy" (small industries and rural cooperatives) appeared, some of which could be implemented in cooperation with the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This critical school of thought in fact had a political nature, because its goal was to create a strong infrastructure at the grassroots level capable of acting as a supporter of the political system while advancing a participatory public sphere.²⁰

Besides these three models of cultural Islam, today the most visible forces for cultural Islam are NU and Muhammadiyah. At the time of independence, when there was debate about the Indonesian State, these two religious social organizations used their respective internal organizational dialectics to become guardians of Indonesia as a State which consistently values diversity. Muhammadiyah has never been directly involved in practical politics, and NU ceased its direct political involvement after 1984. NU and Muhammadiyah also support Indonesia as a State with Pancasila as its foundation and the founding Law of 1945 as its Constitution. As noted above, both reject the formalization of shariah and Islamic criminal law in particular.²¹

In the view of KH. Said Agil Siradj, the current Chairman of NU's board, the mission of the Prophet Muhammad was not to establish an Islamic state, but rather to build a civilization of peace-loving, moderate, prosperous, civilized, modern, and educated people.

For him, the form of the State of Indonesia does not need to conform to the formal dictates of an Islamic state. The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Pancasila are final, with no need of further debate. The NU website in fact states that the organization rejects the political formalization of shariah. NU tends not to fight for shariah at the structural level, but prefers its voluntary implementation with an emphasis on changes in individuals and by communities as the basis of the State. In the organizational body of Muhammadiyah, a former Muhammadiyah Chairman Amien Rais offers the same view. According to him, the Islamic State is not to be found in the Qur'an and Sunnah. There is only the ethos of Islam, such as justice and egalitarianism in running a government. He argues: "What does it mean for a country to use Islam as its basis, if it is only an empty formality?"²² Haedar Nasir, the current chairman of Muhammadiyah, makes the same point. In his view the value (substance) of Islam is much more profound than the mere skin-deep establishment of an Islamic State.²³

As socio-religious groups, both Islamist and cultural Islamic actors have been using the public sphere as an arena for advocating their social and religious agendas. For instance, since its establishment Muhammadiyah has channeled its communications through schools and universities, endowments, hospitals, books, brochures, newspapers, and magazines. *Suara Muhammadiyah* (The Voice of Muhammadiyah) is published regularly, and recently expanded into the virtual world using web tools (www.muhammadiyah.or.id). NU has done the same, albeit often on a smaller scale. Since its inception, NU has used the public sphere as a field for educational institutions (religious boarding and day schools), magazines, and brochures. To convey important issues to the public, NU publishes *Swara NU* (The Voice of NU) and *Berita Nahdhatul Ulama* (Nahdhatul Ulama News).²⁴ Today NU also uses online media (www.nu.or.id) to voice its interests and views.

Thus both these organizations have been active in showing some of the faces of Islam in Indonesia's changing public sphere. In this context the public sphere has become the arena for delivering their messages, and for propagating Islam, which subsequently found fertile ground in newspapers, magazines, hospitals, educational institu-

tions, seminar rooms, and websites.

Other cultural Muslim groups have also worked to present the friendly face of Islam in the public sphere. Islam as a religion has increasingly attracted the interest of bureaucrats and professionals. There has been a boom in Islamic seminars and activities at five star hotels. Senior public officials, like Mar'i Muhammad of the Finance Ministry, have promoted the birth of Islamic institutions. Grand prayer rooms and mosques have been established in various Ministries, with the result that bureaucrats and officials who take part in office religious activities are no longer stigmatized as belonging to the extreme right. The three cultural Islam circles noted above have succeeded in eventuating the State's accommodation of Islam. This has occurred at the structural level, marked by the birth of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) from which the daily *Republika* and the BMI (Bank Muamalat Indonesia) developed; at the legislative level by the National Education and Islamic Courts laws, at the infrastructural level it is evidenced by the building of hundreds of mosques by the *Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila* (Muslim Pancasila Charities Foundation), and at cultural levels, by events such as staging Istiqlal (Jakarta's largest mosque) Festivals in the 1990s.²⁵

2. Political Islam (Islamism)

According to Gilles Kepel, at the end of the 20th century the world witnessed rising Islamism in the Middle East. Islamism spread rapidly in the Muslim world and became the object of universal puzzlement.²⁶ Kepel goes on to say that the 1970s were a critical decade; in many parts of the Islamic world the "avant-garde of the Muslim faithful" pushed their way to the surface. Political Islam gradually permeated university campuses and eventually influenced the thought and behaviour patterns of society through the teaching of Islam, charitable activities, and investment in a variety of community religious and social fields. The movement, in effect, arose to articulate the ideology of Islamist theorists and the various social crises that were part and parcel of the demographic explosion, the general exodus from rural areas, and the emergence of an educated generation in large numbers.²⁷

Kepel notes that although the Islamists were socially conserva-

tive, they brought with them a militant ideology. This movement soon attracted the attention of the poor, of urban youth who had lost their bearings, and the pious bourgeoisie frustrated by structural problems. Ruling regimes seemed indifferent to these problems. They even moved away from Islamic values and gave place to Western values as a guide to Muslim lifestyles. As a result there was revolutionary upheaval in the Middle East, marked by the eruption of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the murder of Anwar Sadat in 1981.²⁸

It is important to note that the success of the Iranian Revolution made the West view the vocabulary of Islamism as extremely alarming. This concept has indeed influenced debates about politics and social dynamics in the Islamic world over the last four decades. Fears about the impact of Islamism have become more real with the Islamist jihadist terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the WTC and the Pentagon in the United States.

In response, the United States waged war on terrorism, identifying Islamist jihadist groups as an enemy that must be destroyed wherever they are. In addition, terror bombings in several African and Asian countries in the past three decades were allegedly the handiwork of skilled members of Islamist jihadist groups, and this most certainly tarnished the face of Islam as a religion of peace.

The term “Islamism” was used with increasing frequency in the widespread debate following the events of 11 September 2001. This concept is essentially a reference to religiously natured phenomena, but the power it contains expresses political goals and social tension that are felt by everyone.²⁹ In addition to Islamism, other terms with the same meaning portray Islamic activism. For example, the terms extremism and fundamentalism are also used, often interchangeably.

In this respect it is important to note that no terms are accepted by all parties to describe the symptoms of Islamist militant groups’ increasing influence. For example, in his book *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World* Kepel used the term “re-Islamization”, while in his 1985 book about Islamic activism he used the term “Muslim extremism”. Meanwhile Emmanuel Sivan chose to use the term “radical Islam”. Other scholars use different terms, from fundamentalism and reviv-

alism to Islamism.³⁰

This book uses the term Islamism to refer to two concepts developed by Olivier Roy and the International Crisis Group (ICG). Roy defines Islamism as a movement which conceptualizes Islam primarily as an ideology.³¹ For advocates of Islamism, Islam regulates all aspects of life, from how to manage the country, to education, the legal system, culture and the economy. Islamism is an ideology that is championed by Islamists who stress that a true Islamic society is not only fair, prosperous and strong as a reflection of personal piety, but also necessitates the establishment of an Islamic State. Once again, the crucial point of Islamism is as a contemporary movement which makes a political ideology of Islam. Roy stresses that for Islamists, the public can only be Islamized by a series of social and political actions.³²

Roy also discusses islamist views of how Islamic societies can be created. The debate on this issue differentiates between radical Islamists and moderate Islamists. Moderate Islamists, according to Roy, are those who seek the re-Islamization project from the bottom up, especially through proselytizing. They also attempt to establish a socio-cultural movement, while putting pressure on leaders (through the various political alliances) to promote Islamization from above by pushing for legislation imposing Islamic shariah law.

The differences between moderate Islamists and radical Islamists lie mainly in the way they fight for their goals. For Roy, radical Islamists stress the importance of non-compromise, and even endorse the concept of revolution to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic State. Their concept evolved from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb, an activist and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt who was executed in 1966, especially about *jahiliyya* and *takfir*.³³ Roy concludes that if moderate Islamists defend a reformist position on Islam in politics, radical Islamists uphold the road of revolution to replace the ideology of the ruling regime with the ideology of Islam.³⁴ From this it is apparent that there is no single concept of Islamism.

In line with Roy, the ICG sees Islamism as synonymous with the term “Islamic activism”.³⁵ This concept is defined as “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, law, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.”³⁶ Therefore, according to the

ICG, in an effort to understand the differences in mainstream Islamic activism, the entry point is to distinguish between Sunni Islamism and Shiite Islamism. There is no doubt that the concept of “political Islam” first appeared when the victory of Iran’s 1979 revolution made Shiite activism a frightening threat. However, in reality, Shiite groups belong to a minority variant of Islam. Shiite activism is more concerned with struggling for Shiite group interests, so it does not become fragmented into competing forms of activism in comparison with Sunni Islam.³⁷

An ICG report gives three main streams of Sunni Islam activism: political Islamism, proselytizing Islamism, and jihadist Islamism.³⁸ This kind of categorization is important because most researchers see Islamism as monolithic: fundamentalist, radical, and threatening the West. It should be said that these three categories are more a tool of analysis, and do not constitute static, clear-cut distinctions between one category and the next. All three groups are dynamic. For example, in a situation that allows proselytizing Islamism, jihadist Islamism can also occur, as shown by Laskar Jihad during the communal conflict in Ambon, Maluku. Profiles of the three main streams of Islamism in the Sunni world will be briefly described below.

First, political Islamism. This movement has the ultimate goal of achieving political power. The various upheavals occurring in a number of Muslim countries are examples of the manifestation of political Islam. In Egypt the political Islamist movement is reflected in the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*). Political Islam also has a presence in several other countries, like Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Sudan, and Morocco. Political Islam generally avoids violent means. Of course there are exceptions to this, for example the armed resistance of Hamas in Palestine.³⁹ In Indonesia political Islamism is represented by the actions of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This party evolved from the *Tarbiyah* (religious education) movement on Indonesia’s public university campuses, which originally took inspiration and developed from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s teachings.⁴⁰ Other political Islamist groups in Indonesia are Hizbut Tahrir (HTI) and Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI). If the Islamic Caliphate is the major issue championed by HTI, the MMI’s most important agenda is upholding an Islamic State

which makes Shariah its State law.

Secondly there is proselytizing Islamism. Unlike political Islamism, proselytizing Islamism essentially avoids political activism both for the purposes of political power and in its staunch refusal to identify itself within the language of political parties. The main focus of this group is intensifying faith through preaching. This second Islamist model is represented by the *Jama'ah Tabligh* movement, which was founded in India in 1926.⁴¹ As in other places, in Indonesia Jama'ah Tabligh has been growing since the early 1980s, encouraging its members in different countries to mount fixed-term preaching campaigns by carrying out *khuruj*, meaning to go out and spread the faith in the path of Allah, recommended at least once for members of this group.⁴² In such missionary activity, followers are called upon to leave the political hurly-burly, and to promote jilbab wearing for women and prevent social interaction with non-Muslims. All their activities are centered on worship and piety.

As well as the Jama'ah Tabligh, another example of a group which adopts the preaching form of Islamism is the Salafi movement. This movement takes as its reference a wholly doctrinal, textual and formally legalistic understanding of Islam, and tends towards the religiously puritanical. The word "Salafi", or *salafiyah* in Arabic, means previous, past, completed, or people of a past time.⁴³ However as a technical term "Salafi" refers specifically to the first three generations of pious Muslims who originally experienced and developed Islam, namely the Companions of Muhammad, the *Tabin* or Successor generation which followed them, and the Followers of the Successors (*Tabiut-tabiin*).⁴⁴ Their lives are regarded as the correct example for subsequent generations of Muslims.⁴⁵ Thus the core of the Salafi movement (Salafism) desires to restore the people to pure Islam, uncontaminated either by local cultural traditions or by a particular doctrinal discourse, as prevailed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, and are called Salafists.⁴⁶ Roy calls this variant of the Salafi movement neo-Wahhabism (the followers of Muhammad ibn Abd Wahab in their new form).⁴⁷

The *Forum Komunikasi Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaah* (FKAWJ), led by Ja'far Umar Thalib, is a variant of the Salafi movement that developed after the fall of the Soeharto regime in May

1998. Earlier iterations of this Salafi movement first emerged in Indonesia in the 1980s, along with an increased number of men using clothing and symbols such as loose shirts or robes (*jalabiyyah*), turbans (*imamah*), three-quarter length Muslim trousers (*isbal*), and long beards (*lihya*), while women wear long head scarves and chadors (*niqab*).⁴⁸ They were less likely to socialize with the general population, separated themselves and usually formed small groups. The FKAJW movement later became notorious when it metamorphosed into Laskar Jihad, representing Jihadist Islamism as the third variant of the political Islamic movement. This was a paramilitary movement whose Salafi youth membership was involved in the field of jihad in Maluku. The establishment of Laskar Jihad itself was intended as a response to the bloody religious conflict in Maluku that erupted in 1999, which they believe to be the consequence of Christianization projects that were spreading their tentacles across Indonesia.⁴⁹

The main characteristic of jihadist Islamism is the use of violent means in the fight for the values they believe, because they conceptualize Islamic society as being at war against the infidels and therefore Muslims should rise up to guard the Lands of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*). There are two main streams of this group. Firstly, the Salafist jihadists consisting of people with Salafist views who have experienced a process of radicalization, and have abandoned non-violent activism to join the jihad forces. Secondly, the followers of Qutb (*Qutbiyyah*), influenced by the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Recent developments describe Osama bin Laden's network as representing a synthesis of Salafist jihadist and Qutbiyyah jihadists.⁵⁰

One of Qutb's writings that has greatly inspired the rise of jihadist Islamism is *Ma'alim fi al-Thariq* (*Signposts along the Way*). The main thrust of Qutb's thought is the notion of an Islamic State, elaborated from ideas of the Islamic ideologue Abu al-A'la al-Maududi. According to Maududi, the true Islamic State recognizes the sovereignty of God and implements His law, i.e. Shariah. If this does not happen then a condition of *jaahiliyyah* arises. *Jaahiliyyah* is an Arabic term meaning pre-Islamic "ignorance of divine guidance" or "the state of ignorance of the guidance from God", which is used by extension for secular, Godless governments. This, according to Maududi, must be opposed by the way of jihad. In other words, jihad

is one way to eliminate the condition of *jaahiliyyah* resulting from the non-application of shariah, and replacing it with the divine order (shariah). According to Qutb, jihad is a force for liberation, freeing people and allowing them to establish the kingdom of God (His laws) on earth.⁵¹

The Qutbis version of jihadist Islamism is evident among other Islamic groups including Tanzim al-Jihad, an organization that emerged in Egypt and actively uses tactics of terror, although it was not involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Jemaah al-Islamiyah is another Qutbiyah movement which spread terror in Egypt in the 1990s by targeting government officials, secular intellectuals, Egyptian Christians, and travelers or tourists.⁵²

After the events of 11 September 2001, the al-Qaida organization under Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the WTC attacks, claimed that the attack was part of a global jihad being waged against America and its allies, who are the enemies of Islam. Hence everything related to the interests of America and its allies became the target of this group's jihadi actions in the form of terror, all over the world. Not surprisingly, Indonesia itself did not escape jihad activity targeting these interests. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a wing of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, expanded jihad operations into Indonesia. It conducted a series of terror bombings, such the Hotel Marriot and Australian Embassy bombings in Jakarta and bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005.

Apart from these two main jihadist movements, there is another movement that can be included in the category of jihadist Islamism, that of Proselytizing Jihadi Islamism (*Islamisme dakwahis jihadis*). This movement is represented by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) led by Habib Rizieq Shihab. The jihad conducted by FPI is not like jihad as war against the enemies of Islam, as understood by JI or Laskar Jihad (LJ) before they disbanded themselves, but is more the use of violence to proselytize under the slogans *amar ma'ruf* and *nahyi munkar* – inviting to virtue and prohibiting injustice.⁵³ They do not counterbalance this with Islamic teachings about communal deliberations (*musyawarah*) and deep wisdom (*hikmah*) as the way to resolve problems and proselytize peacefully. Neither do they hesitate to use intimidation and attacks on groups considered to deviate from

“true” Islam.⁵⁴

As well as Laskar Jihad, the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI – the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) could also be referred to as following jihadist Islamism. This is firstly because the MMI is also active in organizing the jihadist movement to be sent to troubled areas, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, for the sake of Islamic shariah in Indonesia, as well as inviting all Islamic community religious organizations and political parties in Indonesia to join its mission⁵⁵ in the struggle for Islamic shariah in Indonesia, MMI is also ready to fight secular groups that it considers to obstruct the enforcement of shariah law.⁵⁶ According to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a former MMI leader, “If the implementation of Islamic shariah is frustrated, then Muslims are obligated to fight by jihad.”⁵⁷ Despite the diversity apparent from the above categorization, Islamism has several common and fundamental characteristics: (1) belief in the unity of religion and State, in which religion should rule the country; (2) a tendency to a rigid (inflexible), absolute and dogmatic interpretation of religious texts; and (3) the tendency to monopolize the truth of religious interpretation, considering themselves as the most legitimate holders of authority for religious interpretations. As a result, they consider other groups who are not like-minded to be heretical; they see themselves as those who truly believe in religion, while outsiders either do not believe or only believe half-heartedly; they are aggressive in recruiting members, repressive, and seek to eliminate non-Muslims groups; (4) their outlook stigmatizes the West for its social, pluralist and especially political ideas, and sees it as an imperialist monster that at times threatens their faith and existence; (5) they declare war on secular understandings and actions, and because of this sexual regulation is among their main programs; and (6) they tend to be radical (using violent means) in fighting for the values which they believe, especially in dealing with modernity and secularity which they judge to be deviant and destructive of faith.⁵⁸

Islamic Identity in the Public Sphere: A Threat to Democracy?

In the era of *Reformasi*, the various faces of Islam, from the cultural to the Islamist, the political and the jihadist, seem to push their

way into an increasingly democratic public sphere. In a democratic public sphere, not only do greater numbers of people or groups openly state their different ideas and interests, but religious and political authority is also more widely distributed to new actors outside the established structures of authority. The democratic public sphere is open and available not only to secular and religious aspirations, but it also constitutes a legitimate sphere for articulating the views and interests of religious groups with different political orientations. From this perspective we see Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), representing the cultural pole, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) representing polarized, radical Islamists making equal use of Indonesia's democratic public sphere.

The observations above accord with Hefner's thesis in his research on the relationship between Islam and democracy in Indonesia. Hefner proposes that rather than being monolithic, Islam's appearance in the Indonesia's public sphere is pluralist, as are politics in all civilizations.⁵⁹ According to Hefner, Islam itself is so rich in color and presents so many faces that no good, satisfactory or representative map can be made of it. Furthermore, he shows that Indonesian Islamic history provides the social capital for Islam's contribution to democratization. However, he shows that simultaneously it provides a weak point that can drive back efforts for democratization.⁶⁰

Indeed, the presence of Islam in the public sphere cannot necessarily be considered a threat to democracy itself.⁶¹ This is because Islam in general is not a relic of pre-modern history whose existence is limited only to private spaces, but a modern reality that rearticulates itself in line with globalization.⁶² Those who defend the public sphere articulation of religion oppose any denial of its public role, because such denial is contrary to the very values of democracy. More than that, for them the public sphere needs religion, because without religion it would be "naked" of morality and meaning in life.⁶³ In fact, according to José Casanova (1994), in many places the rise of religion in the public sphere is fully consistent with democracy and civic politics.⁶⁴

However, the problem lies not in whether Islam as a religion should be allowed or forbidden to enter the public sphere, because

human rights and the Constitution guarantee this. Rather, the problem is how religion should use the public sphere, so its presence does not threaten society's civic pluralism. Up to here the presence of religion in the public sphere can be perceived as a dilemma for democracy.⁶⁵ This is because the growth of intra- and inter-religious pluralism, with keen contestation in the public sphere, often sparks religious conflict. In short, can religion be present in the public sphere without threatening pluralism, democracy, and peace? These are questions that still hang over the people of democratic countries who observe the role of religion strengthening in social and political life.

Until now, Islamic proselytizing appears to show more a strengthening of culturally inclined societal piety. From this perspective, the phenomenon of Islamic-influenced Provincial Regulations can be seen more as the "Indonesianization of Islam" than "Islamization of the Law".⁶⁶ Signs of Islamic cultural reinforcement can also be seen in the tendency of the majority of Muslim leaders to accept the application of Islamic shariah, but at the same time to recognize Pancasila as the basis of the State of Indonesia.

However, as demonstrated by CSRC's study, the ideology of political Islam has had some influence on the perspective of Muslim activists, especially mosque managers.⁶⁷ In Jakarta, for example, 10-15 per cent of mosque activists hold radical Islamic views. This is a relatively small proportion, but these ideas have opportunities to grow and develop. Moreover, in the political sphere, the trend that leads towards the Islamization of public policy through Provincial Regulations has created concerns for guaranteeing women's and non-Muslim rights.⁶⁸

Main Issues and Research Methodology


This book aims to address and analyze at least three major issues. Firstly, the "what and how" of the construction of Islam in Indonesia's public sphere. This question covers how Islamic issues and symbols emerge in the public sphere and the media. Secondly, how dominant is Islamism in taking over the discourse and symbols of the public sphere, and how great is its influence on the Muslim public exposed to it? Thirdly, the extent to which the presence of Islam in today's public sphere affects the future of democracy in Indonesia.

To answer these questions, CSRC conducted research using a combination of two approaches. First, the research combined the approaches of sociology and Islamic studies. Second, in terms of information gathering methods, this research combined quantitative and qualitative tools. The quantitative approach used a public opinion survey, while qualitative data was obtained by a literature study and in-depth interviews. The qualitative dimension was intended to explore in-depth the epiphenomena revealed by the opinion survey.

The study was conducted in 10 Provinces, selected on the basis of stratification. The main two strata were predominantly Muslim provinces, and Provinces where the majority of the population is non-Muslim. This grouping was intended to obtain a picture of Islamic proselytizing in majority Muslim regions, compared with minority Muslim areas. This comparison was generally made by selecting 8 Muslim majority provinces and 2 Muslim minority Provinces. Muslim majority Provinces were determined as those having a greater than 60 per cent Muslim population. Conversely, a Muslim minority Province was determined as one in which fewer than 40 per cent of the population is Muslim. The two Muslim minority Provinces selected were Bali and North Sulawesi.

Consistent with the spirit of determining the research locations in this way, the 8 Muslim majority Provinces were subject to further stratification, by selecting Provinces with strong historical Islamic roots versus those without these roots. The presence of strong Islamic historical roots was traced from a Province's structural or cultural characteristics, as opposed to Provinces which have traditionally been melting pots. The Provinces of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, South Sulawesi and Banten have deep structural historical roots in powerful and victorious Islamic kingdoms, and were selected as research locations. Provinces in which cultural Islam is very strong are East Java and West Sumatra. North Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, and East Kalimantan were selected as melting pot Provinces.

The purpose of this research was to represent the opinions and attitudes of the Muslim population regarding the expression of Islam in the public sphere. Specifically, the survey represents the opinions and attitudes of adult Muslims. By law an adult is a person who is aged 17 years or older, or is married. The sampling framework was a



list of residents at the lowest level of government (the *Rukun Tetangga* or Neighbourhood Association). The principal unit of analysis of this survey was the individual, rather than family or institutional groups.

There were 1500 respondents in this survey. Because they were selected at random, the methodology allows statistical precision in the analysis of the results. With this number of samples, the margin of error for this survey is estimated at ± 2.3 per cent, at the 95 per cent confidence level. This can be interpreted as follows: If the number of respondents who agreed with a statement was 70 per cent, and if a similar survey was repeated 100 times, then for 95 of these times the result would be in the range of 67.4 per cent to 72.6 per cent.

The samples above were generally distributed proportionally according to the Muslim population of a Province. However, in specific cases adjustments were made in order to obtain a statistically significant number of samples for analysis. This occurred, for example, to obtain sufficient samples in parts of a Province where the Muslim population was in the minority.

Two main analysis methods were used to process the survey data. First, trend analysis of specific indicators. This analysis was done by comparing the relative proportions of two values. Second, comparative analysis was made between variables. This analysis was done by cross tabulating two variables. This method of analysis shows the status of a respondent in relation to more than one variable. In addition cluster analysis was used, and tests of correlation using Cramer's V. Because the questionnaires were distributed evenly in every Province, before the data was processed it was weighted proportionally, based on the Muslim population of the Province.

The Structural System of this Book

This book consists of five chapters. After the introduction in the first chapter, the most important part of this book, chapter II, presents the research findings. This chapter is divided into three sub-discussions. First, a description of the development and the role of Islam and the contestation between political and cultural Islam in Indonesia's post-Soeharto public sphere. Second, a description of the level of influence and public acceptance of Islam as put forward in the public sphere, and third, a discussion of the relationship between Islam in the public sphere and democracy. This sub-chapter mainly addresses the extent to which the promotion of Islamism in the public sphere affects the perceptions and attitudes of Muslims towards democracy in Indonesia.

Chapter III contains an analysis of the survey results described in chapter II. This analysis is focused more on unraveling the dynamism and contestation of Islam taking place in the public sphere. It discusses further how the face of Indonesian Islam in the public sphere today is determined by two main currents of Islam: Islamism which requires the translation of religious symbols and identity into a political agenda, and cultural Islam that tends to combine Islamic symbols and identity with other cultural, social and economic expression. Before this analysis is provided, this chapter first aims to explain how Islamic symbols have become increasingly prominent in the public sphere, and how they shape a religious discourse that shows both continuity and change in the public faces of Islam in Indonesia.

Chapter IV builds on and enriches the analysis presented in chapter III by discussing how the relationship between Islam and democracy determines the future of Indonesia as a nation. First this section explains the relationship between Islam and democracy. The next section contains further discussion of the support or rejection of democracy by Indonesia's Muslim community, and the reasons respondents gave for this. An important part of this section is an analysis of the ambiguous and inconsistent attitudes of respondents both for and against democracy, in relation to the implementation of democracy in Indonesia.

The final chapter, chapter V, contains the conclusions and recommendations, which are followed by a bibliography and appendices

including those on research methods, respondent profiles, and the questionnaire used.

Endnotes

¹ See F. Budhi Hardiman, *Demokrasi Deliberatif: Menimbang Negara Hukum dan Ruang Publik dalam Teori Diskursus Habermas* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009).

² Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 176.

³ M.C. Ricklefs, 'There is Deep Islamization,' interview in *Tempo*, no. 43/VII, 25 June-02 July 2007, pp. 22-25. Also contained in Asia Views, online, URL <http://www.asiaviews.org/?content=634ft600014545e&features=20070628040856>.

⁴ Robert W. Hefner, *Islam Pasar Keadilan: Artikulasi Lokal, Kapitalisme, dan Demokrasi* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000), pp. 96-97.

⁵ J. D. Biersdorfer, "Religion Finds Technology", *New York Times* (16 May 2002).

⁶ Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors (eds.), *Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 1.

⁷ Dougless Kellner, "Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention", at <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html/>.

⁸ Recently, as well as the word "Islamic", some scholars propose use of the word "Muslimness" to refer to Islamic or Muslim identity. For example, see Sonja van Wichelen, "Reconstructing Muslimness: New Bodies in Urban Indonesia", in Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan, *Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging*, ed. Cara Aitchison (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), pp. 93-108; Nida Kirmani, "Competing Constructions of "Muslim-ness" in the South Delhi Neighborhood of Zakir Nagar", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28/3 (2008): 355-370; Tahir Fuzile Sitoto, "Engaging Muslimness and the Making of African Muslim Identity", unpublished paper, 2008; <http://www.muslimnes.com/>; Jahane Rumi, "Shifting the Boundaries: Revisiting Islam and Muslimness", *The Third Frame*, 2/2 (2009).

⁹ Jahane Rumi, "Shifting the Boundaries: Revisiting Islam and Muslimness".

¹⁰ A Muslim social categorization long used by experts is an attempt to divide Indonesian Muslims into *santri* and *abangan*, as popularized by Clifford Geertz in his monumental book *The Religion of Java*. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976). Identification of such social groups, according to M.C. Ricklefs, has actually been around since the late 19th century, and is not a new phenomenon emerging in the mid-20th century. See M.C. Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society, Islamic and Other Visions (1830-1930)* (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2007), p. 100.

¹¹ Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society*, p. 100.

¹² For religion and political behavior, see Jeff Manza and Nathan Wright, "Religion and Political Behavior", in Michele Dillon (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Reli-*

gion, pp. 297-314; and for socio-religious movements see Rhys H. Williams, "Religious Social Movements in the Public Sphere: Organization, Ideology, and Activism", in Michele Dillon (ed.), *Handbook of Sociology of Religion*, pp. 315-330.

¹³ Rhys H. Williams, "Religious Social Movements in the Public Sphere: Organization, Ideology, and Activism", p. 315.

¹⁴ Bachtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara, Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998).

¹⁵ Wichelen, "Reconstructing Muslimness", pp. 93-108.

¹⁶ Greg Fealy and Sally While, "Introduction", in Greg Fealy and Sally While (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).

¹⁷ Abdurrahman Wahid, "Pribumisasi Islam", in Muntaha Ashari and Abd. Mun'im Saleh (eds.), *Islam Menatap Masa Depan* (Jakarta: P3M, 1989), pp. 81-96.

¹⁸ Munawir Sjadzali, "Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam", in Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima (ed.), *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panji Mas, 1988), pp. 1-11.

¹⁹ Enacting Law based on the public good that is not mentioned literally in the Qur'an or hadith. See A. Hanafi, *Ushul Fiqh* (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1989), pp. 144-145.

²⁰ Budi Munawar Rahman, "Dari Tahapan Moral ke Periode Sejarah; Pemikiran Neo-Modernisme Islam di Indonesia", *Ulumul Qur'an* 4/3 (1995): 4-29; see also Effendi, *Islam dan Negara*, pp. 125-179, and Abdul Azis Thaba, *Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orba* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 328-352.

²¹ Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syari'at Islam, Dari Indonesia Hingga Nigeria* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), p. 99.

²² See "Misi Nabi Muhammad Bukan Dirikan Negara Islam" and "Menolak Politik Formalisasi Syari'ah", at www.nu.or.id, *Panjimas* 376 (1982), and Agus Edi Santoso (ed.), *Tidak Ada Negara Islam, Surat-Surat Politik Moh. Roem* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997), pp. xxii-xxiii and 2.

²³ See www.muhammadiyah.or.id, accessed 13 August 2010.

²⁴ Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), pp. 86 and 241-254.

²⁵ Effendi, *Islam dan Negara*, pp. 52-53, 175-329 and Thaba, *Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orba*, pp. 278-328.

²⁶ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered" in *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 251.

²⁷ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered".

²⁸ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered".

²⁹ Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered".

³⁰ Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 17.

³¹ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 28-48.

³² Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*; Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 2.

³³ The concept of *jaahiliyya* holds the meaning of Muslim community in a state of ignorance, as in the pre-Islamic era. Islamists accuse today's Muslim community of being *jaahiliyya*. *Takfir* is the concept that sees a government not based on Islam as

infidel, and therefore able to be attacked.

³⁴ Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, pp. 28-48.

³⁵ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism", Middle East and North Africa Report No 37 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005).

³⁶ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

³⁷ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

³⁸ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

³⁹ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

⁴⁰ Imadadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2008).

⁴¹ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

⁴² Roy, *Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah*.

⁴³ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PSAP & AMBOOKS, 2007), p. 117.

⁴⁴ Roel Meijer, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2009), p. 3. (Most of the Companions of the Prophet died in the year 690 AD, and many of the second generation (*tabi'un*) who studied directly under the first generation died around 750 AD, while the third generation, *atba' al-tabi'in*, died around 810 AD.)

⁴⁵ Meijer, *Global Salafism Islam's New Religious Movement*.

⁴⁶ Azyumardi Azra, quoted from Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia*, p. 132.

⁴⁷ Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad*, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad*.

⁴⁹ Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad*, p. 48.

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, "ICG Backgrounder: Understanding Islamism".

⁵¹ Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, A Work of Comparative Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 74.

⁵² Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Between the Global and Local: Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute for International Policy and Australian National University. Global Politics. http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/analysis/20051101bubalo_fealy.htm, pp. 6-7.

⁵³ One of the indicators of violence in a radical group is the formation of a laskar, a form of paramilitary unit or militia. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) formed the Laskar FPI, tasked with applying physical pressure to directly eradicate immorality, such as by invading night entertainment venues, sweeping operations to find alleged offenders against morality, and demonstrations. See Al-Zastrouw Ng., *Gerakan Islam Simbolik: Politik Kepentingan FPI* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006), p. 95.

⁵⁴ Among the organizations usually considered as deviant by radical groups are Ahmadiyah, Syiah, Komunitas Eden (the spiritual congregation led by Lia Aminudin who claims to be the Imam Mahdi – the prophesied redeemer of Islam), Lembaga Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (LDII), usually called Islam Jamaah, and many more. For more details of these see *Aliran dan Paham Sesat di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2002).

⁵⁵ Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 158.

⁵⁶ See an interview with the MMI leader, Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Hadapi Kaum Sekular dengan Tegas", in *Suara Hidayatullah* 10/13(2001): 27.

⁵⁷ Statement by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as quoted in Andi Muawiyah Ramli (ed.), *Demi Ayat Tuhan: Upaya KPPSI Menegakkan Syariat Islam*, (Jakarta: OPSI, 2006), p. 387.

⁵⁸ See Martin E. Marty and R. Acott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalism Comprehended* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1995), Budhy Munawar-Rachman, *Islam Pluralis, Wacana Kesetaraan Kaum Beriman* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2004), pp. 589-593, Kasdi, "Fundamentalisme Islam TimurTengah: Akar Teologi, Kritik Wacana, dan Politisasi" in *Tashwirul Afkar: Jurnal Refleksi Pemikiran Keagamaan dan Kebudayaan*, No. 13 (2003); and Ribut Karyono, *Fundamentalisme dalam Kristen dan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Klika, 2003), p. xiii.

⁵⁹ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁶⁰ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*.

⁶¹ Marginalization of religion in the public sphere is a secular perspective which is biased against that public sphere. See Hent De Vries and Samuel Weber (eds.), *Religion and Media (Cultural Memory in the Present)* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

⁶² Meyer and Moors (eds.), *Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere*, p. 6.

⁶³ See, for example, Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1984).

⁶⁴ Robert W. Hefner, "Public Islam and Problem of Democratization" at <http://elibrary.bigchalk.com>, accessed 23 March 2010.

⁶⁵ See Ronald F. Thiemann, *Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007).

⁶⁶ Arskal Salim, "Islamising Indonesian laws? Legal and Political Dissonance in Indonesian Shari'a 1945- 2005", *Dissertation*, University of Melbourne, 2006.

⁶⁷ Ridwan al-Makassary et al., "Pemetaan Ideologi Masjid-Masjid di DKI Jakarta", *Report of Research Findings*, (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2009), pp. 105-117, 128-158.

⁶⁸ Sukron Kamil et al., *Syari'ah Islam dan HAM*, pp. 160-207.

CHAPTER II

Describing the Research Findings

The research data findings demonstrate an ongoing contest in Indonesia's public sphere between two articulations of Islam, namely an orientation towards political Islam (Islamism), and an orientation towards cultural Islam. These findings will be presented in three sub-chapters; the construction of Islam in the public sphere, the extent to which Islam in the public sphere is accepted by and influences the community, and finally the relationship between the expansion of Islam in the public sphere and democracy.

This chapter gives a descriptive account of the research findings, while analysis of these is presented in Chapters III and IV. The research findings in this chapter comprise survey results and are presented in the form of tables and graphs. Data resulting from interviews are not included here, but are directly incorporated to enrich the analysis in two subsequent chapters.

The Role of Islam in the Public Sphere and Contestation of Islamic Orientations

This section will discuss two elements of the construction of

Islam in the public sphere. Firstly, the issues marked as “Islamic” in the public sphere and the extent to which they receive community acceptance. Secondly, the media employed in the public sphere, specifically in relation to Islamic issues and interests.

1. Islamic Issues in Indonesia’s Public Sphere


As described earlier, the promotion of Islam in the public sphere is part of a deepening and broadening of public Islam, in which different Islamic persuasions compete to influence the public with their specific discourse. In this instance the public sphere can be classified as both virtual and real space. The public discourses of Islam are carried by a variety of mass media and promotional aids.

To examine Islam in the public sphere, this research first identifies the religious issues to which the Muslim public is most exposed through the mass media. This topic is essential to understanding the construction of Islam in the public sphere.

Three key issues are explored within the research. Firstly there are the fundamental religious issues such as the pillars of Islam, the pillars of faith and Islamic morals. The second related issue is the requirements or legitimate order of worship, from such things as religiously lawful (*halal*) or unlawful (*haram*) food, laws of inheritance, Islamic economics, to Islamic criminal law. And thirdly there are issues of an explicitly ideological/political nature such as divergent religious streams, enforcement of shariah law, and establishment of an Islamic State.

Of these three categories, people tend to be most exposed to fundamental religious issues such as the pillars of Islam and faith, and Islamic morals. For issues related to religious law, the most pervasive mass media covers issues of inheritance and marriage law, and questions of halal or haram. A substantial percentage of the public derives information about issues of Islamic economics or criminal law from the mass media. Compared with other ideological/political issues like application of shariah law and enforcement of an Islamic State, news and opinion about divergent religious traditions is the most prevalent form of this third category. Nearly 40 per cent of the community has obtained information about these last two issues from the mass media. (See Graph 1)

Graph 1
Knowledge and Understanding of Islam Obtained from
the Media (n = 1500)



This indicates that the ideological/political issues commonly promoted by Islamist groups rank fairly high, although still far below fundamental issues such as the pillars of Islam and faith.

2. The Media Used in the Expansion of Islam in the Public Sphere

The following table demonstrates the relative popularity of different media in the dissemination of Islamic discourses. Among these, three media forms give the greatest public exposure to Islamic issues; the loudspeakers of Islamic study groups in mosques, recitations in public spaces like parks, public streets and meeting places, and television broadcasts. The first two of these demonstrate the centrality of local communities in the spread of Islam and Islamic discourses. This is understandable, considering that the majority of Indonesians are still generally bound by communal ties. The high frequency with which issues of Islam are spread by television reflects

the fact that the majority of Indonesians regularly access this media. Islam in the public sphere is also spread through books, radio, newspapers, and street banners, while new media (the internet) is the least accessed.


Table 1
Media Used to Obtain Knowledge and
Understanding of Islam (n = 1500)

MEDIA	PERCENTAGE
Print Media	
Books	43%
Newspapers	41%
Magazines	24%
Leaflets	22%
Tabloids	13%
Bulletins	13%
Electronic Media	
TV	89%
Radio	42%
CDs	24%
Cassettes	19%
Internet	9%
Other Media	
Loudspeakers from mosques/religious study groups	94%
Recitations in public places	78%
Banners and billboards	36%
Discussions/Seminars/Talkshows	18%

Some media have the specific mission and objective of spreading Islamic values. Graph 2 (below) lists some instances of these, and the size of the community which accesses them. Generally speaking, in a national context fewer people access media which aim to spread the message of Islam. The daily newspaper *Republika* (13 per cent)

is the most accessed media in this category. Similarly magazines/ weeklies in the Islamist category such as *Sabili* and *Hidayatullah* are read by about 10 per cent of the community. This is almost the same as the number of readers of print media identified as tending towards a moderate character, such as *Harian Pelita* and *Suara Muhammadiyah*.

Graph 2
Islamic Print Media and its Influence (n = 1500)



The survey further explored how Islamic media consumers (above) made it a reference for their attitudes and opinions. The data show variation in the total readers using Islamic media as a reference. Approximately seven out of ten *Republika* readers said that this daily was a reference point for their attitudes and opinions, showing that *Republika* has a significant influence on its readership.


Something similar occurs with the Islamic media identified with Islamist characteristics, such as *Sabili*, *Hidayatullah*, *Annida*,

Tarbawi and *Ummi*. It appears that these Islamist media have a reasonable influence on their readers. The survey shows that between six and seven out of ten readers of this media make it a point of reference. The data suggest Islamic media are quite effective at disseminating their various messages.

In addition to the mass media, Islamic values can also be communicated through books and articles written by leading public figures to influence public opinions. To test this, the survey asked people which leading figures' books or articles they had read. Graph 3 shows that there are at least four public figures whose books are significantly read by the public, namely Abdurrahman Wahid (former General Chairman of the Board of NU and former President of Indonesia), Abdullah Gymnastiar (a well-known preacher), Nurcholish Madjid (a Muslim scholar) and Quraish Shihab (a Muslim scholar and preacher). These four writers are commonly identified as leaders of cultural Islam.

On the other hand, a number of Islamist leaders have published books and articles in various mass media. They include Adian Husaini, Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Irfan Awwas, and Ismail Yusanto. These leaders were also mentioned in the survey. However, very few people had ever read their works. At most one per cent of respondents claimed to have read a book or article by any of these Islamist leaders.

Graph 3
Books or Articles by Islamic Leaders and
Their Influence (n = 1500)



These leaders can be divided into three categories. Firstly, there are books and articles read by large audiences, with a high impact. Leaders in this category are Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdullah Gymnastiar and M. Quraish Shihab. Secondly, there are leaders whose books and articles are less widely read, but whose thinking is influential. Jalaluddin Rahmat, Abul A'la Al-Maududi, Syafi'i

Ma'arif, Sayyid Qutub, and Adian Husaini are in this category. At least half of their readers used them as a reference. Thirdly, there are those leaders whose books are little read, and whose influence with their readers is slight. This category includes Ismail Yusanto, Irfan Awwas and Hartono Ahmad Jaiz.


One conclusion from this data is that leaders categorized as moderate (cultural Islam) have a greater influence than those classified as Islamist. This supports the interpretation that moderate Islamic thinking still predominates in the public sphere.

A discussion of Islam in the public sphere would be incomplete without mentioning the impact of television. Television viewing in Indonesia has increased significantly in the past two decades especially after the government issued new television broadcasting licenses. Data from AC Nielsen surveys and other institutions show that nationally 90 per cent of the population watches television.


One current trend in television broadcasting, especially television targeting a broad audience, is stories about celebrities in the context of faith, including soap-opera stars, movie stars, and singers. This wave of celebrity shows includes features about celebrities who switch to wearing Muslim clothing. Shows are often aired about non-Muslim celebrities who convert to Islam. Apart from these two stories, programs often tell the story of a leader who defends Islam with single-minded devotion, or of successful businessmen and political leaders who are diligent in their religious devotions.

The survey attempted to identify which of these shows resonated most with the public. Graph 6 shows four topics about exemplary celebrities which often appear on television, namely famous people who have switched to wearing Muslim clothing, non-Muslims who have converted to Islam, prominent figures who steadfastly defend Islam, and other well-known people who are diligent in their religious practices. The first two of these are most often watched by the public. Shows of this type have been seen by at least two-thirds of respondents. However, the second two types are also frequently watched. At least one out of three people acknowledged watching a show about a leading person who resolutely defends Islam, or a famous person who worships diligently.

Graph 4
Media Reporting of Islamic Role-Models (n = 1500)



**The Influence of Media Reporting of
Islamic Role-Models (n = 1248)**




It is important to see whether this reporting of exemplary Islamic role-models has an effect. Half of the respondents said that they were pleased and proud and wanted to take them as role-models to further strengthen their faith, thus it can be said that shows on televi-

sion about famous people have significant results. On the other hand, a number of people expressed pride, however they saw shows about famous people as being normal and unexceptional, while about one third of respondents had no feelings about such shows. Only a very small number of respondents said that they did not like these shows because they were only seeking attention.


In addition to news about exemplary Islamic figures, television programming often includes entertainment or news programs flavored by Islam. The survey shows that viewers often watch such programs. Most people have seen Islamic songs on television, and soap opera with Islamic themes. Similarly, almost half of the respondents had seen a film about Islam on television. However few people had seen shows about the Muslim struggle in conflict areas like Ambon, Poso, and Palestine, which are usually distributed in the form of VCDs.

Graph 5

Islamic-flavored Media Programs (n = 1500)



Perceptions of Islamic-flavored Media Programs (n = 1367)



There are three possible responses to these shows; a negative response, a neutral response, or a positive response which may even inspire viewers. More than 80 per cent of respondents generally considered that art and cultural programs broaden perspectives or are entertainment. However, it is worth considering that 18 per cent of respondents said that art and culture programs inspired them in thought and action. On the other hand, only a few people rated art and culture programs as merely forms of propaganda.


As well as the mass media, books (especially novels), music and art have a role in disseminating Islamic values. The latest development seems to be an increase in the number and popularity of Islamic themed novels. Several of these have even been made into films, such as “The Verses of Love” (*Ayat Ayat Cinta*). In view of this, people were asked if they had ever read such a novel, and their opinion about it. The survey shows that about 23 per cent of respondents had read a novel with an Islamic theme. The data show that a relatively small but still significant proportion of respondents are open to Islamic influence through literature.

Other media identified as frequently used to spread the symbols, values, teachings, and understanding of Islam are outdoor media such as billboards, street banners, pamphlets, and stickers (especially on the back of car windows). This outdoor media is usually strategically positioned to be seen by a large number of people. Its content is


diverse, however most frequently it concerns invitations to make philanthropic alms donations, the specialness of Islam, and shariah law as the solution to the crises impacting Indonesia.

The survey asked respondents about the themes and teachings they had seen in this profusion of outdoor media. Graph 6 (below) shows that of the many symbols and promotions of Islam, those most seen by respondents were street banners inviting *zakat* alms contributions and making sacrifices. Almost the same number of respondents had often encountered themes using Arabic calligraphy from the Qur'an in public places. Outdoor media, such as promotional boards (small billboards) inscribed with the names of Allah (as a form of praise), was also significant. These boards are usually placed beside roads as one of a city or region's public decorations. The media least encountered by respondents was banners/billboards containing the message of shariah law as the solution. This theme is often voiced by Islamist groups. Although the numbers are small, when seen as a percentage they are significant, reaching 24 per cent. This shows that groups categorized as Islamist apparently make fairly intensive attempts to voice propaganda for the formalization of shariah law.

Graph 6
Islamic Symbols in Public Places (n = 1500)



Public Perceptions of Islamic Symbols in Public Places (n = 964)



The effect of placing symbols of Islamic teachings and propaganda in public places remains an important consideration. This survey shows that the public has a positive perception of outdoor media with these symbols. Most respondents (80 per cent) saw these symbols a beneficial in reminding them of and enjoining them to conduct Muslim practices. The number of people who viewed outdoor media negatively was very small. Only 8 per cent of respondents said that these symbols and propaganda had no benefit.


Another important media used in the expansion of Islam in the public sphere, protests or demonstrations, takes advantage of freedom of opinion. In the last few years at least four themes can be identified as those frequently voiced in public demonstrations, especially by Islamist groups. These are rejection of scantily clad public performers (minimal clothing which invites carnal passions); rejection of the publication of *Playboy* magazine, which generally displays minimally dressed women; support for the draft Anti-pornography and Pornographic Action Law; and rejection of the judicial review of the Blasphemy Law (Law No. 1/PNPS of 1965).

Of these four public protest themes, the survey shows that most respondents had seen public protests against shows in which the performers seemed to be naked. Two-thirds of respondents said they had witnessed these protests through the media. Positioned next came


protests against the publication of *Playboy* magazine, and rallies supporting the draft anti-pornography laws. Demonstrations on these issues attracted attention because they allegedly involved morality. Only 24 per cent of respondents had seen rallies about rejection of the judicial review of the Blasphemy Law.

Graph 7

Repondents Who Have Witnessed Demonstrations with Themes of Morality (n = 1500)



Repondents Who Have Witnessed Demonstrations with Themes of Islamic Religion (n = 1500)



It should be noted that 74 per cent of respondents expressed agreement with protests regarding the above issues, while only about 9 per cent disagreed. The remainder, 17 per cent, gave qualified statements.

In addition to the themes of morality and maintaining the purity of Islam, demonstrations/rallies with more politically sensitive themes, often voiced by Islamist groups, supported the enforcement of Islamic State or *khilafah Islamiyah*, and the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) forbidding secularism, pluralism, and liberalism and supporting the implementation of Islamic law by the State (see Graph 7).


The total percentages of these Islamist group issues are far lower than for the issues of morality cited above, and 40 per cent or fewer respondents had witnessed this type of demonstration. Although this number is less than half of all respondents who had seen a demonstration, the presence of Islamist groups in the public sphere voicing their views and agenda in the community is quite high. The Islamic-themed demonstrations most seen by respondents were those supporting the call for jihad in Palestine. Approximately 44 per cent of respondents had witnessed these.

Although many respondents had witnessed such rallies, few acknowledged taking part in them. The survey shows that only 5 per cent of respondents had been involved in raids (sweeping) on foreign nationals, nightclubs, Ahmadiyah, or rice stalls open in the daytime during Ramadan. Similarly, only about 6 per cent had been involved in actions to support the implementation of Islamic shariah by laws and regulations, and 5 per cent in actions supporting an Islamic caliphate or Islamic State.


Some parties also spread Islam in the public sphere by the enforcement of shariah or shariah inflected regulations. However, this is not widely publicized. Only 26 per cent of respondents knew of shariah or shariah inflected regulations.

Graph 8

Application of Provincial Shariah Regulations (n = 1500)



Type of Provincial Shariah Regulations (n = 421)




Of the many official regional regulations known by respondents, the most widely known were those related to banning prostitution, banning alcohol and gambling (both also regulated by the Criminal Code), as well as those related to Muslim dress. These two regulations were known by 15 per cent of respondents. After this were

regulations tending towards purely Islamic themes, such as the obligation to make philanthropic *zakat* donations (10 per cent), regulations for reading and writing the Qur'an (8 per cent), and regulations about improper behaviour (5 per cent), while the least known were regulations for Friday devotions (2 per cent).

Implicit in the above discussion is that contestation has occurred for control of the public sphere. The actors in this are cultural Muslims on one side, and Islamist groups on the other. It appears that cultural Muslims tend to dominate the use of mass media to promote Islam in the public sphere. One indication of this tendency is themes taken up in its media communications, namely faith (theological), religious practice and particularly *zakat* alms payments, and family law (marriage and inheritance). These are identified as the three main issues for cultural Muslims.

However, the presence and strength of Islamists cannot be underestimated. They are obviously in a "battle" to takeover the public space, using various themes and issues of concern. The figure of 30-40 per cent indicated in the exposure to publicity for various Islamist agendas is a very real sign. The Islamist groups have chosen specific issues, and are adept at packaging their contents in different media, explicitly and indirectly. Production of video compact discs (VCDs) or digital video discs (DVDs) about the suffering and struggle of Muslims in conflict areas is an astute effort to win public sympathy. They are able to play on emotions to seize opportunities to garner sympathy and empathy. The Islamists' only weak point is that the space they can use to communicate is restricted. They have not been able to break into media with a broad scope and influence, such as mainstream television.

Graph 9
Indicators of Islamist Groups' Strength in Islam of
the Public Sphere



Community Reception of Islam in the Public Sphere

The preceding discussion argues that through various forms of information and reporting, Islam in the public sphere has a strong influence on the community. This can be seen in the practice of ritual religious observances, styles of dressing, Islamic reading materials, and involvement in Islamic mass organizations. By these measures we can see the extent of Islam's influence in the public sphere, and the prevalence of Islamic issues in public media.

Islam's occupation of the public sphere clearly has implications for Muslim daily practices. One possible indicator is the observance of worship. In this respect the survey shows high levels of ritual piety (habits of worship) among Indonesian Muslims. Eight out of ten respondents stated that they pray five times daily. Worship like this is demanding because of its routine. More than 90 per cent of respondents fully and routinely fast during the month of Ramadan, 88 per cent of respondents routinely make *zakat* donations, and 11 per cent do so sometimes. People who did not make *zakat* alms payments normally came from among those who could not afford it, were unemployed, or were housewives or students.

Table 2
Muslim Ritual Piety (n = 1500)

Islamic Ritual	Yes, Always	Yes, Sometimes	No, Never
Pray Five Times Daily	78%	21%	1%
Fast at Ramadan	91%	9%	0.1%
Pay Zakat Alms	88%	11%	1%

Fasting during Ramadan and making *zakat* donations are the strongest of these three rituals. This is followed by prayer, where those who only pray sometimes is relatively high at 21%.

The tendency towards a more Islamic lifestyle appears not only in the rituals of worship, but also in the desire and inclination to read Islamic novels and watch Islamic soap opera. As noted above, the majority of respondents stated that had watched presentations of Islamic songs, and some of them said that they read Islamic novels or short stories.

Indicators of adherence to religious teachings can also be seen in the number of people participating in religious discussion groups and Islamic mass organizations. Religious discussion groups usually take place once a week, and nearly half the respondents take part in them. Almost the same number said that they were active in mass Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, or other similar organizations. This phenomenon can be interpreted to show that the depth of Islam goes beyond individual compliance, and has extended into wider social fields.

Table 3
Respondent Participation in Religious Discussion Groups and
Islamic Mass Organizations (n = 1500)

Participation in	Yes	No
Religious discussion groups	42%	58%
Mass islamic organizations (in management or as a member)	42.4%	57.6%

Deepening personal acceptance of Islam by Indonesian Muslims also appears in styles of dressing. Clothing becomes a mark of a person's Islamic identity, and may also show a strengthening of Islamism. This survey demonstrates that the percentage of women using a *jilbab* (Muslim headscarf) is quite high. Muslim clothing is not confined to specifically Islamic places, such as mosques and Islamic schools, but is also used in places and at events with no obvious religious associations.

The survey reveals that nearly all respondents said that their female family members wore a *jilbab* in public places. Of this number, 44 per cent said that all the female members of their family wore a *jilbab* in public places, and about the same number said that some of them did.

Table 4
Tendency to Use Muslim Clothing (*Jilbab*)

A. Do female members of your family wear a <i>jilbab</i> ?	
Yes, all of them	44%
Yes, some of them	46%
No	8%
B. Do female respondents use a <i>jilbab</i> in public places?	
Yes, always	58%
Yes, sometimes	34%
Never	8%
C. First use of a <i>jilbab</i>	
A long time ago	43%
Recently	57%
D. Reason for recently adopting <i>jilbab</i> wearing (multiple response)	
Influence of religious study	58.6%
Family pressure	35%
The surrounding environment	31.1%

Influence of friends	13.2%
Formal education	9.6%
Preaching in the mass media	5.1%
To comply with Provincial Regulations	2.7%

The survey particularly asked female respondents if they wore a jilbab in public places. Nearly all of them (92 per cent) answered 'yes' to this question. Of these, 58 per cent said that they always wore a jilbab in public, and 34 per cent said that they sometimes did. This represents large total numbers, and thus it is not surprising to find women everywhere wearing jilbabs.

Jilbab wearing by Muslim women has increased quite rapidly over the last decade. The survey shows that more than half the women who always or sometimes wear a jilbab say that they only recently started doing this. Less than half said that they had been using a jilbab for a long time. These findings show that there has been a rapid escalation in use of the jilbab by Muslim women. There are various reason and motivations for starting to wear a jilbab, among them encouragement from religious study activities (this was the highest), the surrounding environment, encouragement from friends, preaching on the mass media, and compliance with Provincial Regulations. Two things at least should be noted from these motivations. Firstly, the promotion of Islam in the public sphere contributes to women wearing Muslim clothing. Secondly, Provincial Regulations were identified as the motivation of a number of women to wear Muslim clothing in public places.

Islamist and Cultural Islam Orientations

This chapter presents a considerable amount of data concerning the phenomenon of Islam in the public sphere. This data can be seen as an indicator of the strength of the phenomenon and of its influence on the respondents. The hypothesis implicit in the survey is that its findings can show the Islamist or the cultural Islam orientation of each respondent, so that the strength and the influence of these two orientations can be understood and quantified. To provide this understanding, the survey identified the Islamic orientation of

Indonesia's Muslim community as reflected by the respondents.

This identification was made by using cluster analysis. This is a statistical method used to differentiate between the groups (or clusters) that exist within a population. The technique examines the data case by case to find relationships within the data set, and divides the data into two (or more) groups that have similar characteristics. By using cluster analysis, researchers can identify the size of each group, and how much the groups differ. In this survey identification using cluster analysis was made using three variables:

- Firstly, perceptions of the obligation for Muslim women to wear a chador.
- Secondly, perceptions of the movement to establish an Islamic caliphate or Islamic State in Indonesia.
- Thirdly, perceptions of the permissibility or otherwise of using violence in the struggle for Islam.

Three main indicators were used to characterize Islamism versus cultural Islam. A tendency to agree with the three indicators above was taken to mean that a person had Islamist tendencies. Conversely, a tendency to reject or disagree was understood as a cultural Islam tendency.

Cluster analysis of all respondents showed that the three indicators above gave significant results, so that they were suitable for use as distinguishing factors. Islamist or cultural Islam orientations could be statistically differentiated using these three variables. The categorization of Islamist and cultural Islam respondents can be seen by the average values for each indicator. Table 5 shows that the lower average values indicate that a person has Islamist tendencies. This is because the value given to their responses in the survey was most frequently 1 (mainly agree). On the other hand, higher average values show a tendency towards the cultural Muslim group, because this means the respondents did not agree with the indicators (shown by the value 2)

Cluster analysis of all respondents identified two groups with characteristics that are clearly different. The first group, whose members had lower values, is the Islamist group. The second group, which had higher values, is the cultural Muslim group. In Table 5 (below) the maximum value for each indicator is 2, and the minimum possible

value is 1.


Table 5
Islamist and Cultural Islam Characteristics

	Group	
	Islamist	Cultural Islam
Muslim women are obliged to wear a chador	1.33	1.88
The use of violence is permitted in the struggle for Islam	1.28	1.92
An Islamic caliphate/State should be established in Indonesia	1.04	1.77

As an example, in Table 5 above the average cultural Islam value for the issue of wearing a chador is 1.88, very close to the maximum possible value of 2. This means that the value of almost all respondents in this group was 2 (do not support the obligation to wear a chador). On the other hand, the average Islamist value on the issue of an Islamic Caliphate was 1.04. This means that the value of nearly all responses was 1, (support establishment of an Islamic Caliphate).

The cluster analysis also provides the number of members in the two groups, Islamist and cultural Islam. According to this analysis, the majority of respondents (80.1 per cent) have a cultural Islam orientation, while 19.9 per cent tended towards Islamism. On a national scale, the proportion of Islamists should not be seen as small, because it represents a fertile field for planting the seeds of Islamism, which include within them radical Islamist views (jihadist). This must certainly be seen as a threat to mainstream Islam in Indonesia, which until now is more widely known as moderate.

Graph 10
The Islamic Orientation of the Population (n = 1500)



The research further explored how many of the Islamist population actually practiced its ideologies. Three things came out of the survey, based on the three principal indicators above. Firstly, only about 5 per cent (of 19.9 per cent) acknowledged ever being involved in raids on night entertainment venues or people with divergent religious beliefs, such as Ahmadiyah and the like. Secondly, the same proportion of Islamist respondents acknowledged supporting an Islamic caliphate. Thirdly, about the same number (6 per cent) acknowledged ever being involved in direct action to impose shariah law.

From another perspective, to confirm the assumption that respondents categorized as cultural Islam tended to have moderate views, their views on several issues were explored. Table 6 below shows that cultural Islam oriented people are likely to permit non-Muslims to believe and practice the teachings of their religion, are more prepared to work with people of other faiths, have fewer problems with democracy as the national system, and almost all of them accept Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the State and the source of law in Indonesia.

Tabel 6
Cultural Islam Views of Religion and the Prevailing Political System

Views on Religion and the Political System	Yes	No
Allow non-Muslims to hold their beliefs and practice their faith	85%	15%
Work with non-Muslims in community affairs	91%	9%
Agree with the democracy currently embraced by Indonesia	87%	13%
Accept Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the nation and main source of law in Indonesia	96%	4%

The grouping of respondents as Islamist or cultural Islam was further used to analyze the correlation between factors relating to the promotion of Islam in the public sphere. This analysis was made to show if there was a difference between Islamists and cultural Islam in their attitudes to particular issues, and their experience as consumers of Islamic information in the public sphere.

The correlation analysis allows two conclusions. Firstly, the column showing Islamist answers was compared with the column of the Cultural Muslim group's answers in order to see if there was a relationship or correlation between them. Using the Pearson's V method showed a strong correlation between these two columns, with a value of 0.880 at a significance level of 0.01 (two tailed).

Table 7
Correlation of Responses between Islamist and
Cultural Islam Orientations

Issue	Islamist	Cultural Islam
Support Islamic regulations for marriage and inheritance	81.2%	63.6%
Support Islamic economics, such as sharia banking	63.1%	34.7%
Support Islamic criminal law	68.9%	38.4%

Support the establishment of an Islamic caliphate/State	61.9%	29.5%
Support the enforcement of sharia law through National laws and Provincial regulations	64.2%	32.6%
Reject streams of religious belief that are considered to diverge from Islam	74.2%	63.0%
Programs watched:		
Islamic soap opera	80.6%	72.6%
Islamic flims	62.8%	43.6%
VCD about the struggle for Islam	45.3%	22.6%
Have seen Islamic symbols:		
Islamic stickers	38.5%	26.2%
Banners or billboards about sharia law	37.1%	20.5%
Have seen public demonstrations:		
To reject the Judicial Review of Law No. No. 1/1965 (Blasphemy law)	35.2%	20.8%
To support the establishment of an Islamic caliphate	48.3%	25.0%
To impose sharia law	47.0%	21.9%
To call for jihad to Palestine, Afghanistan	51.8%	42.1%
To support the fatwa against secularism, pluralism and liberalism	38.1%	24.8%
Islamic Provincial Regulations		
Sharia influenced regulations exists where I live	41.3%	22.4%
Correlations		
Pearson correlation	.880	

Significant at the level of	0.01 (two tailed)
Mean (SD) Islamist	55.26% (SD 15.48)
Mean (SD) Cultural Muslim	35.55% (SD 16.51)
Mean difference	19.71%

The level of support and/or experience of the Islamist group for the indicator issues averaged 19.71 per cent higher than that of that cultural Muslim group. The greatest difference concerned establishment of an Islamic caliphate: The Islamist level of support was 61.9 per cent while only 29.5 per cent of the cultural Muslim group supported this idea (a difference of 32.4 per cent). On the other hand, the Islamist level of watching Islamic soap opera was 80.6 per cent, only 8.0 per cent higher than the equivalent cultural Muslim level of 72.6 per cent.

Secondly, closely connected with the mass media in the public sphere, Table 7 clearly and consistently shows that people with Islamist tendencies take more information about Islamic values from the mass media than the cultural Muslim group. The first conclusion is that the presentation of Islam in the public sphere tends to make the public more inclined towards Islamism. The second conclusion is that Islamists have a greater interest in watching or reading about Islamic values in the mass media, or other media in the public sphere.


The survey further examined if there was a comparative difference in the intensity of information received by people in different regions. The results of this analysis are useful to see if there is a connection between the strength of Islam in a region, and the intensity of information about Islam in the public sphere of that region. Using indicators such as marriage and inheritance regulations, Islamic economy, Islamic criminal law, and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, the survey found at least five regions in which the intensity of these issues is high. These five regions are Aceh, South Sulawesi, DKI Jakarta, Banten and West Sumatera. In these regions the public is more inclined to receive information about the above matters, compared with people of other regions.

One indicator, attitudes towards the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, can be used as an example. The survey shows that a high

proportion of people in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and DKI Jakarta are exposed to this information about this. The issue of an Islamic caliphate is an element of the Islamist groups' agenda. This is an example of how the Islamist group repeatedly tries to occupy the public sphere with interests which are in aligned with the characteristics of that region. Aceh is Province which has formally adopted shariah law. Shariah law applies in a number of areas of South Sulawesi, and the groups supporting an Islamic caliphate show considerable growth. DKI Jakarta is a melting pot, in which the disputation of ideas in the public sphere actively occurs.

Grafik 11

Level of Acceptance of Information from the Mass Media or Other Sources Concerning Establishment of an Islamic Caliphate or State
(n = 1500)




Islam in the Public Sphere and its Relation to Democracy

Since the year of *Reformasi* (1998), democracy has become an inseparable part of Indonesia's civic and national life. Despite this, within the body of the Muslim population the debate for and against democracy still continues. The public sphere has become the arena of debate and contestation between those for and against democracy. In order to examine how much those public sphere actors opposed to democracy influence the belief patterns of Indonesia's Muslim community, and to ascertain if Islam's expansion in the public sphere constitutes a threat to democracy, this research asked the public questions about democracy.

The first question asked was whether respondents agreed with the current practice of democracy in Indonesia. 87.1 per cent agreed with it, while only 12.9 per cent disagreed.

Graph 12


Muslim Community Attitudes Towards the Practice of Democracy in Indonesia (n = 1500)



On further examination, the Muslim population's rejection of democracy was greatest in Jakarta and South Sulawesi. Conversely, acceptance of democracy as practiced in Indonesia was highest in East Java and Aceh (see Graph 13). It is possible that the lower acceptance of democracy in Jakarta is related to its greater access to Islamist inflected information.


Graph 13

Levels of Acceptance and Rejection of the Democracy Practiced in Indonesia in 10 Provinces (n = 1500)



It is interesting to then examine if political Islam and cultural Islam oriented groups differ in their acceptance of democracy. The survey shows that there is no significant difference between these two groups (Graph 14). The majority of both groups supported the way democracy is currently practiced in Indonesia.

Graph 14
Attitude of Islamist and Cultural Muslim Groups towards
Democracy (n = 1500)



This survey explored why some Muslims in Indonesia reject democracy, and found three strongly held reasons. Firstly, there was a view that democracy has spawned the practice of money politics, leading to the proliferation of corruption that plagues Indonesia. Secondly, democracy has not succeeded in bringing peace and harmony, but rather has produced unrest and strife. Thirdly, there is a rejection of democracy on theological grounds. In this last case democracy is seen as not consistent with Islam. These findings indicate that most of the reasons for rejecting democracy in Indonesia were not based on political ideology (see Table 8).

Although this rejection is not for Islamist ideological reasons, the ideological factor needs to be watched carefully. There remains a suspicion that it has the potential to grow if those who oppose democracy make increased efforts to promote Islam in the public sphere. This would certainly impact the healthy progress of democratic practices in Indonesia.

Table 8

Reasons for Non-acceptance of Democracy (*Multiple Responses*)
(n = 1500)

Reason	Percentage
Produces money politics and fosters corruption	38.4%
Produces unrest and strife	35.0%
Not consistent with Islamic teachings	28.3%
Democracy comes from the West	8.7%
Other	10.4%


For the present context, it can be concluded that Indonesian Muslims do not generally have great concerns about democracy. However this acceptance of democracy is not accompanied by comprehension of the substance of democracy itself. Many people still cannot distinguish between symmetrical and asymmetrical democracy, the latter holding the view that the government can participate in and regulate the correctness or otherwise of the religious understandings of any particular group. Graph 15 shows that a large part of the Muslim community in fact agrees that the State can participate in and regulate the religious beliefs held by the people.

This perspective accepts that the State can judge a particular religious stream as either legitimate or divergent (heretical), hence the State has the right to outlaw its existence in Indonesia. It follows that the majority agrees with discriminatory/unjust action by the State, either directly or indirectly, against the followers of any particular minority religion. This is, of course, not consistent with democracy's concepts of *majority rule*, *minority rights*. Granting this authority to the State seems to be influenced by perceptions of absolute truth related to religious conviction. However at least one-third of the community believes that the State does not have the right to regulate the public's religious beliefs, either individually or in collectivities.


In parallel with the above findings, the same graph shows that the Muslim public also believes that religious values can be made the source of official regulations, for example, formalization of shariah as National Laws or Provincial Regulations. Overall, six out of ten people

agreed with this.

Graph 15
Government Participation Regulating
Certain Religious Doctrines (n = 1500)



Graph 15
Religious Values can be Made the Source of
Official Regulations (n = 1500)




This analysis shows that differences in tendencies exist between Islamist and Cultural Muslim groups regarding the formalization of

shariah law. The majority of the Islamist group wants the formalization of shariah law in national and local regulations. On the other hand, most of the Cultural Muslim group rejects this (see Graph 16). This finding echoes earlier findings that the Islamist group has a strong desire to apply shariah law through National Laws and Provincial Regulations.

Graph 16

Agreement that Religious Values should be the Source of Official Regulation – Political Islam and Cultural Islam (n = 1500)




Agreement that religious values should be a source of official government regulations differs by region. The Aceh respondents agreed most strongly with this concept, while the second strongest agreement was in Banten. In these regions the majority of Muslims agreed with the enactment of religious values as official regulations. These two Provinces are currently recognized as Provinces which do in fact impose shariah law, and their Muslim communities may consider this as being quite effective.

On the other hand, the highest rejection of formalizing shariah law came from the Muslim community of Bali, however this rejection is not exceptional considering that Muslims are a minority in Bali, and

so there is no possibility of this happening. Something quite interesting is apparent in South Sulawesi, where many Districts have implemented shariah law and many groups have initiated Islamic shariah themselves. However this Province's rejection of religious values as a source of official State regulations is very high. We may suspect that this is because of awareness by South Sulawesi Muslims that the existing Islamic-influenced regulations, which were campaigned for by a number of Islamist groups, have not had a positive impact on their economic and social life.

Graph 17


Level of Agreement that Religious Values should be Made



In theory, the question of making religious values into official regulations is not in complete conflict with democracy, as long as it fulfills at least three conditions. Firstly, regulations must satisfy the

element of justice for all parties. Secondly, they should take into account the diversity of religious and cultural differences. Thirdly, they must be debated by the various parties. People who agreed with the formalization of religious values as regulations were asked questions about these three conditions. The majority agreed with them, meaning that the majority of the respondents understand that proposed Islamic-influenced regulations must first go through public review to assess whether they are appropriate and needed, whether they are just, and that they do not discriminate against any religion or culture. The intent is that no party should feel aggrieved if the draft regulation is declared as an official regulation.

Graph 18
Conditions for Ratifying a Draft Provincial Regulation (n = 1500)




Based on these Muslim community perceptions, it can be concluded that the expansion of Islam in the public sphere does not pose a serious challenge to democracy. As well as being measured by perceptions, the influence of Islam on democracy is also measured by the Muslim community's practice of, and involvement in, democracy. Respondents were asked about their involvement in various community and civic activities. The findings were very positive that almost all of them participated in public elections, both at national and district levels, and took part in local community activities such as In-

dependence Day celebrations (17 August) and other neighborhood activities (see Graph 19).

However, the fact of their participation contrasts with their involvement in critically examining and debating regulations at the level of National Law, Provincial Regulations or village regulations, either through meetings, discussion or demonstrations. Only two out of ten respondents said they had ever been involved in such activities. This indicates that democracy as a part of society's political culture has not been developed effectively, at least in terms of personal participation in the legislative process. Culturally, real democracy is democratization which continuously evolves. This process will be enhanced in tandem with improvements in areas such as education.


Graph 19
Participation in Various Activities (n = 1500)



Experts (such as Freedom House, among others) agree that with Pancasila and the amended 1945 Constitution, Indonesia is a democratic State. Thus this research asked the views of respondents about Pancasila as the foundation of the nation, and the 1945 Constitution as the principal source of law. The results of the survey show that almost all respondents, both those identified within political and cultural Islam, accept Pancasila as the foundation of the nation and


the 1945 Constitution as the principal source of law in Indonesia. Very few people rejected these (see Graph 20). Almost the same number of people rejected Pancasila as rejected democracy.

Graph 20
Acceptance of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (n = 1500)



In the matter of tolerance, the survey shows that the Indonesia's Muslim community practices high levels of tolerance. This conclusion is drawn from three indicators shown in Graph 21. Firstly, almost all respondents respect people with different opinions from theirs. Secondly, about the same number of people respect those who are active in different organizations. Thirdly, almost the entire population stated that they themselves had supported other people to be free of fear or threat. Thus, it can be said that only a small part of the Muslim community does not have a tolerant attitude.

Graph 21
The Practice of Tolerance (n = 1500)



CHAPTER III

The Dynamism and Contestation of Islam in the Public Sphere

This chapter analyzes the findings of the data in Chapter II. It focuses on the dynamism and competition between various streams of Islam. Islamism, which demands interpretation of religious symbols and identity within a political agenda to change the structure of the State and its population, is not the only stream to develop and proliferate in Indonesia's public sphere. Outside the secular stream which carries the banner of Islamic liberalism, a cultural Islamic stream has also grown, which leans towards a creative synthesis of religious symbols and identity with, for example, expressions of culture and of social and economic status. This competitive dynamic determines the face and construction of Islam in the public sphere. But first of all, it is important to look at how Islamic symbols are becoming more prominent in the public sphere, and how they shape a religious discourse that shows both continuities and changes in the manifestations of Islam in Indonesia.

The Formation of the Discourse of Islam in the Public Sphere

Islam is built on a system of convictions (pillars of faith) and of ritual (pillars of Islam). Both constitute Islam's core teachings, known as *akidah* (faith) and *ibadah* (worship). In addition to these, Islam recognizes other principal teachings that regulate family law (marriage and inheritance) and human social relations (*mu'amalah*), such as trade and financial transactions. Islam also regulates matters of criminality (*jinayah/pidana*) and jihad.

In relation to public life, Islamic teachings have a bearing on political norms, both from the perspective of constitutional matters and in the ethics of authority. Apart from these aspects, Islam gives serious attention to cultural matters, particularly those formulated in ethical codes relating to matters of dress, eating, and drinking.

The various teachings of Islam are not only taught and practiced in homes, schools and mosques, but its symbols also have a prominent place in the public sphere. Through Islamic study sessions broadcast through mosque loudspeakers, as well as by the mass media including television, radio, tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, magazines, leaflets, books, and even banners, billboards and stickers, Islamic symbols come into the public sphere and influence the dynamics of the public's religious discourse and practice. However it should be noted that these aspects of Islamic teachings are differentially accepted by the Muslim public.

As expected, the influence of Islam penetrates most strongly in matters of faith, worship, ethics and family law. Almost all Muslims claim to gain a deepening in their religious understandings through the media, which then influences their religious and social identity and expression. Despite this, it is important to underline that the extent of media influence on family law (marriage and inheritance) was slightly lower, at 67 per cent, than its influence on matters of faith and worship. Islamic influences also penetrate social and economic matters (*mu'amalah*), however not as deeply as in the three matters noted above. This is shown by the data, in which 44 per cent of the Muslim public obtains information about Islamic criminal law from the media, and 40 per cent about Islamic economics. The Islamic influence is weakest in political matters. Only about one third of Indonesia's Muslim

public obtained information from the media about the application of sharia law by the State (38 per cent) and the formation of an Islamic State (36 per cent).

Based on this data, it is evident that in post-Soeharto Indonesia, the penetration of Islamic influences in the public sphere is both dynamic and varied. This differs from the New Order period, in which Islam as articulated in the public sphere was mainly directed by the State. In this period, Islamic family law developed as the result of implementing the Compilation of Islamic law (*KHI – Kompilasi Hukum Islam*) by Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991. Towards the end of the New Order, institutionalization of Islamic economics also developed through the establishment of the Bank Mu'amat Indonesia. This bank began operating on 1 May 1992. However Islam's entry into political issues was inhibited by the policy of a Single Principal (*Asas Tunggal*). This policy only began to change towards the end of the Soeharto regime's rule, which marked the public sphere's deepening interpenetration with Islam.

The issue of implementing sharia law saw a very clear resurgence during the time of *Reformasi* followed by calls for the establishment of an Islamic State, associated with changes in the direction of State policies towards Islam which emerged at the end of Soeharto's era.

1. Faith and Ritual

The fact that issues of faith and ritual occupy the greater part of the discourse of Islam in the public sphere can be explained by the fact that Muslims themselves generally see these two tenets of religion as extremely significant indicators of the expression of their Islamic faith. Muslim religious expression in the public sphere regarding both these dimensions also attracts the least rejection from non-Muslims. This pattern can be seen both in areas where Muslims are in the minority, such as Bali, or are the majority, such as in Padang. A Muslim leader in Bali, H. Musta'in, acknowledged that there were no significant difficulties in proselytizing about matters of faith, because this is associated with devotion to God which is the common interest of all religious communities.¹ The call to prayer through loudspeakers is also allowed by the people and Government of Bali. Naturally an

exception is made during the celebration of Nyepi. Similarly in Padang an MUI chairman said that proselytizing in the public sphere mainly concerned matters of faith, as well as issues of religious morality. These two issues have always been an important part of the Muslim community's religious identity and expression.²

2. Morality and Social Ethics

In addition to issues of faith and worship, the expansion of Islamic influence in the public sphere also concerns Islamic morals, especially the ethics of dress. This is reinforced by the tendency of the majority of celebrities to wear Islamic dress. Moreover, issues of morality are a topic which receives wide media attention. Muslim concerns about morality also influence the rejection by many groups of musical performances where the singer wears skimpy clothing deemed to be incompatible with Islamic morality (63 per cent of respondents opposed this). They were also convinced about rejecting *Playboy* magazine (48 per cent), while voicing support for the ratification of the draft Anti-Pornography Law (44 per cent).

The trend for women to wear the jilbab has increased in almost all parts of Indonesia, both those steeped in Islamic culture like Padang and Makassar, and those which are not. This phenomenon raises the question of whether the jilbab is an expression of religion, or just part of a look and a lifestyle which has developed in the context of an Islamic popular culture. Whatever the conclusion, the most popular jilbabs are the ones which are trendy and fashionable. Although they are rejected in some circles because they are seen as incompatible with Islamic law, trendy jilbabs are being worn more and more. Rejection of them has gradually faded away with the flood of trendy jilbab products being offered in the marketplace.³

A Nahdatul Ulama leader in Makassar, Dr. KH. Baharuddin, has observed a significant change in the popularity of jilbabs with female Muslims. He sees this as an indication of an increased religious awareness, but does not discount that this has also developed in response to changes in community life.⁴ Taufik Pasiak, an academic from North Sulawesi, agrees with this explanation. He said that the strengthening of Islamic symbols in the public sphere of North Sulawesi is occurring more in the context of lifestyle.⁵

The trend of wearing a jilbab also occurs among the Muslim community in Bali. Although initially some schools did not allow female students to wear jilbabs, now there is no obstacle to this. H. Musta'in, Chairman for Islamic Guidance in the Bali Department of Religion, believes that the appearance of jilbabs is more in the context of lifestyle rather than religious identity. In evidence of this, the jilbab wearers generally do not completely cover their upper chests.⁶

The popularity of the jilbab, however is becoming even more prominent in regions where shariah-influenced Provincial Regulations are in force, especially those which regulate Muslim clothing. In some regions which apply such regulations, such as Serang, Aceh, Padang, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Indramayu, there has been a massive increase in jilbab wearing, which has virtually become mandatory and results in social sanctions for offenders.⁷

3. Family Law, Economics and Criminal Matters

The penetration of Islam's influence in the public sphere is also taking place in relation to the growing observance of Islamic teachings about family law, human social relations, and criminal matters. The most significant of these is in arrangements for marriage. This is not surprising, considering that marriage is an important part of the teachings and traditions of Islam, as an element of sacred worship. According to one interviewee, issues of marriage are a major community concern. Muslims often come to ask religious leaders and clerics about this. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) chairman in Padang, for example, said that an increasing number of consultations with Muslims about religious matters were related to issues of fostering family harmony. Presumably this is related to modernity and social problems, which often disturb the harmony of the family. Another respondent, a print media manager, said that 70 per cent of the questions to the editor for religious consultation are about harmony in the family, especially marital relationships.⁸

The Islamic influence also penetrates Muslim Indonesia in economic issues and matters of criminal law. About 40 per cent of respondents were familiar with various aspects of Islamic economics and law. This is to be expected, considering that the discourse of Islamic economics has been promoted heavily since the time of the

New Order. The trigger was the release of several new legislative instruments regulating issues of Islamic banking. Law No. 7 of 1992 enabled the operation of banks applying a profit and loss sharing system based on shariah law. Law No. 10 of 1998 gave direction to conventional banks to open shariah branches, or even convert themselves into wholly shariah banks. Shariah law was similar. Caning, stoning, the cutting off of hands and other criminal sanctions called *hudud* are increasingly popular in public discourse, appearing more frequently with respect to post-Soeharto changes in Indonesia's legal policies.

Examples of these are the special treatment given to Aceh in Law No. 44 of 1999 (articles 3 and 4) concerning Implementation of Special Privileges; Law No. 18 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Aceh; and Law No. 11 of 2006 concerning the Governance of Aceh. Islamization of the law in this Province has occurred through Regulations enacted in the context of Aceh's special autonomy. Firstly, Qanun No. 13 of 2003 contains prohibitions on gambling (*maisir*). Offenders are liable to a minimum of six strokes of the cane and a maximum of twelve. Institutional offenders are liable to a fine of from 12 to 35 million rupiah. Secondly, Qanun No. 14 of 2003 prohibits immoral acts (*khalwat*). Offenders can be caned from three to nine times or fined from 2.5 to 10 million rupiah. Thirdly, Qanun No. 12 of 2003 prohibits alcoholic drinks, and offenders are liable to 40 strokes of the cane, in accordance with traditional shariah law.⁹

4. Politics

The upsurge in rallies supporting the implementation of an Islamic caliphate and demanding implementation of shariah law in a particular time frame has attracted considerable attention from the mass media, particularly television. Despite this, only a few Muslims have seen such television programs. Thirty per cent of respondents had seen programs about an Islamic caliphate, and 27 per cent about implementing shariah law.

Several interim reasons can be proposed to explain this phenomenon. In the political arena itself ideas of establishing an Islamic State or codifying shariah law have been resisted in party political circles, especially those of nationalist and moderate inclinations. For

example, the Golkar Party's rejection of the necessity of an Islamic State, which was expressed by the East Kalimantan Golkar chairman, Dahri Yasin. He did not agree that Islam should enter the public sphere in the form of Provincial Regulations, because the heterogeneous composition of the East Kalimantan population meant that it would not be of positive value to himself or his party. The party's constituents might leave it.¹⁰

Another factor is the appearance of all kinds of Islamic symbols in the political arena, more stemming from political rather than religious motives. In the assessment of Dr. Faris Pari, a leader in Jakarta, the penetration of Islam in the political field is merely for political consumption, in the interests of a handful of people. There is no genuine movement supporting this.¹¹ In fact Dr. Mohd. Sabri AR, a Muslim leader in Makassar, described the emergent symptoms of shariah-nuanced Provincial Regulations as an outburst that only "creates turmoil" for the promotion of Islam, in a more genuine field of culture. He recognizes these symptoms as a sort of political binding agent that will only last as long as the political authority that supports it. He believes that the case in the Bulukumba Regency, for example, is the most recent example illustrating this phenomenon. Immediately after the term of office of Bulukumba Governor Patabai Pabokori – a central figure behind the region's Provincial shariah regulations – the local population rapidly "returned" to the cultural "populist Islam" model.¹²

In Aceh the same view was offered by an intellectual leader in Biruen, Khairuddin Nur. For him the emergence of codified shariah law in a number of areas, especially Biruen and Aceh generally, is a movement or camouflage by the local political elite to divert public attention from economic and other social welfare woes. Thus the energies and attention of the public will be distracted from the failures of the regional political elite in managing social issues, the economy and political matters, and even the corruption they engage in. Rather, they are directed towards historical romanticism and positive sentiments towards the shariah of Islam.¹³ Tangerang City Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning prostitution, although capable of lowering the level of prostitution, was politically loaded. This regulation gave increased political weight of the Mayor, Wahidin Halim, so that in the Provincial

elections the only contest was at the level of Deputy Mayor.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the obvious presence of Islamic symbols in the political arena, although attracting little public support, gains the sympathy of Muslim clerics, leaders of Islamic mass organizations, and some political figures. Thus, although their numbers are small, their voices echo loudly. An East Java Muslim leader, Masdar Hilmy, recognizes this, and sees the minority Islamic mass organizations, apart from NU and Muhammadiyah, as playing an important role in Islamic involvement in the field of politics.¹⁵ According to Ali Machsana Musa, an NU leader in East Java, these minority groups make much use of the print media to promote their ideas, such as by their continued production of weekly bulletins in mosques.¹⁶

A Samarinda *ulama* (religious scholar), KH. Fahrudin Wahab, who supports the appearance of Islamic symbols in the political arena, said:

...every individual must proselytize Islam in whatever way... and non-Muslim groups living in larger Muslim communities are called protected non-Muslims (*kafir dzimmi*). They should not be offended by things like this. In the event that shariah law is enforced, these *kafir dzimmi* must participate in implementing them. For example, speaking about Islamic criminal law (*hudud*), if *kafir dzimmi* offend against it they must be subject to such laws as well.¹⁷

Muh. Ikbāl Djalil, a PKS politician in Makassar, also seems to support implementation of Provincial Regulations governing liquor consumption in Bulukumba. He stated that this Regulation had a positive effect on the people. If there was anyone who felt disturbed by it, this was because they felt they were incurring losses because of the Regulation.¹⁸ Support in the same vein was given by Prof. Dr. H. Suparman (Deputy Chairman of MUI, in Serang).

“I agree that shariah law should be codified, as long as this is in line with national unity and within Indonesia’s legal framework. If we say that the Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI) is formal, then religious courts are formal. Therefore if someone says that it shouldn’t be made formal,

the substance is enough... so the reality is already there and they are not prohibited. Because, Muslims are required to implement shariah law. Only, its implementation should not conflict with the principles of the Unitary Indonesian State. If the government has given the impression of obstructing it, perhaps the government is backtracking, because the Dutch Government itself accommodated the forming of religious courts.”¹⁹

5. The Role of the Media

The preceding chapter proposed that this survey showed the central role of the media in representing the face of Islam in the public sphere. The greatest role is played by television (89 per cent). This number is almost the same as that of religious studies broadcast on mosque loudspeakers (94 per cent). Print media such as books and newspapers were only used by 43 per cent and 41 per cent respectively, not very different from radio which was used by 42 per cent. Outdoor media, like banners and billboards, were used by 36 per cent. One media utilized, but only by small numbers of people, was the internet (9 per cent). Spreading the influence of Islam also occurs through seminars, discussions, and public demonstrations (18 per cent).

The size of television's role in spreading the influence of Islam in the public sphere is reinforced by the strength of Muslim interest in the performance of Islamic songs (77 per cent) and Islamic soap opera (75 per cent). These numbers are very high compared to the role of the print media, for instance Islamic books and novels (23 per cent). The magnitude of television's role cannot be separated from the people's visual culture, which is much stronger than their culture of reading. On the other hand, the trend towards using electronic media such as television is a contemporary global phenomenon. Meyer and Moors said that religion today has been able to “discover technology” (media), and that it uses this in its efforts to offer the public alternative views, convictions, and identities.²⁰

The low impact of the print media in shaping the discourse of Islam in the public sphere was also recognized by a journalist from the leading national daily *Kompas*. He attributed this to the print media's

low market penetration, which is limited to urban dwellers who have the requisite basic knowledge and adequate education.²¹ At the same time, television media reaches almost all of the population, both in urban and rural areas.

Nevertheless, the question arises of how much the promotion of Islam in the media affects public levels of political orientation. Some see that the media plays an important role in shaping a Muslim's Islamic identity. KH. Arifin Asegaf, an ulama in Manado, concurs with this. According to him, the media functions to encourage the emergence of Islamic identity in the public sphere.²² A sociologist from Padang shares this opinion. He believes that the influence of Islam's presence on television is limited to Islamic identity, and is not of an ideological nature. This is related to the interests of media such as television, which give priority to commercial gain. Because of this, programs which proselytize Islam are packaged as light, non-ideological entertainment. To this extent the Islam appearing in the mass media is hybrid, combining Islamic symbols with pop culture.

The tendency to avoid religious reporting from an ideological or political perspective is stronger in regions where Islam is in the minority, such as Bali. Marketable issues are those related to aspects of Islam that suit the daily needs of the Province's Muslim readers. Apart from safeguarding security and encouraging growth in the tourist economy, highlighting Islam's cultural elements creates feelings of security and comfort among the people, especially after the trauma of the first and second Bali bombings.²³

The Dynamics of Islamic Competition in the Public Sphere

As seen above, the face of Islam appearing in Indonesia's public sphere is not singular, but rather diverse. To different extents, various aspects of Islam influence its public face. The depth of influence of each of these is determined by the long struggles of Islamic doctrine in the historical development of Indonesian society. This pattern changed slightly when the mass media started to grow and accelerate the spread of Islamic influences in the public sphere. However this did not always have great political significance, because the Islamic symbols which increasingly entered the public sphere were adapted to fit the interests of the community, and these were also

changing. A dynamic negotiation ensued, hand in hand with improved education, social mobility, and society's aspirations.

The negotiation process involves actors who can be categorized into two large groups, as shown in the preceding sections. The first of these is the group oriented towards cultural Islam, which is always prepared to negotiate Islam through Muslim subjectivity and changing identities. The second group comprises those with an Islamist orientation. They prioritize the political dimensions of Islam, and dream of seeing society and even the State growing to be more and more Islamic. In this contestation the cultural Muslim group still appears to dominate the formation of Indonesia's religious discourse. Islamists have only managed to annexe 30 – 40 per cent of the public sphere by bringing up issues such as shariah as the solution to the crises suffered by Indonesia.

The contestation between these two religious streams became more dynamic with the involvement of progressive-moderate Muslims who joined with the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). On the home page of its website, JIL promotes a progressive view of pluralism with a free translation which modifies the *basmalah*, the opening words of the Koran recited several times in daily prayers. The original reads "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful", which is modified to become "In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful, and God of all religions."²⁴

In 2000 – 2006, the JIL, at the request of Goenawan Muhammad, was given much space to present its liberal Islamic views in the daily *Jawa Pos*. In 2007, cooperation between JIL and the *Jawa Pos* was discontinued because, according to the editor of this daily, Ulil Abshar Abdallah's successors were seen as less mature in their approach, and their writings upset readers. Apart from this, the break was apparently influenced by Friday sermons in many East Java mosques which discredited JIL and the *Jawa Pos*.²⁵

The question is why, compared with Liberal Islam, Islamists have developed more room to move and influence, so that they can now be said to have annexed 30 – 40 per cent of the discourse of Islam in Indonesia's public sphere. An interview with the chairman of Bali's MUI revealed that opposition to liberal Islam was in fact very strong in the National Congress held on 28 July 2005, which produced

a fatwa making liberalism, pluralism, and secularism Islamically unlawful (*haram*). Liberalism is understood by the MUI as readings of the religious texts (the Koran and the Sunnah) which use reasoning and free thinking, and which only accept those doctrines which fit rational thinking.²⁶ The strongest opposition to JIL, according to this source, came from East Java. This was related to the cooperation between the *Jawa Pos* and JIL mentioned above. Echoes of the opposition to JIL were felt as far away as Bali. As a result, mosques in Bali took the initiative to print a book about the evils of JIL's Islamic liberalism.

However, as mentioned above, opposition to JIL does not indicate the victory and domination of the Islamists in influencing the discourse of Islam in Indonesia's public sphere. Most Indonesians are little affected by the Islamist discourse, but rather by the everyday issues raised by cultural Islam groupings. For example, they are very appreciative of Islamic music, soap opera and film shows, and demonstrations on issues of morality, ritual worship, and codes of dress. It can indeed be said that these cultural Islam issues have brought a deepening, broadening, and strengthening of Islamic identity at individual and social levels. What stands out most in this is a heightened observance of the rituals of Islam (worship), with numbers reaching 99 per cent, and wearing the jilbab which reaches 92 per cent. These indications seem to represent new developments in Muslim religious expression in Indonesia, as half of all female respondents said that they had only started wearing a jilbab in the last five years. As well as jilbabs and ritual, there has been significant growth in social religious dimensions, such as activities in socio-religious institutions, to choices of food, the economic system, and even in politics.

The findings of this research are not unique. If dimensions of religiosity are used as a measure, Stark, Glock, and Hassan's work says that a deepening of Islamic influences in the ritual dimension has already reached its highest point in Muslim communities in various regions of the world.²⁷ There are a number of explanations for the heightened Islamic influence in Indonesia's post-Soeharto public sphere. Firstly, there is the socio-political context after the fall of the New Order. At this time the spirit of *Reformasi* opened social and political valves, which included giving people the freedom of expres-

sion in cultural, economic and political areas. In the first two decades after the New Order rule, the government emphasized freedom of expression in religious matters. Public morality was shaped by the State's secular ideology. In tandem with a free market, the spread of Islam's influence was made possible by what has been called the commodification of religion. This "commodification" implies a shift by which things relating to Islam were assigned an economic value, and could be 'sold' to the public for economic profit.

The booming phenomena of shariah banking, clothing like loose Islamic garments and the jilbab, Islamic medicines, and Islamic soap opera and novels are among the indications of the ongoing commodification of Islam.²⁸ When there is economic potential to sell Islamic-inflected issues and commodities, the market is quick to turn Islam into a profitable commodity. This commodification not only occurs in relation to the market, but also penetrates social and political fields. For example, in order to obtain wide electoral support, candidates for legislative office will maximize adaptation of their physical appearance to suit the voters, the majority of whom are Muslim. They will use Islamic symbols in their campaigns (such as the veil and Islamic cap), campaign in Islamic communities and organizations, and take up issues that are seen to be supportive of Islam.

The spreading Islamic influence in the public sphere seems to be inseparable from the emergence of Islam as part of communal identity in middle class Muslim circles. By presenting the market-friendly face of Islam, this class indirectly brings the public to commodification and acceptance of modernity and technological advances. This communal identity is strengthened by the concept of *ummah*, being part of a religious following or *umat*.²⁹ The findings of his survey show that the concept of *umat* is not a myth, but a reality which becomes the collective Muslim identity. For the middle class, Islamic identity becomes a status symbol and an expression of class.³⁰ This explanation is reinforced by the increased visibility of Islamic symbols in urban areas, for example in Jakarta and Depok.

The growth of a communal Muslim identity in the middle class helps explain the varieties of Islam observed to be developing in smaller districts and towns. In areas where Muslims form the minority, collective Muslim identity differs from that developing in majority Mus-

lim areas. The discourse of Islam developing in North Sulawesi and Bali is truly that of cultural Islam, and the agenda of political Islam is not to be seen. This well formed communal identity encourages a willingness to practice peaceful Islam and to coexist with the followers of the majority religion. The reality of Bali as a tourist area makes all parts of society adopt the interests of tourism as a common and uniting ideology, including Muslims. There is therefore a tendency to develop a peaceful, moderate Islam, and coexistence depends on these factors. This is also the picture given by the Provincial leaders. Religious leaders, government leaders, and the media promote moderate Islamic views. They reject the presence of radical groups which use violence, and efforts to Islamize Provincial Regulations.³¹

Conversely, in majority Muslim areas like Aceh the discourse strongly supports Islamization of the law and Provincial Regulations. It is only natural that in Aceh the community voice supporting Islamism is quite strong,³² whereas in culturally mixed areas or cultural melting pots, the Muslim communal identity is split between identity derived from smaller identities such as mass and socio-religious organizations. An example for this is the Jakarta region, where cultural Islam views and orientations and Islamist orientations are segregated according to socio-religious organizations. In an interview with a member of the Fatwa Committee of MUI Jakarta, KH. Syaifuddin expressed his view disagreeing with politically oriented Islam.³³ Apparently his official position on the Executive Board of NU, known as an organization with the mission of cultural Islam, affects his way of thinking.

The Challenge of Islamism for the Future of Indonesia

Riaz Hassan has said that “observance of religion tends to be associated with low support for militant Islamic movements”, or what is called Islamism in this report. Hassan provides data showing that the majority of Muslims have moderate attitudes, and do not join with militant Islamic organizations.³⁴ This report reiterates the lack of correlation between degrees of ritual observance (such as daily prayer, fasting, and *zakat* donations) and Muslim political and ideological views. This means that a ritually strict Muslim may have either cultural Islam views, or be Islamist, or even be liberal. It depends on the

influence of religious dimensions and socio-political factors, and includes factors of individual psychology. Several cases show that the gap between the cultural and the political poles is narrow and people can easily change sides. For example, an activist who was previously known to fight for cultural Islam worked for a legal aid organization which was notably secular. However, he subsequently made an extreme change in his outlook to become an activist (in fact, one of the leaders) in a mass militant Islamic organization which often uses violent means.

On the other hand, ritual observance does not negatively impact on a community's civic commitments. Data on jilbab wearing shows that of the respondents who said they always wore a jilbab in public (58 per cent), 99.1 per cent agreed with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the foundation of the country and the highest legal guide in Indonesia. Despite this, ambivalence was seen in the fact that 57 per cent of them agreed that Islamic shariah should be enforced by Provincial Regulations.

Because of this, and supporting Sonja van Wickelen's findings, this research sees the phenomenon of jilbab wearing to be more significant as an expression of culture, rather than as an ideological statement.³⁵ Broad, tightly closed jilbabs, usually black or dark in colour and usually worn by people oriented towards an Islamist organization, are still on the very edge of the mainstream jilbabs generally worn in Indonesia. Cultural jilbabs which are seen as fashionable, which are matched in colour to the other clothing which tends to be bright, and which cover only the head or the hair and sometimes use accessories to make them look attractive, are seen to be more dominant. This sort of jilbab appears more as a part of lifestyle, and at the same a social status marker of the urban middle class. By adopting a trendy style of jilbab, wearers are on one hand working to maintain their identity as Muslim, but on the other hand they are also accepting elements of modernity.

As a cultural expression, the dominant factor influencing a woman's decision to wear a jilbab is related to social concerns. In a social environment that displays a preference for Islamic symbols, the jilbab has slowly evolved to be a social norm that must be followed. The motivation to wear a jilbab, therefore, is often related to

social pressure from family, friends, and the surrounding environment. People who decided to wear a jilbab in the last five years in fact acknowledged being influenced by a variety of factors: religious study groups (34 per cent), family (21 per cent), social environment (18.5 per cent), friends (7.9 per cent), school (5.8 per cent), the media (3 per cent), and Provincial Regulations (1.6 per cent). If these factors are combined, excluding religious study groups, then it is clear that social factors are far more influential on a person's Islamic patterns than factors of religious doctrine.

This reality confirms the findings of other research. Robert W. Hefner, for example, has said that because of social influences, Islamic communities in Indonesia with moderate views (cultural Islam) still comprise the majority, compared with followers of radical Islam (Islamism).³⁶ In other words, changes in individual behavior, including choices of clothing styles, are caused by wider changes occurring in the social landscape.

However this research does not mean to minimize the influence of Islamists, whose numbers reach 19.9 per cent. This number shows that almost two of every ten Muslims have an Islamist orientation. Although this number is not a majority, it is still cause for concern, particularly given the possibility of them becoming increasingly vocal and influencing the support of culturally oriented Muslims.

The survey findings are backed up by the results of a number of interviews. KH. Baharuddin, a religious leader in Makassar, said that generally speaking the Muslim community of South Sulawesi was moderate.³⁷ However, he went on the stress, it is undeniable that these days Islamist groups are starting to emerge and actively spread their influence. For example, *Wahdah Islamiyyah* promotes a particularly rigid Islam. Its male followers appear with beards and its women in chadors. They disseminate Islamic teachings which differ from the mainstream. As well as this there is *Jamaah Tabligh*, which intensively proselytizes from one mosque to another.

KH. Fahrudin Wahab,³⁸ a Muslim leader in Samarinda, revealed something similar. He said that the direction of proselytizing in Samarinda was still moderate, and there were no indications of Islamism yet. Society still has a filter to counter Islamism in the form of great respect for their religious leaders. However the conservative

Muslims' aggressiveness in proselytizing the teachings they embrace may one day threaten the existence of moderate Islam in the East Kalimantan provincial capital.

The finding that a number of Muslims have an Islamist orientation (19.9 per cent) is generally not very different from other research findings. One of these was a survey by the Center for Religious and Cultural Studies (CRCS), a study institution in Yogyakarta. This research which examined the results of 15 surveys, found that Indonesia is a "religious country".³⁹ For Indonesian Muslims religion is a very important marker of identity, compared with other signifiers such as nationalism and ethnicity. Furthermore, the CRCS report states that based on Riaz Hassan's study, Indonesia is one of most religiously oriented countries, along with Malaysia and Pakistan, compared with other countries surveyed including Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Kazakhstan.⁴⁰

The figure of 19.9 per cent is certainly not to be underestimated. The Gallup Poll found that only about 7 per cent of Muslims worldwide agree with acts of violence, and termed these people "the politically radicalized", that is Muslims who have radical political views but do not necessarily perform acts of violence. Another survey was conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in 2006. The findings of this survey said that only 9 per cent of Muslims expressed support for the Bali bombings. Another poll was conducted by Global Attitudes Project. This poll gave an indication of the fluctuations in the number of people who approved of violence. Of the various polls that had been done, Indonesian Muslims who support violence reached the figure of 27 per cent in 2002, but decreased to 10 per cent in 2007.

The differences in the numbers of Muslims with an Islamist orientation noted above, although in the 10-20 per cent range, can be explained by the different measures used. In this research the number of Islamist Muslims was based of three things: support for enforcing an Islamic caliphate or Islamic State in Indonesia; the permissibility of using violent means in the struggle for Islam; and agreement with wearing the chador as a religious obligation for female Muslims. Certainly the number of Muslims recorded who were actually involved in the Islamist agenda to change the State was only

around 5 per cent. This 5 per cent acknowledged direct involvement in actions or demonstrations for causes usually articulated by Islamists. They were involved in raids on foreigners or night entertainment venues, Ahmadiyah followers, rice stalls which stayed open during the day in the month of Ramadan; supported enforcement of shariah law through national law and Provincial Regulations, and supported an Islamic caliphate or an Islamic State.

The fact that 19.9 per cent of respondents support the enforcement of an Islamic caliphate shows the considerable influence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in changing their point of view. Clearly membership of HTI does not reach 19.9 per cent. This reality seems to be related to HTI's change from working as an underground organization to becoming a mass organization, and its Friday bulletin *al-Islam* is the second most circulated free bulletin in mosques; and lastly the wide media coverage given to HTI, especially its achievement in conducting an International Conference on the caliphate at Jakarta's Bung Karno stadium on 12 August 2007, attended by about one hundred thousand people.

HTI's success in developing and organizing its members in cadres and in interactions with Muslims as the initial stages before taking over power, seem to have been quite effective in influencing people to support the concept of a caliphate. In Oliver Roy's terms⁴¹, by this strategy HTI has combined the characteristics of the ideological Islamist movement (political) with the moderate (proselytizing) movement. On one hand as an Islamist movement, HTI has located shariah as a political project rather than within the religious corpus. Establishing a caliphate with a trans-national character has become its primary political agenda. However on the other hand it does the things normally done by proselytizing groups, that is striving for re-Islamization from the bottom up, primarily through preaching and social movements to establish Islamic culture so people are prepared to accept the major project of an Islamic caliphate.

The figure of 19.9 per cent shows that the widespread influence of Islamism throughout Indonesian society seems to be connected with the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and the State in Indonesia's modern history. There are some, such as Ali Abd ar-Raziq, who hold that Islam should be separated from State affairs,

taking as their ideal the secular State model; there are others who believe there should be a blend, with the idealized model of an organic (Islamic) State, like Maududi and Natsir. There are others, like Nurcholish Madjid, who choose a position between the two theories. Of these three, the most often chosen by political Islam experts is the moderate view.

However, many experts and influential grass roots Islamic leaders idealize the model of an organic relationship (Islamic state) by taking up formalization of Islamic shariah, or even supporting a wholly Islamic state. MUI (Majlis Ulama Indonesia), which leaves itself open to the influence of Islamist oriented groups, tends to accept a semi-theocratic state by supporting the formalization of shariah in areas that are already prepared for it. This is evident from fatwa No. 7/ Munas VII/MUI/II/2005 which forbids secularism. The MUI meaning of secularism is the separation of worldly affairs such as politics from religion, where religion is only used to mediate a personal relationship with God and relationships with fellow human beings, especially in politics, are governed by social agreement only. The the Crescent Star Party (PBB) is highly visible in idealizing the model of a religious or semi-religious State. Its leaders remain consistent in making formalization of shariah law the major issue for which they fight and campaign.⁴²

For 19.9 per cent of Muslims it seems that a religious government or theocracy that does not completely meet Islamic ideals, as, say, a secular government fails to do, is unacceptable. In fact a religious State model has both positive and negative sides. On the upside, it not only acts to spread religion, but its values also encourage the growth of the arts and philosophy. On the downside, in practice modern religious States such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable to distortion, because their sacral nature and tendencies towards totalitarianism proscribe religious freedom and inhibit freedom of thought.⁴³

Hence, according to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im (2003), the idea of an Islamic State or the application of shariah law by the State is invalid. Within a plural society all attempts to fight for an "Islamic State" will trigger intimidation. In addition, and as asserted by an-Na'im, the Medina State model referred to by Islamists, including the 19.9 per cent above, was founded more on moral authority and com-

promise than coercive State rule over the community. It was formed because of the unique historical experience of the Prophet.

Conversely, the positive aspects of a Secular State are most certainly not given consideration, or are even unknown by Islamists. Among these are the growth of religion in society untainted by and disconnected from political practices which tend to be soiled in a religious State. In the construct of a secular State, the role of religion is based on the institution of civil society. In this context civil society is taken to mean a strong community group whose relations with the State function to ensure checks and balances to the practices of governance, which is economically independent of the State, and which can work with the State in particular matters of common concern.⁴⁴ Such a concept of the secular State is closely comparable with the thoughts of Muktaẓilah or Khawarij. Both held that adopting a caliphate was not obligatory either according to rational assessment or by shariah (religion). For them, what is obligatory is upholding the teachings of religion. If followers of Islam follow the path of justice and religious teachings are implemented, for example, through civil society as known today, then there is no further need for a caliphate. Accordingly, attempts to realize a caliphate are not an obligation.⁴⁵

As shown above, the majority of the Indonesian community is content to use peaceful means to strive for a meaningful Islamic presence in the public sphere (80.1 per cent). The data show that the majority view of the Indonesian public is consistent with Sunni political perspectives which give first place to benefiting human welfare, especially security, rather than the rule of justice by armed force. *Ushul fiqh* (the methodology of enacting Islamic law) recognizes the principle of “*Daf’u al-mafâsid muqaddam ‘alâ jalb al-mashâlih*” (“Rejecting the harmful must take precedence over bringing benefit”). This means that what must come first is avoiding warfare and acts of violence which result in political chaos, the loss of lives and feelings of insecurity. There is no justification whatsoever for using violence, including war against authority which does not enact shariah law in its entirety. In the words of Qudamah (1146-1223), a follower of Hanbali, political rebellion only disrupts the unity of all Muslims. It is not legitimate to oppose a ruler unless his rule denies God. Or in the words of Imam Hanbali himself, this can only be done if a ruler has

turned away from God and forbids the shared Friday religious observances. Imam Asy'ari, the founder of Sunni theology, concurred with outlawing armed rebellion, as has almost every Sunni religious scholar. In Sunni religious jurisprudence those who rebel against a ruler are termed *bughat*, although if they succeed they also must be obeyed.

However, what can we make of the phenomenon evidenced by 19.9 per cent of Muslims? Seemingly this community group is not influenced by Sunni ways of thinking. For example, perhaps they are influenced by the success of the Shia in 1979 Islamic Revolution. It needs to be noted that Shia is diametrically opposed to Sunni in its discourse of opposition to prevailing authority. If Sunni elevates political stability or welfare above demands for justice, Shia does just the opposite. The Shia conviction is that belief in an infallible Imam (*imâmah*) and upholding (demanding) justice (*al-'adl*) by opposing unjust governments, including those which do not enforce the shariah, is a pillar (*rukun*), or primary article of faith. Hence according to the Shia, upholding justice and opposing unjust rulers, including those who do not enforce the shariah, is given precedence over political stability.⁴⁶ These differences are shaped by historical traditions which are very different. Unlike the Sunni, in Shia history its followers can only establish power that is based on the Shia at the time of the Buwaih dynasty imamate, which prevailed from 788 to 985, and the time of the more stable Fathimiyyah dynasty which the Isma'iliyah ruled from 909 to 1003.

If it is not the Islamic revolution, then what affects the way of thinking of the 19.9 per cent of Muslims who are willing to use violence? Firstly, the Wahabiyah ideology, which is founded on using violent means to oppose prevailing authority and entrenched Islamic tradition – although traditional Sunni Abbasyiah also did this. Secondly, the perspectives of Khawarij (neo Khawari/modern Islamic fundamentalism) which holds fast to the principle *La hukma illa lillah* (there is no law but the law of Allah). For these people, it is lawful to spill the blood and seize the wealth of a government which does not consistently implement this principle. The underground organization still operating in Indonesia, NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia* - Islamic State of Indonesia), believes such a doctrine.⁴⁷ This is similar to the doctrine developed by the Jama'ah Islamiyah network.

The Islamist oriented Muslim outlook is also apparently influenced by the spread of the jihad concept. In the view of this 19.9 per cent of Muslims, the most fundamental jihad is religious war, with the usual meaning that whoever dies a martyr will be rewarded in Heaven. For them the greatest meaning of jihad, that of jihad as resisting carnal passions as stated in the hadith (traditions of the Prophet), is given less attention. Thirdly, there is the doctrine of *amar ma'ruf* and *nahyi munkar* (command virtue and forbid disobedience to God), as stated in QS. 3:104. For this 19.9 per cent of Muslims, the ideals *amar ma'ruf* and *nahyi munkar* are carried out physically by hand (force), not merely by word and in the heart, based on the hadith related by Muslims from Abi Sa'id al-Khudri. This is found in the Book of Hadiths *al-Arbai'in an-Nawawiyyah*, which is studied in pesantren and other Islamic educational institutions. However the concept of *nahyi munkar* or 'by hand' should not be understood deductively and as the only way, but balanced by adequate *musyawarah* or resolving problems peacefully, as emphasized in QS. 42:38.

With regard to the chador, its use by women in Islam emerged after the death of the founding Imam of Islamic schools (*mazhab*). Some scholars of that time understood the *hijâb* (protective veil) spoken of in the Koran as a requirement to wear a full jilbab with a chador (*niqâb*) and burka (*burqa* - a thin cloth)⁴⁸. The interpretation of *hijâb* means a piece of cloth covering a woman's entire body.⁴⁹ This Islamic view is followed by the 19.9 per cent of Muslims noted above.

However the Hanafiah, Malikiyah, and part of the Syafi'iyah schools take the view that the parts of a woman that should be covered (*hijâb*-ed) outside the home are the whole body except the palms of the hands and face, based on QS. 32: 53, 24: 31, and 33:59 and also on the traditions (*hadis*) of the Prophet. Imam al-Baghâwî gave the same opinion. He allowed women to show their faces and the palms of their hands as adornment (*zînat*., parts of the body which are attractive to males).⁵⁰ This view is apparently shared by the majority of Muslim respondents in this research.

In Sunni Islam there are even more progressive views. Imam Hanafi and Imam Malik took the view that apart from the face and the palms of the hands, a woman's calves could be uncovered. Against

this, Imam Hanbali, who tended to be more literal, took the narrower view that a woman's *aurat* – physical parts that should properly be covered – constituted the whole body, including the palms of the hand. Only the face could be shown.⁵¹

Discourse about the veil is growing among modern Sunni Islam scholars. For example, Qâsim Amîn, a leading Egyptian scholar, firmly rejects the chador. According to him the veil and robes do not come from Islamic teachings, but rather from traditions taken from pre-Islamic times. Furthermore Fatima Mernissi and Muhammad Said al-Asymawi, two

other modern Egyptian thinkers, reject the obligation to use a jilbab.⁵² The ultimate and quite significant opinion of both these leaders influences views about the jilbab of Indonesia's liberal Islamic groups.

Endnotes

¹ Interview by researcher Sukron Kamil with a Muslim leader in Bali, H. Musta'in, on 30 April 2010.

² Interview by researcher Irfan Abubakar with the Chairman of MUI Padang on 28 April 2010.

³ Interview by researcher Irfan Abubakar with the Chief Editor of the daily Singgalang, Sahrur, on 27 April 2010.

⁴ Interview by researcher Ridwan al-Makassary with Dr. KH. Baharuddin, A Nahdatul Ulama leader in Makassar, on 29 April 2010

⁵ Interview by researcher Amelia Fauzia with Dr. Taufik Pasiak at Manado on 4 May 2010.

⁶ Interview by researcher Sukron Kamil with a Muslim leader on Bali, H. Musta'in, on 30 April 2010.

⁷ Sukron Kamil et al., *Syari'ah Islam dan HAM: Dampak Perda Syariah terhadap Kebebasan Sipil, Hak-hak Perempuan dan Non-Muslim* (Jakarta: CSRC and KAS, 2007), pp. 117-123.

⁸ Interview by researcher Irfan Abubakar with the Chairman of MUI Padang on 28 April 2010.

⁹ Sukron Kamil et al., *Syari'ah Islam dan HAM*, pp. 124-131.

¹⁰ Interview by Muchtadlirin with the East Kalimantan Golkar Chairman, Dahri Yasin, at the end of April 2010.

¹¹ Interview by Rita Pranawati with Dr Faris Pari in Jakarta, at the end of April 2010.

¹² Interview by Ridwan al-Makassary with Dr Mohd. Sabri AR, on 29 April 2010.

¹³ Sukron Kamil et al, *Syari'ah Islam dan HAM*, p. 138.

¹⁴ See further Sukron Kamil et al., “Pengaruh Peraturan Perundangan Bernuansa Syari’ah terhadap Kehidupan Masyarakat Kota Tangerang: Studi atas Hukum Pelacuran, Keluarga, dan Kebebasan beragama”, *Laporan Penelitian* (Jakarta: CSRC UIN Jakarta and Respect Program, 2008), pp. 119-131.

¹⁵ Interview by Sholehuddin A. Azis with Masdar Hilmy, in Surabaya, at the end of April 2020.

¹⁶ Interview by Sholehuddin A. Azis with East Java NU leader Ali Machsan Musa, in Surabaya, at the end of April 2010.

¹⁷ Interview by Muchtadlirin with KH. Fahrudin Wahab (a religious leader in Samarinda), end of April 2010.

¹⁸ Interview Ridwan al-Makassary with Dr. Mohd. Sabri AR, on 29 April 2010.

¹⁹ Interview by Sri Hidayati with Prof. Dr. H. Suparman (Deputy Chairman MUI , Serang), on 28 April 2010.

²⁰ Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors (ed.), *Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

²¹ Interview by Rita Pranawati with Ilham Khairi, a Kompas journalist, in Jakarta at the end of April 2010.

²² Interview by Amelia Fauzia with KH. Arifin Asegaf, an ulama in Manado, at the end of May 2010.

²³ Interview Sukron Kamil with Hermanto, a senior journalist, Nusa Bali, 26 April 2010.

²⁴ For JIL and its religious views, see among others <http://www.Islamlib.com>.

²⁵ Interview by Sholahudin A. Aziz with Ahmad Zaini, Opinion Editor Jawa Pos.

²⁶ Religious secularism, according to the MUI, is the separation of the affairs of the world from religion, where religion is used only to regulate personal relations with God, while relations with fellow humans are regulated only by a social contract. Pluralism in religion, according to the MUI, is the understanding that all religions are the same and the truth of each religion is relative; no religion can claim that it has a monopoly on truth and that other religions are wrong, and all followers of religion will enter heaven and live side by side. See the Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia No. 7/Munas VII/MUI/II/2005 in Decision, Part Two, Legal Determination, Article (1) and the magazine Gatra, 6 August 2005, pp. 76-77.

²⁷ Stark and Glock divide religiosity into five dimendions, namely ideology, ritualisitic, intellectual, experimental and consequential, while Hassan adds the further dimension of loyalty to this. See R. Stark and C.Y. Glock, *American Piety and the Nature of Religious Commitment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Riaz Hassan, *Faithlines, Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁸ See Greg Fealy and Sally White, *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).

²⁹ Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica Inc., 1989).

³⁰ Hassan, *Faithlines*, p. 95.

³¹ Interview with leaders in North Sulawesi: KH. Arifin Assegaf, Taufik Pasiak, Dani Panarang and Suhendro Boroma; in Bali KH. Hasan, Gung Arsana, H. Musta'in, dan

Hermanto.

³² Conclusion from the results of an interview with Ustad Kholilurrahan (Member of Parliament for Lhoksemawe), and Mursyid (Head of the Islamic Shariah Agency, Lhoksemawe).

³³ Interview with KH. Syaifuddin (a member of the Fatwa Committee of MUI Jakarta), April 2010.

³⁴ Hassan, *Faithlines*, h. 234.

³⁵ Sonja van Wichelen, "Reconstructing Muslim-ness: New Bodies in Urban Indonesia", in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan (eds.), *Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007).

³⁶ Robert W. Hefner, "Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Trends" (Keynote Address), in the Conference Political Islam in Southeast Asia, 25 March 2003, Washington DC.

³⁷ Interview by Ridwan al-Makassary with KH. Baharuddin, Religious Leader of NU in Makassar, April 2010.

³⁸ Interview by Muchtadlirin with KH. Fahrudin Wahab, Religious Leader in Samarinda, April 2010.

³⁹ Zainal Abidin Bagir and Suhadi Cholil, *The State of Pluralism in Indonesia Literature Review of The Discourse and Practice of Pluralism, 1998-2007* (Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2007), pp. 4-8.

⁴⁰ Zainal Abidin Bagir and Suhadi Cholil, *The State of Pluralism in Indonesia*, pp. 4-8.

⁴¹ Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (Columbia University Press, 2004).

⁴² This can be seen in the Party Debate between PBB (Crescent Moon and Star Party) and the PDS (Peace and Welfare Party) shown on TV One, Friday 17 October 2008, and the daily *Republika* 4 February 2009.

⁴³ For more about this, see Sukron Kamil, *Islam dan Demokrasi, Telaah Konseptual dan Historis* (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), p. 171-187. For the positive side of the Western practice, see also Henry S. Lucas, *Sejarah Peradaban Barat Abad Pertengahan*, translated from A Short History of Civilization, (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1993).

⁴⁴ Nurcholish Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan, Artikulasi Nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), pp. 172, 109.

⁴⁵ Harun Nasution, et al., *Ensiklopedi Islam* (Jakarta: Ikhtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 2003) Vol. 3, pp. 35-36.

⁴⁶ Al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkâm As-Sulthâniyah* (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr), n.d., pp. 5-21, Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara, Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1993), Edition V, pp. 65-66, Yusuf Aibasy, *Nushush al-Fikr al-Islami: al-Imamah 'Inda as-Sunnah* (Beirut: Dar At-Thali'ah, 1966), pp. 47-50, 212-215, and Antony Black, *Pemikiran Politik Islam, dari Masa Nabi Hingga Masa Kini, translated from The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Jakarta: Serambi, 2006), pp. 167-169.

⁴⁷ See Mataharitimoer, *Jihad Terlarang; Cerita dari Bawah Tanah* (Jakarta: Kayla

Pustaka, 2007).

⁴⁸ *Niqâb* is to cover the face, except that only the eyes can be seen. A *burqu'* is a covering which conceals the face and consists of a thin cloth, so that it does not impede vision, and it is usually worn over the *niqâb*.

⁴⁹ Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *Al-Fiqh 'alâ al-Madzâhib al'Arba'ah*, p. 47 and Syekh Zainuddin al-Malibary, *Fath al-Mu'in*, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Al-Baghawi, *Tafsir al-Baghawi: Ma'âlim al-Tanzîl* (Riyadh: Dar Thayyibat li al-Nasyr wa al-Tauji', 1411 H), p. 34.

⁵¹ Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *Al-Fiqh 'alâ al-Madzâhib al'Arba'ah* (Beirut: Darul Fikr, 1999), p. 47, Syekh Zainuddin al-Malibary, *Fath al-Mu'in* (Semarang: Usaha Keluarga, n.d.), p. 14, dan Fatima Mernissi, *Wanita di dalam Islam* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1994), pp. 160-163.

⁵² Qasim Amin, *Tahrîr al-Mar'ah*, p. 89, Mernissi, *Wanita di Dalam Islam*, p. 121 and Muhammad Said al-Asymawi, *Problematika dan Penerapan Syariah Islam dalam Undang-undang* (Jakarta: GP Press, 2005), pp. 5-25.

CHAPTER IV

Islam and Democracy: Negotiating the Future of Indonesia

Democracy can be defined as a political system in which the people hold the power, either directly as when democracy first emerged in the Greek city of Athens, or indirectly through representative institutions, as is now practiced by many States. In democracies, majority support is the principle used for decision making. Even so, this does not mean that democracy justifies the tyranny of the majority, but rather that it upholds the principle of a majority which contains within it the concept of fair compromise without infringing the fundamental interests (rights) of the minority. In this respect democracy is “majority rule, minority rights”. This is because the State is not founded on the exercise of political power alone, but also on law and basic human rights.

As well as having a completely democratic and representative political system based on free and fair elections, a State is said to be democratic according to the following indicators: (a) its effective rec-

ognition of fundamental individual liberties and freedoms, including freedom of religion, speech and assembly; (b) its abolition of all laws and regulations which impede the functioning of a free press and the formation of political parties; (c) its creation of an independent judiciary; (d) its establishment of impartial military, security, and police forces; (e) the existence of accountability (good governance) through public scrutiny and elections; (f) the peaceful and orderly rotation of power; and (f) open political recruitment.¹

As well as a political system, democracy is also a social system. From a cultural perspective, democracy is understood not as a noun, but as a verb, hence as the process of democratization. Thus democracy is also a way of life. The significant characteristics of democracy as a way of life are; the principles of awareness of diversity, community deliberation, the means must be consistent with the end, honest consensus, meeting the needs of economic and social planning, freedom of conscience, and the needs of political education.²

Islam and Democracy

The relationship between the increased presence of Islamic symbols in the public sphere and democracy as it is developing in Indonesia depends on the meaning the public gives to those symbols. Islam's presence in the public sphere may foster democracy, if by this is meant sowing the universal values which are inherent in Islam and are practiced by cultural Islam. The Islamic presence can even strengthen democracy, if we examine efforts made by cultural Islam as represented by Indonesia's two moderate Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, which readily accommodate the political system first established by the nation's founders.³ Conversely, the penetration of Islamic symbols by Islamist circles (political and jihadist) endangers and may threaten democracy. Their activities are based on the conviction that democracy is contrary to Islam, and for this reason should be resisted.

In general, the rejection of democracy by Islamists stems from the following considerations: (1) Misunderstanding of the concept of Western democracy, which they identify with absolute equality. In fact, in the West itself democracy is not understood as a political

system in which there must be absolute equality, (2) erroneous interpretation of the concept of the majority in the verses of the Qur'an, by which the majority is (wrongly) considered as the sole holder of truth, as is the opinion of Ali Benhadj, the young leader of the FIS (*Front Islamique du Salut*), and also Abdul Qadir Zallum, an Islamic leader in Egypt. In fact, such an opinion can justify the tyranny of the majority, which contradicts the democratic principle of "majority rule, minority rights", because the people's power is limited by law; (3) Protest against the foreign policies of Western countries that are considered undemocratic because of their monolithic character. Ali Benhadj, for example, protests against Western leaders who often reject the results of elections won by Islamic parties. He also objects to the allegations of Western leaders who accuse Islamic parties of hijacking democracy, motivated by their ideological conflicts with it, (4) Errors in understanding the verses in the Qur'an about the absolute power of God (QS. 3:26) and verses stating that the Qur'an is all-inclusive, containing everything (QS. 16: 89), such as Qutb and Fadhullah Nuri believe. In fact what these verses mean by the absolute power of God is not that only God holds power, remembering that in humans there is temporal power which is given by God.⁴ Similarly the meaning of QS. 16:89 is that the Qur'an only contains all ethical dimensions, but does not include ways to manage all social and political issues; (5) Literal understanding of the necessity to enforce shariah criminal law, which is seen as the sole, black and white, non-negotiable option.⁵

In Indonesia there are many groups of Islamists who reject democracy. There are, for example, HTI, Hidayatullah, as well as the Islamic Youth Forum of Surakarta (FPIS).⁶ For the FPIS community (centered on the Al-Islam Gumuk Mosque) of Solo, Central Java, the argument that in a democracy "the voice of the people is the voice of God" is considered heretical, because this view challenges God's absolute sovereignty. The concepts of natural (human) rights and equality of political rights that underlie democracy as articulated by Western thinkers are considered by Islamist militants to be the opinions of infidels, because they do not rest on the Shariah of Allah. Some of them even conclude that democracy is false and could plunge the human race into hell. They also flatly reject the cultural notions of

democracy, such as pluralism. For them, hatred of non-Muslims for their beliefs must be cultivated, although they are still allowed to live with their beliefs as long as they do not disturb Muslims. In the area of *muamalah* (social interaction), they try not to associate with non-Muslims, and even deny their right to hold public office.⁷

Somewhat different from the militant Islamist circles above, literalist or revivalist Islamists agree that Islam holds the principles of democracy, but on the other hand they recognize differences between Islam and democracy. They also start from the doctrine of the God's sovereignty in the form of Shariah (divine law) that limits the sovereignty of the people. The group is spearheaded by Abul 'Ala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan and Mohammad Natsir in Indonesia. The Crescent Star Party (PBB - *Partai Bulan Bintang*) is also in this second category. It was founded by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a student of Natsir, and is an Islamic political party that idealizes the model of a semi-religious State (theistic democracy). Its leaders consistently make the formalization of shariah law the main issue of contention.⁸ Mawdudi and Natsir see similarities between democracy and Islam. This is because Islam has almost the same concepts, such as justice (QS. 42:15), equality (QS. 49:13), government accountability (Surah 4:58), deliberation (QS. 42:38), national goals (QS. 22:4), and the right to opposition (QS. 33: 70, 4: 35, 9: 67-71). However, the difference lies in the fact that in the Western liberal political system a democratic country enjoys the rights of absolute sovereignty, while Islamic democracy stipulates that temporal authority is restricted by the limits set by divine law. Mawdudi calls this system of government a "theo-democracy", meaning a system of government in which sovereignty is limited by the sovereignty of God through His laws. Mawdudi's argument is based (inter alia) on QS. 12: 40; 3: 154; 16: 116, and 5: 44.⁹

As with the political Islamists and jihadists, the element of a literal understanding of the obligation to apply Islamic law, and especially Islamic criminal law, appears to be the root of this second Islamist group's problem with Western democracy. In fact, a body of law such as Islamic criminal law is not the only one possible, and need not be literal. According to Imam ash-Shafi'i (150-204 H, 767-820 AD) *Qishash* law (comparable to the death penalty for murder),

for example, is optional, and is actually determined by the family of the murdered person. Likewise, the penalty of hand amputation for thieves has the same value as 86 grams of gold. Imam Hanafi (80-150H, 699-767 AD) says that this punishment is also optional, because the party who most determines the penalty, apart from the judge, is the victim of the theft. The same is true for the penalty of *rajam*, (stoning to death) for adulterers with the status of a widower or widow, or a family person. According to Khawarij, it is sufficient if they are whipped 100 times. Muhammad Syahrur, a modern Syrian thinker, interprets Islamic criminal as setting the maximum sentence that can be imposed. According to him, Islamic criminal law can impose a lighter sentence than that set down, but may not exceed it.¹⁰

Although both groups of Islamists are still on the fringes of mainstream Islam in Indonesia, if their actions in the public sphere achieve prominence they may successfully channel the aspirations of Indonesian Muslim society as a whole. Strengthening their position in the public sphere has the potential to threaten the position of non-Muslim minorities, as already described. This is of course problematic in terms of democracy, because democracy is “majority rule, minority rights”. This is especially so if they use as their basis or source exclusive Islamic doctrines which marginalize non-Muslims. At a minimum, non-Muslim minorities will feel unfairly treated because they are subject to rules not derived from their religion. In fact, it is possible that the expansion of Islamism will also threaten the face of Indonesian pluralism, and the public sphere will be dominated by one shade of Islam, namely the color of the hegemonic Islamists. In addition, the Islamist movement’s impassioned expansion into the public sphere will surely threaten the integration of the Republic of Indonesia as a culturally diverse nation-state. It can bring disunity and spawn opposition movements such as the Christianization of the public sphere, especially in areas where Christians are a majority.

The reason that the penetration of Islamic symbols in the public sphere by culturally oriented Muslims does not threaten democracy is the fact that they have come to understand the compatibility of Islam and democracy. They do not see democracy as a problem that must be questioned. This is shown in the opinion of Yusuf al-Qardhawi, an influential Muslim intellectual in such activist circles as the PKS (Pros-

perous Justice Party), as can be seen from its platform.¹¹ He believes that the substance of democracy is consistent with Islam because the Qur'an and democracy equally reject dictatorship. Fahmi Huwaidi is another intellectual who holds this view, as does Nurcholish Madjid, one of the main driving forces of cultural Islam Indonesia.

The cultural Muslim group acknowledges the use of power as stated in the Qur'an and Hadith, using the principles of trusteeship, equality, justice, consultation, consensus, and allegiance (*amanah, musawah, 'adl, syura, ijma'* and *bai'at*). Hence this group asserts that the principles or roots of democracy are very strong in the Qur'an and Hadith. What is needed is a reformulation and reinterpretation. Some of the passages to be found which instruct this are (among others) QS. 3: 159; 42: 38; 49: 13; 5: 8; and 42: 15. In matters of justice, Nurcholish Madjid quotes Ibn Taimiyah as saying: "God supports just authority, even if it is heathen, and does not support unjust authority, even if it is Islamic". The same applies to matters of freedom. Freedom to criticize, for example, accords with the principle of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (QS. 3: 104) – doing good and rejecting evil. In fact, the narratives of Ibn Majah, as quoted by Fahmi Huwaidi, explain that the most important form of jihad is to present the truth to an unjust ruler. As with the freedom to criticize, other freedoms are also guaranteed in Islam. For example, freedom of speech, as long as it is morally and legally responsible, as in QS. 42: 38, 4: 59, and 4: 83; freedom of association in QS. 5: 2 and 58: 22; and religious freedom in QS. 2: 256 and 10: 99.

Moreover, as one of Indonesia's leading modernist thinkers, Amien Rais has said that Islam even guarantees freedom for atheists, as long as they do not disturb the public order. Apostasy in Islam is a sin without a fixed penalty, and if it is to be punished it should not be by the death penalty as prescribed by mainstream jurisprudence. A Muslim apostate must be cajoled into returning. Muhammad Hasyim Kamali expressed such ideas, following the opinions of al-Baji (d. 494 H), Ibn Taymiyya, al-Nakhai (d. 95 H) and Sufyan Tsuri (d. 162 H).

According to Fahmi Huwaidi, the principle of majority rule is not necessarily right, as shown in the rejection by ancient communities of the great religions as stated in the Qur'an. This happened because they were unbelievers, errant, did not give thanks for the

blessings of God, and did not know of Allah and His teachings (QS. 6:16; 2:243; 12:103; 11:17; 7: 187). However in Islamic belief the rightness or otherwise of majority rule depends on the extent to which it operates within the ethics and principles of Islam.¹²

Another argument that shows Islam's compatibility with democracy, as explained by Fahmi Huwaidi, is its rejection of the dictatorial rule of the Pharoahs and Nimrod, the Babylonian king who built the tower of Babel (QS. 2: 258 dan 44: 31); its condemnation of those who mindlessly follow their leader (QS. 28: 8, 40 dan 11: 97-98), and that its leaders should be chosen and witnessed by the people (QS. 2: 282-283). In addition to this, Islam upholds pluralism and sees it as *sunnatullah*, or natural law (QS. 2: 256; 11: 118; dan 10: 99). There are still many other arguments that support the compatibility of Islam and democracy; among them the argument that legislation by parliament does not mean going against the laws of God, because this legislation only regulates matters that are not clearly regulated by shariah law; meanwhile, multi-party system democracy is an institution that can prevent tyranny, and its multiplicity here is in terms of types and specifications, not of discord.¹³

Nevertheless, the fact that many activists from cultural Islamic organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, are involved in the movement for formalizing shariah law through shariah inflected Provincial Regulations is actually quite surprising, when viewed from alongside the construction of their inclusive religious perspectives. While many interests may underlie their involvement, this fact could potentially threaten democracy.¹⁴ In addition, the acceptance and appreciation by cultural Muslims of the democratic system may diminish, because so far the democracy they have seen in practice has had negative consequences. Democracy, for example, is often marred by conflicts and political disputes that could threaten the stability and integrity of the State. Democracy is also considered responsible for rampant money politics and political cronyism following the principle of reciprocation that prevails in direct presidential or district head elections. Democracy is also understood to have failed to increase economic prosperity for the people.¹⁵

In this case the critics do not distinguish between democratic ideals and the practice of a democracy which is still in the process of

growth (consolidation), and is therefore as yet unable to achieve those ideals. This group is similar to the Islamists who reject democracy by citing actions by the United States which treat some Muslim countries undemocratically.¹⁶ Negative perceptions of democracy can only grow stronger when they are given theological legitimacy. In this case, Islam's political conceptions stress the importance of political stability and the avoidance of political chaos, the importance of upholding accountability (*amanah*) and justice (*'adalah*), especially economic justice, and the need to eradicate corruption (*ghulul*).

In addition to mapping the theory of Islam and democracy, the relationship between Islam's presence in the public sphere and democracy can also be explained through Habermas's theory of the construction of religion in the public sphere. Unlike secular rule which comprehensively excludes all religion and religious causes from the public sphere, Habermas proposed a pluralistic model that accepts a variety of aspirations, including religious ones, without disallowing any of them. He did not reject religion in the public sphere, because it makes public policy more legitimate. The process involves all parties, without silencing those who voice religious aspirations. However, he proposed rules to be applied to religion in the public sphere. First, religious aspirations, especially if they are to become public policy, must be explained rationally and dealt with as a rational domain, so they have an acceptable epistemic status for secular citizens or those with different beliefs. Religious aspirations, therefore, must be rationally debated and understood by all parties through public reasoning.

For Habermas, the source of political legitimacy is not the general will alone, but the formation of deliberative processes (consultation, consideration, and deliberation). A political decision must be jointly considered and is always provisional and open. No matter how coherent, systematic and aesthetic a public policy may be, including religious public policy, it is not legitimate unless it is rational and open to public testing. In this regard public opinion, including religious opinion, can only qualify as public opinion if it has passed the test of discursive examination. To this end, religious aspirations must first of all shed what religious fundamentalists hold to be their sacral nature and non-negotiable finality. Religious aspirations, if they are to become a source of values for formal rules, are not self-legitimizing (legitimate

in themselves) rules to be enacted without the requirement for community participation that exists in the logic of civil law. The values of a particular religion, therefore, should not be singled out by countries and made into public regulations just because that religion claims its teachings as the absolute truth coming from Almighty God, as is claimed by theocracies. Formal rules using religion as their source are only valid if they are the result of a public deliberation process.

In this Habermas used the logic of common law, which requires that a public policy be preceded by a process by which it is agreed to by a number of different parties. Religious public policy in this regard must be proven to meet the principle of reciprocity and be accepted following reasoned public consideration. Religious believers who want to formalize their beliefs in legislation must use persuasion, not coercion or force. In this context, it is important to stress that the public testing of formal regulations derived from religion must be through a rational process, and a public majority vote or majority public desire is not sufficient. Formal public regulations derived from religion must satisfy the principle of inclusion, and not marginalize or violate the rights of minorities. They must contain the principle of social justice for all parties (to meet the principles of pluralism and human rights). This means that there should be no policy, even if it is based on a majority vote, that threatens and marginalizes minorities.¹⁷

Habermas seems to see that if these two conditions are not met, then democracy and human rights must be violated. His view is justified by practices such as those demonstrated by Iran's theocratic government post the 1979 revolution. In that country, pluralism – in the sense of the permissibility of alternative opinions, difference, and opposition – is not recognized, because the country is the agent of a divine and absolute God. In post-revolutionary Iran the State controls the media, intimidates those who act against it, and both limits and silences opposition. In other words, the State is quick to strike out, not only against officials and supporters of the Shah, the previous ruler, but also against all those who disagree with clerical autocracy. This applies even to an Ayatollah, such as Ayatollah Syariat Madari. In the ideal concept of the continuation of Islamic government developed by Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, it seems there was no room for dissent. According to him, all opponents of Islamic rule are infi-

dels who can and must be removed for the sake of Islam and Iran.¹⁸ As well as this there was a cleansing of non-Muslim minorities. This, for example, occurred to the Baha'i, who hold non-Muslim beliefs that draw inspiration from various religions and faiths and believe in a new revelation that replaces the Qur'an. Firstly, after the revolution thousands of people considered as having been pro-government or who rejected the Islamic government were killed. Because of this, William Shawcross judged that Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini was much more authoritarian and arbitrary than during the reign of the Shah. He pointed to the jails and courts that became full again and the summary executions that took place.¹⁹

Secondly, secular citizens or those of other faiths, according to Habermas, need to learn from religious aspirations to reach a consensus. This means that in Habermas's ideal of the public sphere, all parties must be open to a variety of discourses. This of course does not only apply to followers of religion, although Habermas himself doubted they could think out of the box, beyond their world view. By opening themselves to a variety of discourses, compromise will occur. In the contestation of Indonesia's public sphere the secular nationalists and Islamists, in the sense of Islamic political parties, seem to have started to open up to different discourses, as seen in the debate on the draft Pornography Law that non-Muslim minorities see as having Islam as its source. However, among the Islamic fundamentalists, especially the radicals, and among liberal Islam such as JIL (Liberal Islam Network), this is still problematic. Each of them occupies their own space where there is no mutual respect, tolerance, or compromise. On one hand the fundamentalists impose their rigid religious debate in the public sphere, believing this to be the pure faith. On the other hand, the second group pushes its way into sensitive areas with little if any appreciation of the fundamentalist's opinions, because they are so impressed with the absoluteness of their convictions.

Thirdly, according to Habermas, the State must be neutral. However, this neutrality does not mean the State should make political secularism absolute, such that religion can really only exist in the private sphere as it would in wholly secular States. The task of the State is to instigate public deliberation, to encourage rational discourse,

and maintain legal order. By being neutral the State, consisting of government, judiciary, parliament, and political parties, will function as a reservoir that receives and is responsible for the flow of communication or input from the periphery. Thus the State will be able to make the correct political decisions. By being neutral, the State's starting point in making public policy will not only be the principle of "what is good", but also "what is fair". The neutrality of the State in this regard is not only procedural neutrality, where legal procedures are impartial and political policy represents the interests of all parties, but also neutral with respect to themes of public discourse. These themes should not be restricted in order to repress pluralism, religious thinking or belief. The mass media as well as the State should be neutral, and should mediate the learning process of all parties in the public sphere. As the holder of a mandate from an enlightened public, the mass media should also be independent of the State, the market and other actors in the public sphere who may co-opt it. Thus a critical public should not be oppressed by a manipulative public.

In Indonesia, State neutrality in matters of religion as suggested by Habermas is still problematic, although conceptually it is already fulfilled. This can be seen from a 2008 report by the SETARA Institute which recorded 188 violations of religious freedom in which the actor was the State, either by commission or omission. Although, it should be noted, questions remain about how best to assess the occurrence of these violations, and what indicators to use.²⁰ Included among acts of commission, for example, are the prohibition on Ahmadiyah activities, such as occurred in Sukabumi and Tangerang City, and the forced demolition of three churches by the city of Bekasi's public order authorities. Acts of omission include violence which the State does not deal with in accordance with existing law.

Fourthly, according to Habermas, majority religious groups should not block contributions from members of other religions or secular groups. Members of majorities should not neglect or silence the potential truths of minorities.²¹

In Indonesia, Islamic intellectual and cultural leaders such as Nurcholish Madjid and Kuntowijoyo have almost the same view as Habermas. In Madjid's view, religious aspirations, especially if they are to be made into public policy such as with the formalization of

shariah or shariah inflected rules, must be universally accepted by all parties. This opinion is based on the democratic tradition of Western countries, especially in the United States. For him, values such as liberty, individual rights, and the rule of law are political values, and although they were adopted by the West from the Protestant religious tradition they have become universal.²²

In Madjid's words, if the teachings of Islam are to be a source of formal law as part of the public realm, they must first be objectified. By this he means the process of translating or rationalizing religious values into an objective category. In this way followers of other religions can see them as something natural, and no longer exclusive to followers of the public policy's source religion. Nor should they be presented as religious laws used as instruments of public policy. Non-religious people will then accept and enjoy them without feeling themselves the victims of discrimination. He gave Pancasila as an example of religious teachings that have been objectified and made public policy. He explained further that the above objectification of religious values does not mean rejection of the Qur'an as a source of public policy. According to him, the whole of Shariah cannot directly be made into positive public policy, but must first go through the objectification procedure.²³

Nonetheless, what these thinkers mean by rationalization, universalization, and objectification of (Islamic) religious values proposed as public policy is linked to social issues, and is not in the realm of exoteric worship. This is because complete universalization of things which are internal and particular, such as ritual and worship, would deprive religion of its sacredness, and thus threaten its very essence.

Support for Democracy and Criticism of its Implementation

Understanding the theoretical explanation of the above allows us to examine the background to Indonesian Muslim attitudes towards democracy. Previous chapters have explained that the majority of Indonesian Muslims (87.1 per cent) agree with the democracy that is currently practiced in Indonesia. Almost the entire Indonesian Muslim community participated in the elections, both at the national level (90.4 per cent) and regionally (89.5 per cent). In addition, almost all Muslims also accept Pancasila as the foundation of the State and the

Constitution of 1945 as the main source of law (96.3 per cent). In addition to accepting democracy in its political sense, the Muslim community also accepts and practices democracy in the cultural sense, at least if an attitude of tolerance is taken as a measure of democratic cultural values. Almost all Indonesian Muslims are very tolerant. They respect people who have different opinions (98.6 per cent), others who are active in different organizations (95.3 per cent), and 91.8 per cent of them support the right of others to be free from fear and threats.

But there are some things worth noting. Firstly, among the 12.9 per cent of people who reject democracy, it was shown that some of them (38.4 per cent) also believe that democracy has spawned the practice of money politics which contributes to the proliferation of corrupt practices. Instead of bringing peace and harmony, for them democracy has caused unrest and conflict (35 per cent). There was also 28.3 per cent of respondents who refused democracy for theological reasons, as not being in accordance with the teachings of Islam (28.3 per cent), and because it comes from the West (8.7 per cent). Secondly, 19.9 per cent of Muslims who have an Islamist orientation support the establishment of an Islamic caliphate or Islamic State in Indonesia, and approve the use of violent means to fight for Islam. In fact, six out of ten people approved Islamic religious values as a source of official National laws or Provincial Regulations. Thirdly, the rate of Muslim involvement in criticizing or debating official regulations is very low, only about 18.1 per cent. Fourthly, as many as 65.9 per cent of them support State involvement in regulating whether or not a particular religious group's beliefs are correct or incorrect.

Data showing the degree of Muslim support for democracy is understandable, as people now enjoy political freedom under the democratic system introduced by Reformasi. This applies even for Islamists and jihadists. Islamic political parties and organizations that were prohibited by the New Order have emerged and thrived under democracy. We only need to look, for example, at the 1999 election results. Apart from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which won 33.76 per cent of the votes, and Golkar with 22.46 per cent, the Islamic or orthodox Muslim based parties drew considerable votes; PKB (National Awakening Party) won 12.62 per cent of

the vote, PPP (United Development Party) 10.72 per cent, PAN (National Mandate Party) 7.12 per cent, PBB (Crescent Star Party) 1.94 per cent, and the Justice Party won 1.36 per cent. Because of this significant share of the vote, in 2002 the PBB and the PPP joined the FDU (Daulat Ummah Faction) in parliament to spearhead the fight to restore the Jakarta Charter through amendment of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, although this failed. At the same time other orthodox Islam-based parties which combined in the Reform Faction, the Justice Party (PK) and the National Mandate Party (PAN), proposed changing the text of the first principle of Pancasila from “Belief in the one and only God “ to “Belief in the one and only God, with the obligation for adherents of religion to follow their respective religious teachings.” Although these efforts ended in failure, the discourse on the application of Islamic shariah found space in the national political arena, something which was impossible during the New Order. In this respect the 2004 and 2009 elections were similar.

In addition to these political parties, Islamic organizations leaning towards Islamism in the reform period have also evolved, from political groups such as HTI (Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia) and MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council), to proselytizing groups such as the Jamaat Tabligh and Communication Forum Ahlussunnah Wal Jama ‘ah, to jihadists such as Jama’ah-Islamiyya and the Jam’ah Ansar al-Tauhid (JAT). If an Islamic caliphate is the main issue that HTI struggles for, the struggle for an Islamic State with shariah as State law is the MMI’s chief ambition. It is important to note that the issue of a caliphate was first made prominent by Taqiyyuddin an-Nabhani, the founder of Hizbut Tahrir. According to him, Muslims have two main obligations, to unite Muslims worldwide under an Islamic caliphate, and to apply shariah law in its entirety. Hizbut-Tahrir in Indonesia initially developed as an underground organization in the 1980s.²⁴ After the fall of Soeharto, its activists openly declared themselves and founded Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

For HTI supporters, all Indonesia’s problems today have their roots in the absence of an Islamic caliphate and the non-application of Islamic Shariah. This is why Indonesia has always been dogged by political chaos, separatism, poverty, foreign debt, drugs, and other problems. To achieve the goals it struggles for, HTI has developed three

strategic stages: guiding and developing its members as cadres, interaction with the public, and the transfer of power.²⁵ As with HTI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) strives to uphold Islamic shariah. For MMI the formalization of shariah law is an imperative, and it must keep struggling for its achievement. Shariah is a fundamental obligation for every Muslim, as well as the only way to create a just society. Hence MMI has made enactment of the provisions of Islamic law a necessity. For MMI activists there are only two choices, succeed in enforcing Islamic law or die in the attempt. The program of enforcing shariah law sought by MMI covers the full scope of the personal, family, community, and the State in its entirety.²⁶

The expansion of Islamist groups in the Indonesian public sphere clearly raises a number of challenges for the development of democracy. But these challenges have faded with the ongoing process of democratic consolidation. The surge of Reformasi allowed the public to become involved in the public sphere. The freedom of the newly opened space allowed free growth of the press. Control over the running of the government also improved; parliament (DPR) and the Consultative Assembly (MPR) were no longer subordinated to the executive. Elimination of the dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) encouraged increased civil supremacy. Regional autonomy grew, reducing excessive regional dependence on central government. However, according to Kristianto Wibisono, decentralization may lead to negative excesses which could encourage the development of federalism.²⁷

With the introduction of a democratic system came increased public accountability, and those guilty of corrupt acts started to feel the weight of the law. For example, in 2006 the Kutai Regent, Syaokani HR, was alleged to have corruptly received Rp 15.9 billion; likewise many Members of Parliament were alleged to be corrupt, including Al-Amin Nur Nasution of the PPP who allegedly received bribes amounting to Rp 2.1 billion, as well as Tahir Taher (Democratic Party), Hamka Yandhu and Antoni Zedra (Golkar Party). Corruption eradication increased during the reform period, compared with the time before. Admittedly, according to a Transparency International poll in 2006, law enforcement agencies (courts, prosecutors and police) in Indonesia were the most corrupt institutions after the parliament, and

60 per cent of respondents stated that corruption eradication in Indonesia was still not effective.²⁸

Apparently, despite its shortcomings, the democracy adopted by Indonesia is understood by the Muslim community, as Nurcholish Madjid put it, as a precious heritage of humanity, for which until now no better alternative has been found.²⁹ On one level democracy is judged to produce good policy, a society that is more just and free, mutual benefit and more equitable progress, and more autonomous knowledge-based and intellectual development.³⁰ Society also appears to see democracy as a satisfactory vehicle for criticism. In the democracy practiced today, the people determine their choice of government and entrust its representatives to take care of their interests. Elites or elected representatives must take account of the real or imagined will of the people in deciding what policies will be adopted or rejected. If they do not, they will fall or will be replaced by others considered more able to channel and embody the aspirations of the public.³¹ Democracy, therefore, becomes a mechanism for the delivery of representative government that is held responsible by the people, although in practice it may not run smoothly and ideally. In substance the concept and ideals of democracy are consistent with the opinions of classical Islamic political experts such as al-Mawardi, al-Baqillani (living in the fourth century AH), Abu al-Farra Ya'la (990-1065), and Ibn Hazm who suggested that unaccountable rulers be removed from their positions.³²

As described by Schumpeter, democracy seems to be viewed by the public as a market mechanism that allows interaction and intense negotiation between the people and authority. Voters are the consumers, while politicians (parties, presidential, vice presidential and legislative candidates for provincial elections) are entrepreneurs who seek rewards (the most votes). They are like merchants who try to provide products they believe will produce the highest profits. Hence they advertise their wares to the buying public in a variety of ways. Presidential, legislative and provincial elections are a mechanism of the political market. The decision to support or not support a candidate is the same as the decision to buy or not to buy merchandise in the market.

Analysis of the high participation rate in national and provincial

elections is also of interest. Along with a desire for democracy, this high participation may result from the contributions by religious scholars who call for community participation in democracy, and particularly in connection with the MUI meeting (*ijtima'* MUI) III held in Padang Panjang (West Sumatra) on 24-26 January 2009, which was attended by about 500 religious scholars from all parts of Indonesia. This meeting issued a fatwa against empty (blank) votes, although this was rejected by (among others) Gus Dur (KH. Abdurrahman Wahid) who saw it as without a sound basis. In contrast to this, the Vice Chairman of the MUI Fatwa Commission said on behalf of the MUI: "The Indonesian nation is required to elect its leaders. If those chosen are not properly chosen, it is *haram* (not religiously legitimate)." Another reason is that blank votes are dangerous is that they may result in having no leader.

There are at least two things which seem to have influenced the religious scholars who produced this fatwa. Firstly, the doctrine of the necessity to establish a caliphate (Islamic leadership), by which the institution of the president is now understood as a re-interpretation of the concept of "caliph", although the HTI rejects this view. This doctrine is based, among other things, on QS. 6: 38, although scholars do not all agree on the interpretation of the words *ulī al-amri* (holders of command) in this verse as meaning rulers. Of particular influence is the doctrine of the obligation to *bai'at* (the taking of a ceremonial oath and public recognition of a chosen caliph, which takes place in a mosque), although this is somewhat problematic as according to some experts *bai'at* is only conducted once in a person's lifetime. One of the things on which the MUI based its fatwa appears to be the hadith: "Whoever dies without performing *bai'at* (to a mosque leader) dies in ignorance."

Secondly, the illegitimacy of blank votes, and also the attitude which makes almost all Muslims participate in the election of leaders, is apparently influenced by the views of al-Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyah, Sunni reformist scholars of the 12th and 14th centuries respectively. This is because al-Ghazali agreed with the dictum: "Tyranny is preferable to anarchy." In fact, in order to legitimize the power obtained through a successful uprising, al-Ghazali once said: "Is it not better to recognize the *imamah* (leadership) that in fact exists?" Ibn Taimiyyah

concurred with this adage: “Sixty years of a tyrannical ruler is better than one night with no ruler”,³³ although Ibn Taimiyyah also placed great emphasis on justice.

The attitude of the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims, who accept Pancasila as the basis of the State, is in accord with the positions of NU and Muhammadiyah, who also support Indonesia as a State based on Pancasila with the Constitution of 1945 as its founding legal document. For example, KH. Said Agil Siradj, current chairman of NU, holds that Indonesia does not need to become an Islamic State. As far as NU is concerned, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila are final, without the need for any further debate.

The accommodating, even uncritical, attitude towards the existing political system can be further explained with reference to culture and notions of cultural harmony. For Javanese people, including the Sundanese and even other ethnicities of the Indonesian archipelago, the principle of harmony (mutual accord) does not allow open dissent, including dissent in public issues such as elections. Harmony also prohibits taking a position which could lead to open conflict, and teaches respect for hierarchical relationships such as those held with respect to public officials. It also prioritizes social harmony above the demands of personal interests and individual rights. Children in Java are taught the feelings of *wedi* and *sungkan*. *Wedi* is fear of physical threat and unpleasant outcomes coming from a particular action. Not to vote, let alone to reject Pancasila, seem to be included in the category of acts which are subject to the attitude of *wedi*. As a society in which the influence of feudalism has long applied, Javanese and Sundanese children are taught to be wary of people who should be respected, such as officials, elders, and strangers. *Sungkan* is the feeling of courteous respect for those above you, or for people you do not know, as the refined restraint of your personal inclinations.³⁴

Democracy in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. The growth of Indonesia’s democracy is not always accompanied by good governance and the supremacy of law, for example.³⁵ The cultural context makes the research findings much more explicable, where 38.4 per cent of the 12.9 per cent of respondents who reject democracy stated that it has spawned the practice of money politics and

proliferating corruption. Hence instead of bringing peace and harmony, 35 per cent of these respondents see democracy as causing unrest and disputes. The in-depth interviews also demonstrated a similar thing. In the view of KH. Ali Masckhan Musa, one of the sources interviewed for this research, the democracy currently prevailing in Indonesia tends to destroy moral values. In elections, he sees the morality of democracy as limited to *berjuang*, a play on words between *berjuang* meaning struggle, and *berjuang* as an acronym for *beras* (rice), *baju* (clothing), and *uang* (money).³⁶

Many cases demonstrate the prevalence of money politics in the practice of democracy after the collapse of the New Order. For example the actions of Sintje Sondakh Mandey (the wife of North Sulawesi's Governor) and Ariane F. Nangoy (the wife of the Mayor of Manado). Both of them openly handed out Rp 50,000 notes to crowds during the Golkar Party's election campaign in 2004.³⁷ Other political parties did the same thing, including the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the Gerindra Party. These parties distributed Rp 20,000 notes to the crowds at their 2009 election campaigns.³⁸ Even more alarming is the practice of money politics in provincial elections. As well as requiring funding from the national budget of the Electoral Commission (KPU), provincial elections entail major expenses for the candidates. They are responsible for the costs of a campaign team, the campaign itself, the services of pollsters, and political consultants. In a provincial election, for example, giving the candidate positive press exposure requires about Rp 20 billion (about \$US 2 million), media advertising costs between one and five billion (\$US 100,000 to 500,000), and voter surveys from 100 to 500 million (\$US 10,000 – 50,000). The Minister for Home Affairs has revealed that to become a Governor one requires about Rp 100 billion (\$US 10,000,000), while a Governor's salary is Rp 8.7 million (\$US 870) per month. To overcome this it is proposed to reduce costs and hold simultaneous provincial elections.³⁹

Naturally, candidates try to recover their capital outlay, seeking wealth for the benefit of themselves and their cronies and preparing the capital needed for coming elections so that they can successfully serve two terms. Many cases show this. For example in 2006 there was a Rp 57 billion corruption case involving Hendy Boedoro, the

Regent for Kendal in Central Java, and in 2005 a Rp 440 billion corruption case against the Governor of East Kalimantan, Suwarna AF. For the DPRD (Regional People's Representative Council), a case in point is the 43 cases of corruption that occurred in Surabaya, amounting to Rp 22.5 billion, of which the best known was the 2.7 billion corruptly acquired by the DPRD Chairman, Ali Burhan. And this is not including violations of regulations governing DPRD support activities, which according to Provincial Regulation No. 110/2000 should be 0.5 per cent of domestic revenue,

Other perceived shortcomings of democracy include the tendencies toward primordialism and communalism, where local political power is used for short-term goals. After an election, the winner's campaign team is surrounded by a circle of people who often have more influence on Provincial Government leaders than their official staff. Corruption becomes even more prevalent. Regional autonomy, including the election process, can come to be nothing more than the wish list of people who want to act in their own self-interest, want to rule, and want to enjoy material wealth without consideration of the national interest. The purpose of regional autonomy, that of tailoring power to local interests, becomes the use of power in the interests of the elite.⁴⁰

As well as resulting in money politics and corruption, the 35 per cent of the respondents who reject democracy said that they see it as giving rise to numerous instances of unrest and conflict. Prof. M. A. Tihami, a leading intellectual figure in Serang confirmed this. According to him, democracy exists only as jargon, and has no impact on the community. In the actual practice of democracy, enjoyment of life is nothing more than empty rhetoric and is not felt by the people. Democracy produces many conflicts. Tihami asserts that the people do not really understand the term democracy. What they understand is living together without conflict.⁴¹

These research findings are comparable with various media reports covering real events in various communities. In the period 2005-2008, at least 210 of the 486 regional elections were challenged and ended up in court. Every legally contested election has the potential to trigger physical horizontal conflict between supporters of the competing candidates.

The most common reasons are errors in the electoral roll resulting from poor management of voter information, and in the counting of votes, especially if the counts are close. Conflict in Makassar and North Maluku, for example, resulted from narrow winning margins. Maybe this is what makes some communities in Sulawesi (15-20 per cent) reject democracy. The Department of Home Affairs believes that combining elections is a good solution to some of these problems. "First, people are not kept busy with many elections, and second, for ease of control", says Tanribali Lamo, the Department's Director General of National Unity and Political Affairs. In addition, standardizing the relevant election regulations is also considered urgent, in addition to updating the voter data.⁴² Apparently for these reasons, part of the Muslim community questions the effectiveness of the nation's democracy in improving the political practices in Indonesia.

Hence, for a number of interest groups the practice of democracy in Indonesia has begun to stray from the values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In other words, democracy as practiced in Indonesia is not in accordance with the core values of the national identity.⁴³ It is important that the foregoing notes are understood by both the government and pro-democracy activists. If not, the democratization currently underway in Indonesia will face resistance and rejection, and could even be reversed.

Theological Rejection of Democracy

It is also interesting to analyze the data that of the 12.9 per cent of respondents who reject democracy, 28.3 per cent of them reject it literally for theological reasons. Some feel democracy is not compatible with Islam (28.3 per cent), while others reject democracy because it is derived from the West (8.7 per cent). Both of groups giving this kind of answer can be said to reject democracy because of their Islamic orientation. The orientation of these respondents is categorized as Islamist, because one of the characteristics of Islamism is a view which stigmatises the West (both conceptually and socially), where the West is seen as an imperialist monster that threatens their faith and existence. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Islamist-oriented Muslim per centage reached 19.9%. In addition, 60

per cent of respondents supported taking the values of religion (Islam) as a source of official regulations in the form of Laws or Provincial Regulations.

Related to the formalization of shariah, the public privileging of Islamic values as legislative instruments runs counter to the data showing strong support for democracy and Pancasila, as mentioned above. This suggests that part of the Muslim community has a split personality regarding questions of an Islamic State and the formalization of shariah law, where the split is between their civic (national) feelings and their feelings as Muslims. As citizens they fully support the Pancasila and democracy, but as Muslims they also support the formalization of shariah, which is a characteristic of Islamic countries (States). This personal identity is more apparent in the 19.9 per cent of respondents who consistently rejected Pancasila and democracy. When asked about Pancasila almost all of them supported it, however it is interesting that they also supported an Islamic caliphate/State. Presumably this fact related to their disappointment with the prevailing system in Indonesia, which has not brought many benefits for the betterment of shared community living. Politically this perception is not only growing in the community, but is also the official position of choice for Islamic political parties such as the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) and the PPP (United Development Party). The PKS, for example, is founded on Islam, however in its core objectives it unambiguously aims: “to achieve a just and prosperous society which is blessed by Allah in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, based on Pancasila.” The same applies to PPP. In addition to referring to Islam as the foundation of the party, it also declares that the party’s founding goal was the realization of a just civil society within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, prosperous, physically and spiritually well endowed, and democratic, based on Pancasila under the blessings of Allah “.44

On a community level, the attitude of the 60 per cent of the public in favor of the formalization of shariah and at the same time supporting the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be compared with the elite view of the MUI. According to the Chairman of the MUI in Bali, as already mentioned in previous chapters, the MUI formally supports the formalization of shariah in areas that have been

sociologically prepared (the people already understand shariah), but on the other hand they see Pancasila and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia as being final.⁴⁵ This community attitude can also be compared with the political practices in Aceh, which is part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia) but is nevertheless allowed to implement Islamic shariah criminal law, as reflected in Law No. 44/1999, Law No. No. 18/2001 and Law No. 11/2006 on the Governance of Aceh. Aceh's special governance is part of the resolution of the crisis between the Central Government and GAM (the Free Aceh Movement), which demanded independence for Aceh.

These facts show how the ideology of Pancasila and democracy have not been fully internalized and well integrated into the public's political reasoning, especially when they clash with the accepted logic of political Islam. In many people's political reasoning, Islam is unable to fully legitimize their support for the Pancasila form of the State and the democratic political system. They still seem ambivalent. In fact, it could be argued that they accept democracy and Pancasila only as long as they are within an Islamic framework. Their ideal, borrowing the language of Natsir and Maududi, is a theistic democracy, thus a democracy bounded by the teachings of Islam, especially the shariah (Islamic law), or Pancasila containing the Jakarta Charter clause which states: "with the obligation for Islamic shariah to apply to adherents of Islam". Their difficulty is with the concept of the sovereignty of God through His laws, versus the sovereignty of the people through democracy. In this case, they seem transfixed by literal perspectives and a partial understanding of the verses describing such Islamic laws as inheritance and criminal law, especially the expression *yahkum* (to enforce law) in QS. 5: 44 and QS. 16: 89, as previously discussed.

The strong support for the formalization of shariah discussed above can be compared with the Muslim community's support for the implementation of Islamic punishments like stoning to death for adulterers who are widows/widowers or have families. Forms of punishment deemed to be cruel by the international community, particularly the West,⁴⁶ were approved by 54.7 per cent of respondents in this research. They based their opinions on the practices of the Prophet, described in the transmitted narratives of Bukhari and Muslim. This hadith is taken literally. They do not recognize other interpretation of

this matter. In fact, according to experts in modern, rational shariah, stoning is a pre-Islamic Arab and Jewish tradition which has been Islamicised. Quoting the Khawariji's opinion, Prof. Dr. Anwarulah rejected stoning for married adulterers, saying that it was enough if they were whipped 100 times. This is because the verses about whipping have annulled the stoning verses, which do not appear in the Qur'an.⁴⁷ The Zhahiri school of thought takes the same view, that adulterers should only be whipped 100 times according to the words of QS. An-Nur 24: 2.⁴⁸ Furthermore, in the Qur'an the punishment for adultery is not only contained in QS. An-Nur 24: 2, but also in QS an-Nisa 4: 15, which prescribes home confinement until death or until Allah gives another way, although experts understand this first verse to abrogate the second.⁴⁹

In fact, the results of previous CSRC UIN Jakarta research in six regions which have adopted shariah regulations indicate that many members of the Muslim community agreed not only with stoning, but also with other Islamic criminal laws. Five forms of Islamic criminal law were included in this research, in which the Muslim community's approval rating in areas with shariah bylaws was in the 70-85 per cent range. The five forms of punishment were: first, the positive perception of flogging for adultery between girls and bachelors (85 per cent). This figure is the highest approval rate of respondents relating to Islamic criminal codes; Second, caning for gamblers (79 per cent); Third, caning for liquor drinkers (78 per cent); Fourth, the death penalty for murderers (*qishâsh*) (72 per cent). In addition, about half the respondents agreed with the law requiring hand amputation for certain thieves, and the death penalty for apostasy. However, 58 per cent of respondents also agreed with the lighter punishment of seclusion.⁵⁰

This shows the strong prevalence of literal or scriptural understandings of Islamic shariah, especially relating to criminal matters. This stagnation is partially explicable, as open public discussion of Islamic law has really only occurred since the period of Reformasi. Moreover, in Islamic jurisprudence, criminal law and political issues are not as prominent as family law. We need only look at Imam an-Nawawi, who wrote more than a dozen volumes of *Majmu' Syarah al-Muhadzab*, while there are few volumes on Islamic common law

(*siyasa*) or criminal (*jina*) jurisprudence. This fact allows us to understand that while the official attitude of the NU and Muhammadiyah central leadership resists formalization of shariah, particularly Islamic criminal law, their members in regional areas are strongly involved in formalising shariah law through Provincial Regulations.⁵¹ This explains the tendencies of the Islamist group in issues of formalizing shariah law (60 per cent support).

Based on this data, their view of Islamic criminal law does not seem to be like asy-Syathibi's thinking (730-790 AH), in which human benefit is seen as the core of Islamic shariah (law), including criminal matters, as a universal and perennial principle. Human benefit is understood especially as benefit in the sense of *dharuri* (imperative/cannot be abrogated), namely safeguarding each of five things: religion, the human spirit, intellect, lineage, and property. Furthermore, the views of the Muslim community above seem to compromise the views of Ibn Rushd (1127-1198), who suggested that shariah (literal Islamic law) and human benefit should be interpreted contextually (*takwil*). The intent of *takwil* is understanding the inner meaning contained by a text, based on the signs within it and the context of its origins.⁵² From Ibn Rushd's perspective, focus on the form of criminal law should be diverted to focus on the intended objective of the criminal act. Thus understandings of the criminal law should be strongly contextual and should not be applied literally.

Modern Syrian intellectuals, like 'Abîd al-Jâbiri and Muhammad Syahrur, along with Anwarullah, continue in the tradition of Ibn Rushd. Al-Jâbiri believed that because Arab society was nomadic, it was very difficult to sentence a thief to imprisonment. Hence we can understand why the penalty adopted in Islam's classical period was amputation of the hand for theft of something worth more than 86 grams of gold. Without this understanding Islam would be ahistorical. If the current social context is different, then the verse about cutting off hands should not be abandoned entirely but understood in its substance, that is punishment as a deterrent.⁵³ Muhammad Shahrur interpreted *hudûd* (punishment of criminals as established by the Qur'an and Hadith) such as stoning as the maximum punishment that can be applied. Therefore, he argued, lighter forms of punishment than the existing provisions of shariah may be applied, but these provisions

should not be exceeded.⁵⁴

Democratic Ideal and Muslim Ambivalence

Although the above data indicate inconsistency in the attitudes of respondents (accepting democracy but supporting the formalization of shariah and even an Islamic State), there is also relatively positive data from the perspective of modern democracy and human rights. Of the 60 per cent of respondents who agreed with the formalization of shariah law, 79.8 per cent affirmed that if religious values were to be made the source of official regulations, these draft regulations should be debated by a variety of parties (through public review) to assess if they are appropriate and needed, based on public rationality. Nearly all respondents (95.9 per cent) also agreed that the religiously inflected draft regulations must meet the need for justice of all parties, so that no party feels aggrieved. In addition, nine out of ten respondents affirmed the precondition that these religiously inflected draft regulations must take into account the cultural differences of diverse religions.

Thus there are significant differences of opinion between the Islamist group and the way of thinking of the above 60 per cent of respondents, although there are also similarities. They believe that if religiously based public policy is to be made, both the drawbacks of the Western experience and of theocratic States needs to be avoided. One perspective of the secular State is that it takes no hand in religious matters, and in the interests of protecting human rights it disallows religion in the public realm. It appears that this perspective is acceptable to 60 per cent of Muslims, at least in as much as it allows them the freedom to criticise public policy derived from religion and safeguards freedom of religion. As long as this applies, the penetration of the public sphere by Islamic symbols is always open to public review and challenge. Hence it is not necessarily a matter for concern, and can even contribute to the development of democracy.

However, given that the Muslim community's participation in criticizing or debating official regulations is very low (18.1 per cent), the ideals of democracy exist in its views rather than its actions. Once again, the attitude of the Muslim community is not consistent. Data about the requirements for turning Islamic values into public policy

also look very inconsistent, when compared to data showing that 65.9 per cent of respondents agreed that the State should determine the legitimacy or otherwise of any particular group's religious beliefs. If this were the case, public religious policy would have the potential to violate a basic human right, namely the freedom of religion. The democratic theory "majority rule, minority rights" would not be met. In practice, the rights of non-Muslims are often violated in areas where shariah-inflected Provincial Regulations (or something similar) apply. For example, in the Cianjur district where there is circular instruction from the Regent about wearing the jilbab, it has been reported that a non-Muslim woman was forced to wear Muslim clothing in the office every Friday. An employee at the post office, a public school teacher and a high school student were also forced to do the same. The parents of students who refused to wear jilbabs were required to file an application and a statement that the student is non-Muslim. At the same time waivers do not apply to teachers, because it is the teachers who require students to wear the jilbab on Fridays. The same thing also happened in Padang, West Sumatra. After State High School 1 Padang required all female students to wear jilbabs, non-Muslim students were also subject to this rule. For three years Fransisika Silalahi, a Christian, had to be veiled while she was studying at this school.⁵⁵ In Aceh a process of 'jilbabisation' has taken place for people of Chinese descent and non-Muslims working in the BCA (Bank Central Asia).⁵⁶

It is also worthwhile examining the number of Muslims (65.9 per cent) who agree that the State should participate in determining the correctness of a religious group's beliefs. This data displays inconsistencies between respondent support for democracy and the ideals of integrating religious values with public policy. This data seems to show that certain key liberal constructs are totally unknown to the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Two early exponents of the liberal State, Woodrow Wilson (1892) and John O. Sullivan (1837), suggested that the construct of a liberal State is a country of small government whose principle responsibilities are in the areas of security, defense, and taxation. Hence the government does not interfere in the lives of individuals,⁵⁷ including their religion. The term a "night watchman State" is sometimes used for the concept of a liberal State that upholds

individual rights vis à vis the State, in which the State's primary function is only in the field of security. Later, due to the greater demands on the role of the State, others postulated that in the formation of a liberal State "the less government the better the State", although in practice in countries like the US the increasingly wide powers of the State gave birth to a welfare State. The concept of the liberal State is related to the concept of civil society. In this concept, if the State is too strong it will disrupt the consolidation of civil society..

In the context of Islam, religious attitudes such as those shown by the majority of Muslims suggest that less emphasis is placed on the Islamic concept that the core elements of religion include the freedoms to choose and to act (*ikhtiar*, chose to attempt, and *kasb*, to attempt). Hence there should be no coercion by the State or by anyone else. The State should not be present in such matters. In this way there is no deception, as emphasized in QS. 98: 5, and sincerity will be apparent. This is what makes reward and punishment possible on the day of judgment. In Islamic law, this is seen from the fact that one condition for applying a law to a person is that the person's action was not forced. If it was forced then person is not liable before the law, as in the case of mentally disturbed people or small children. What is influential in this matter is the concept and practice of *wilayah hisbah*, a kind of shariah policeman whose job is to oversee breaches of religious law by the general public. This institution is distinguished from the jurisdiction of the *mazhalim*, which oversees and prosecutes abuses committed by authorities, especially the authorities under a caliph. These two institutions have existed since the classical period, especially from the time of Abdul Malik bin Marwan's rule (685-705 M).⁵⁸

The strongest influence on the views of the majority of Muslims who support the State's right to determine the correctness of a religious belief is Law number 1 of 1965 concerning blasphemy, through religious belief, convictions that differ from the mainstream and through actions. The Constitutional Court upheld this law in a judicial review. Conservative groups present themselves and the State as gatekeepers of pure religious faith by preventing the emergence of divergent streams of faith (splinter groups) and divergent religious interpretations, rather than as upholders of religious freedom. Thus they have

no difficulty in suppressing groups that are deemed to make new interpretations or conduct religious acts that diverge from the mainstream of religious doctrine or practice. For them and the government, Law No.1/1965 on blasphemy reinforced by Article 156a of the Criminal Code, is seen as functioning in the interests of minimizing or eliminating social unrest and preserving social stability. Apart from the law, the Islamic concept of apostasy (*riddah*) also influences the views of the majority of the Muslim community. In shariah law, apostasy is not only refers to people who convert from Islam to another religion, but also to people whose views or practices diverge from mainstream Islamic religious patterns.⁵⁹

In its implementation, Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 has been used to targeted Ahmadiyah (among others), more recently through Joint Determination 3 of 2008 by the Minister for Religious Affairs, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Attorney General. This decree ordered Ahmadiyah to stop spreading interpretations and activities which deviate from the tenets of Islamic teachings. As a result, Ahmadis, such as those as in Tangerang City, were requested by the Sub-district Head to stop internal religious activities such as prayers in their own Annur Mosque. This action was at the urging of residents, although previously a meeting had been held between the Ahmadis, the police, and the local MUI. The Ahmadiyah leadership were also forced to remove all Ahmadiyah signboards and other symbols and signage.⁶⁰ Elsewhere the Ahmadis have been subject to violence, as happened in Parung Bogor, Sukabumi, Kuningan, Lombok, and Bulukumba.⁶¹ Moreover, in Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara) approximately 137 Ahmadis were forced to become refugees from their own home towns.⁶² Paradoxes such as these occur when democracy grows and blossoms. If left unchecked, democracy may soon wither again.

Endnotes

¹ Peter Jones, "Persamaan Politik and Kekuasaan Mayoritas", in David Miller and Lary Siedentop (eds.), *Politik in Perspektif Pemikiran Filsafat dan Teori* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1986), pp. 254-283, and Robert A. Dahl, *Demokrasi dan Para Pengkritiknya* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1992), pp. 3-4, and pp. xxiv-xxv, and Elza Peldi Taher (ed.), *Demokratisasi Politik, Budaya dan Ekonomi; Pengalaman Indo-*

nesia Masa Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), pp. xxvii-xxix.

² Nurcholish Madjid in *Fatsoen Tekad* 1/2 (1999) and 1/16 (1999).

³ This is done by organisations such as KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam – Preparation Committee for Implementing Islamic Shariah), an organization for formalizing shariah which originated and developed in South Sulawesi. It is critical of NU and Muhammadiyah which it sees as having become part of the anti-shariah regime. See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syari'at: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PSAP & AMBOOKS, 2007), p. 317.

⁴ (QS. 2:30) for example speaks of humans as caliphs, while QS. 18:29 and 13:11 speak of human free will (freedom of choice).

⁵ For further discussion see Sukron Kamil, *Islam dan Demokrasi, Telaah Konseptual dan Historis* (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), pp. 47-49.

⁶ Ridwan al-Makassary et al., "Pemetaan Ideologis Masjid-Masjid di Solo", *Laporan Penelitian* (Jakarta: CSRC, 2009), p. 38.

⁷ Despite the stated FPI hatred of democracy, its followers are not reluctant to enter the voting booth. See Ridwan al-Makassary et al., "Pemetaan Ideologis Masjid-Masjid di Solo".

⁸ This is seen in the Party Debate between PBB and PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera – Peace and Prosperity Party) broadcast by TV One, Friday, 17 October 2008 and the daily *Republika*, 4 February 2009.

⁹ Abul A'la al-Maududi, *Hukum dan Konstitusi Sistem Politik Islam*, published by Asep Hikmat, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (Bandung: Mizan 1990), pp. 160-166, 243-245 and Abul A'la al-Maududi, *Khilafah dan Kerajaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), pp. 94-109.

¹⁰ Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *al-Fiqh 'alâ al-Madzâhib al-'Arba'ah* (Beirut: Darul Fikr, 1999), Vol. V, p. 59 and Mun'im A. Sirri, *Hukum Barat pun Islam, Membongkar Argumen Kejumudan Syari'at* (Jakarta: PBB UIN Jakarta and KAS, 2003), pp. 25-35.

¹¹ Kompas Research and Development Team, *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2004), pp. 305-327.

¹² Yusuf al-Qardhawi, *Fiqh Daulah in Perspektif al-Quran dan Sunnah*, translated by Kathur Suhardi from *Min Fiqh al-Daulah fi al-Islam* (1997) (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 1997), pp. 191-195, *Tekad* 1/1 (1998), J. Suyuthi Pulungan, *Prinsip-Prinsip Pemerintahan dalam Piagam Madinah Ditinjau dari Pandangan Alquran* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1994), pp. 125-265, M. Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam, Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1991), pp. 53-57, Muhammad Hasyim Kamali, *Kebebasan Berpendapat dalam Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), pp. 74-141, and Fahmi Huwaydi, *Demokrasi Oposisi dan Masyarakat Madani* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), pp. 193-292.

¹³ Sukron Kamil, *Islam dan Demokrasi*, pp. 53-76.

¹⁴ Sukron Kamil et al., *Syari'ah Islam dan HAM, Dampak Perda Syariah terhadap Kebebasan Sipil, Hak-Hak Perempuan, dan Non Muslim* (Jakarta, CSRC UIN Jakarta and KAS, 2007), pp. 125-121.

¹⁵ *Kompas*, Monday 10 July 2006, *Suara Karya*, 6 February 2007, *Koran Tempo*, 31 January 2007, and *Indopos*, 25 January 2007.

¹⁶ The al-Kahfi Mosque community, for example, as well as seeing democracy as not originating from Islam, which began its demise, also see it as a fraudulent system. The United States and other Western parties will certainly bring down an Islamic party or a Muslim who wins election in a country, as happened in Algeria. See Ridwan al-Makassary et al., “Pemetaan Ideologis Masjid-Masjid di Solo”, pp. 23-36.

¹⁷ F. Budhi Hardiman, “Demokrasi Deliberatif: Menimbang Negara Hukum dan Ruang Publik”, in *Teori Diskursus Habermas* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), pp. 128-130, 156-159. See also Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Saiful Mujani (eds.), *Gerakan Kebebasan Sipil: Studi dan Advokasi Kritis atas Perda Syari’ah* (Jakarta: Penerbit Nalar, 2009), pp. 20-22, and Asma Afsaruddin, “Mitos Sekularisme and Politik Barat in Islam”, <<http://www.commongroundnews.org>>, accessed on 19 June 2010.

¹⁸ This policy of Khomeini is seen in its clearest concrete form in his fatwa pronouncing the death penalty on Salman Rushdie (author of the novel “The Satanic Verses”) on 14 February 1989. It appears this policy still remained in force until recently. In September 1998, for example, the liberal daily paper TOUS, which was supported by the then President Khatami, was closed. As its reason, the Tribunal cited several articles in this paper which threatened the interests and security of the nation. In this country freedom of the press is yet to be established. Hard line leaders apparently disapprove of freedom in Iran. This is often used as evidence to support Western contentions that Islam is intolerant and anti-democracy, an assessment which is inaccurate and mistaken. It is caused by monolithic observation; the fact is that the teachings of Islam are in no way opposed to democracy. See John L. Esposito, *Ancaman Islam; Mitos atau Realitas* (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), pp. 214-220 and *Majalah UMMAT* 4/12 (1998).

¹⁹ William Shawcross, *Perjalanan Terakhir Syah, Senyum Pembalasan Sang Imam* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1988).

²⁰ This is because in some parts a single event is counted more than once in different calculations of violations of religious freedom.

²¹ See F. Budhi Hardiman, *Demokrasi Deliberatif*, pp. 140-162. See also Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Saiful Mujani (eds.), *Gerakan Kebebasan Sipil*, and Asma Afsaruddin, *Mitos Sekularisme dan Politik Barat dalam Islam*.

²² Nurcholish Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan, Artikulasi Nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 172, 109.

²³ Kuntowijoyo, *Identitas Politik Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997), pp. 65-90.

²⁴ Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, *Daulah Islamiyyah*, (Jakarta: HTI Press, 2007), pp. 290-305 and M. Zaki Mubarak, “Muslim Utopia: Gerakan and Pemikiran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Pasca Reformasi”, *Refleksi, Jurnal Kajian Agama dan Filsafat* 9/1 (2007) pp. 27-45.

²⁵ Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, *Daulah Islamiyyah*, pp. 27-45.

²⁶ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004).

²⁷ *Kompas*, Sunday 25 May 2003, p. 25.

²⁸ *Koran Tempo*, 10 December 2006.

²⁹ Agus Edi Santoso (ed.), *Tidak Ada Negara Islam, Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Moh. Roem* (Jakarta: Djembatan, 1997), p. 27.

³⁰ Peter Jones, *Persamaan Politik and Kekuasaan Mayoritas*.

³¹ SP. Varma, *Teori Politik Modern*, Translated by Yohanes Kristiarto et al. from *Modern Political Theory* (1982) (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1995), pp. 212-215.

³² Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkâm As-Sulthâniyah* (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr ttp.), pp. 17-18, Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Negara, Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemerintahan* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1993), edition V, pp. 65-66, Muhammad Azhar, *Filsafat Politik, Perbandingan Antara Islam dan Barat* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers), 1996, pp. 180-181, and M. Yusuf Musa, *Politik dan Negara in Islam*, translated from Nizhâm *Al-Hukm Fi Al-Islâm* (Surabaya: Al-Iklas, 1990), p. 160.

³³ Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 47, 77, pp. 89-90.

³⁴ However Javanese culture also includes feelings of *isin*, or being ashamed or embarrassed. Being embarrassed by a mistake, for example, is the first step towards having a mature Javanese personality. In Javanese culture to say someone has no shame (*ora ngerti isin*) is a sharply pointed criticism. See Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Etika Jawa, Sebuah Analisa Falsafi tentang Kebijaksanaan Hidup Jawa* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1985), pp. 56-72.

³⁵ *Kompas*, Sunday, 25 May 2003, p. 25.

³⁶ Interview by Sholahudin A. Aziz with KP. Ali Maschan Musa, 23 April 2010.

³⁷ The daily newspaper *Kompas*, 19 March 2004 and see also AS. Burhan et al. (ed.), *Korupsi di Negeri Kaum Beragama* (Jakarta: P3M and Partnership for Governance Reform, 2004), p. 17.

³⁸ *Koran Tempo*, Tuesday, 24 March 2009.

³⁹ *Kompas*, 23 July 2010 and 24 July 2010, p. 1, 15.

⁴⁰ *Kompas*, 9 March 2003, p. 25, 26, 1, 25 May 2003, p. 28, and the magazine *Forum Keadilan*, No. 14, 29 July 2007, pp. 42-43.

⁴¹ Interview by Sri Hidayati with Prof. M.A. Tihami.

⁴² “Depdagri Bentuk Tim Terpadu Pilkada 2010”, in <<http://www.depdagri.go.id>>, accessed 16 August 2010.

⁴³ Interview by Irfan Abu Bakar with a West Sumatra academic.

⁴⁴ Daniel Dhakidae, *Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia, Ideologi dan Program 2004-2009* (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2004), p. 305, 100.

⁴⁵ Interview Sukron Kamil with KP. Hasan, MUI Chairman, Bali

⁴⁶ For example, the case of Safiya Huseini and Amina Lawal in Nigeria who were charged with adultery and sentenced to stoning drew international protests. See Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syari’at Islam, Dari Indonesia Hingga Nigeri* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), p. 188.

⁴⁷ Mun’im A. Sirri, *Hukum Barat pun Islam*, pp. 28-35 and Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *Al-Fiqh ‘alâ al-Madzâhib al’Arba’ah*, Vol. V, p. 59.

⁴⁸ Harun Nasution et. al., *Ensiklopedi Islam* (Jakarta: Ikhtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 2003), 11th printing, Vol. V, p. 237.

⁴⁹ Harun Nasution et. al., *Ensiklopedi Islam*, Vol. IV, p. 17.

⁵⁰ Sukron Kamil et. al., *Syari’ah Islam dan HAM*, pp. 208-209.

⁵¹ *Kompas*, 19-03-2002 and Taufik Adnan Amal & Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syari’at Islam*, p. 99.

⁵² Abu Ishaq Al-Syatibi, *Al-Muwâfaqât fî Ushûl al-Syari’ah* (Beirut: Dâr al-Hadîts

al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, ttp.), vol. I, part 2, pp. 7-8, 28-29 and Abu al-Walid Ibn Rusyd, *Fashl al-Maqâl fîmâ Bainâ al-Hikmah wa as-Syari’ah min al-Ittishâl*, (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1999), pp. 31-32, and Muhyammad Khalid Mas’ud, *Filsafat Hukum Islam, Studi tentang Hidup dan Pemikiran Abu Ishaq asy-Syathibi*, translated from *Islamic Legal Philosophy: a Study of Abu Ishaq al-Syathibi* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1996), p. 191, 195.

⁵³ Al-Jabiri, as quoted by Khamami Zada in *Media Indonesia*, 24 August, 2001.

⁵⁴ Mun’im A. Sirri, *Hukum Barat pun Islam*, pp. 25-35 and ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *al-Fiqh ‘alâ al-Madzâhib al’Arba’ah*, Vol. V, p. 59.

⁵⁵ Fransiska Silalahi, “Kami Kesel Banget Pake Jilbab”, in *Jurnal Perempuan* 60 (Jakarta: Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, 2008), September 2008 edition, pp. 116-119.

⁵⁶ Lily Zakiah Munir, “Simbolisasi, Politisasi dan Kontrol terhadap Perempuan di Aceh”, in Burhanudin (ed.), *Syariat Islam Pandangan Muslim Liberal* (Jakarta: JIL, 2003), p. 133.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Nyoman Rudana, *Who Governs? The Individual (Actor) Level*, in <<http://www.scribd.com>>, accessed 6 February 2006.

⁵⁸ Harun Nasution et al., *Ensiklopedi Islam*, Suplement Vol. 2, pp. 51-53, and Suplement Vol. 1, pp. 192-94 and Miftah Adebayo Uthman, “Wilayah al-Hisbah and al-Mazhalim”, *Ulumul Qur’an*, No. 9, Vol. II, 1991 M/1411 H, pp. 28-32.

⁵⁹ See Sayyid Sabiq, *Fiqh al-Sunnah* (Cairo: Dar al-Tsaqafah al-Islamiyah, 1365 H), Vol. II, pp 286-289, Sulaiman Rasyid, *Fiqh Islam* (Bandung: Sinar Baru Algensindo, 1995), 28th printing, pp. 444-445 and Abdullah Nashih Ulwan, *Hurriyyah al-I’tiqâd fî as-Syari’ah al-Islâmiyyah* (Cairo: Dar as-Salam, n.d.), pp. 78-95, and Abd ar-Rahman al-Jaziri, *Al-Fiqh ‘alâ al-Madzâhib al’Arba’ah* (Cairo: Dar al-Hadits, 1994), Vol. V, p. 328.

⁶⁰ *Kompas*, 18 April 2008 and <<http://news.okezone.com>> accessed 20 June 2008.

⁶¹ See Laporan Imparsial, “Penyeragaman and Totalisasi Dunia Kehidupan sebagai Ancaman terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia, Sebuah Studi Kebijakan di Indonesia”, December 2006.

⁶² Laporan Imparsial, “Penyeragaman and Totalisasi Dunia Kehidupan sebagai Ancaman terhadap Hak Asasi Manusia”.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

Conclusions Reached

From the discussion in the preceding chapters of this book we can conclude that Islamic symbols are increasingly prominent in Indonesia's public sphere, which is witnessing the growth of freedoms along with the idioms of modern democracy. These seemingly paradoxical events are apparently occurring against a backdrop of changes in the public's interpretations of religion, and their historical and contextual experiences in addressing the State. Islam emerges as a major point of reference when the public suspends its anxieties and focuses on aspirations for a better future community life. It appears to present an alternative vision, colored by a discursive dynamic and the people's real-life struggles to realize the ideals of democracy.

Seen from the central religious issues voiced in the public sphere, its development still centers on issues of faith (*akidah*), ritual (*ibadah*), morality (*akhlak*), halal food, and family law (marriage and inheritance). At the same time Islamic social, political, and economic issues

do not loom large in the construction of Islam in the public sphere. However, it must be acknowledged that the effective influence of Islamic symbols and values has increased, and is in the 35 to 40 per cent range.

The most popular and influential media used to build Islam's presence in the public sphere are the loudspeakers of mosques and Islamic study groups, television and religious events in public places such as parks, public streets, residents' houses and meeting places. Other media used include books, radio, and newspapers, however these media are not as strong. In this respect the internet is the least used media. The strongest of the other media are books, music and the performing arts, literature, notice boards, stickers, banners and billboards located in public places, rallies, and Provincial regulations.

The actors involved in urging the appearance of Islamic symbols in the public sphere come from the ranks of cultural Islam and Islamism. Contestation occurs between the two, and in Indonesia's public sphere cultural Islam still seems to be dominant. Although this dominance deserves to be noted, the Islamists, with their issues such as the necessity for an Islamic State and shariah as the solution to crises, have gained access to 30-40 per cent of Indonesia's public sphere.

This research also found that the presence of Islam in the public sphere influences public policy, such as the making of laws and Provincial regulations, and this appears to be consistent with the way Jürgen Habermas saw the position of religion in the public sphere. The majority of the people who agreed with the formalization of religious values also agreed that if religious values are to be made the source of official regulations, these draft regulations should be debated by various parties, should satisfy the demand of justice for all parties, and should take religious difference and cultural diversity into account. However the ideal concept of Islam's position in the public sphere, especially if it is to become the life-breath of public policy, is that it should be subject to criticism, because the reality shows otherwise.

The level of public acceptance of Islam's penetration of the public sphere is also high, especially in relation to the issues commonly raised by cultural Islam. This can be seen from public accep-

tance of preaching by Muslim role models, Islamic music and soap opera/film shows, the locating of symbols, teachings and Islamic promotional material in public places, and rallies for moral issues. The public is also highly receptive to Islam in the public sphere in relation to issues of ritual worship, styles of dress, and Islamic readings, while participation in mass Islamic organizations is also high. In connection with this last issue, we can confirm that there has been a deepening, broadening and also strengthening of Islamic identity at individual and community levels, as many scholars have observed and noted. In the last five years, for example, use of the head scarf by female Muslims has seen a significant increase.

However, this reinforcing of piety and Islamic identity does not necessarily mean a parallel strengthening of Islamist (political Islam) opinions, for example, opinions favoring the establishment of an Islamic State or caliphate. This research shows that the proportion of Muslims oriented towards Islamism is 19.9 per cent. The Islam of the majority of Muslims (80.1 per cent) still tends towards cultural Islam. This percentage is derived from a cluster analysis of three issues: the obligation for female Muslims to wear the chador; support for establishing an Islamic caliphate or State in Indonesia; and the permissibility of using violent means in the struggle for Islam.

Despite this, numerically the total Islamist-oriented population is not small. Two out of ten Indonesians lean towards Islamism, with the potential to plant the seeds of jihadist Islamism. This should certainly be considered a threat to the character of mainstream Islam in Indonesia, which has so far been known for moderate, cultural Islam. These findings demonstrate an increased trend towards Islamism in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the number of Muslims actually involved in Islamism and who may in fact become active participants is only about 5 per cent. This percentage of respondents acknowledged involvement in actions or rallies for the causes usually voiced by Islamists, such as raids on foreigners or night entertainment venues, Ahmadiyah, or rice stalls open during the day in the month of Ramadan. Those who were involved in such actions supported enforcing shariah law through Provincial regulations, and other activities in support of an Islamic caliphate or State.

A number of factors produced a positive correlation between Islam's penetration of the public sphere and the orientation by the public towards the views of the Islamist group noted above. Examples include knowledge of and public demonstrations for an Islamic caliphate or State and enforcement of shariah law by national or provincial legislation; VCDs and DVD s about the suffering and struggles of Muslims in conflict areas, and banners or billboards about shariah as the solution to the crises afflicting Indonesia.

As to whether or not the expression of Islam in the public sphere threatens democratic development, this research found that a majority of Indonesian Muslims agree with the democracy currently adopted by Indonesia. In practice, almost the entire Muslim population of Indonesia takes part in general elections, both at national and at local levels. In addition, almost the whole Muslim community also accepts Pancasila as the basis of the State and the 1945 Constitution as the main source of law. With the exception of political understandings of democracy, democracy in the cultural sense is also accepted and practiced well. Almost all Indonesian Muslims practice high levels of tolerance, respecting people with other opinions and people active in different organizations, and supporting the rights of others to be free of feelings of fear and threat. That is, this research found that the penetration of Islamic symbols in the public sphere is not a threat to democracy in Indonesia.

Recommendations

The recommendations presented on the basis of the above research are:

1. There is a need to campaign for increased awareness that if the current development of Islamist currents of belief is not properly responded to, there may be a threat to the character of Indonesia's cultural (moderate) Islam
2. Islamist actions such as putting up banners and holding rallies demanding the establishment of an Islamic State need to be combated with counter activities, so the public can obtain alternative information.
3. There is a need to conduct or increase training to disseminate the concept of Islam as a religion of peace, and the Unitary State of

the Indonesian Republic with Pancasila as the final form of the State, based on the perspectives of Islam.

4. The government needs to take steps to eliminate practices that are counter-productive to democracy, such as money politics.
5. Efforts need to be made so that democratic values are internalized both by the public and by those tasked with governance. For example, through training programs to increase community participation in critiquing public policy, training in Islam and democracy, and training in religious public policy based on human rights.

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
APPENDIX

RESPONDENT PROFILES

Research Areas

The research sampled ten Provinces with 150 respondents in each, thus the number of respondents totalled 1,500. The selection of Provinces was based on either their majority or minority Muslim populations. Bali and North Sulawesi represented Muslim minority Provinces. Muslim majority Provinces were divided into those having historically structural roots in Islam or which have once been great Islamic kingdoms, represented by Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, South Sulawesi and Banten. The second regional grouping was Provinces with a strong Islamic culture, represented by East Java and West Sumatera. The third grouping consisted of the “melting pot” Provinces of North Sumatra, DKI Jakarta and East Kalimantan. Weighting these sample Provinces according to their total Muslim populations gave Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 5.6 percent of the sample population, North Sumatra 10.4 per cent, West Sumatera 5.7 per cent, Banten 10.7 per cent, DKI Jakarta 9.9 per cent, East Java 46.5 per cent, Bali 0.3 per cent, East Kalimantan 3.3 per cent. South Sulawesi 6.9 per cent, and North Sulawesi 0.8 per cent. These percentages are shown in the following chart.


Chart 1
Research area



Place of Residence

Comparison of respondents by place of residence shows that 29 per cent lived in urban areas, while 71 per cent lived in rural areas.


Chart 2
Place of Residence



Male/Female Gender Balance

This research used a purposive sample following the Kish Grid method. Even numbered questionnaires were used for female respondents and odd numbered ones were used for male respondents. After weighting, 50.4 per cent of respondents were males and 49.6 per cent were females.


Chart 3
Gender of Respondents



Age of Respondents

This research surveyed respondents who were at least 17 years old or who were married. The age distribution of respondents was: aged 17-25, 20.1 per cent, aged 26-35, 24.6 per cent, aged 36-40, 12.6 per cent, aged 41-50, 23.4 per cent, aged 51 or older, 19.3 per cent.


Chart 4 4
Age of Respondents



Education Level of Respondents

In general most respondents had completed primary education (32.9 per cent) or senior high school/vocational education (26.3 per cent), followed by those with junior high school education at 15.9 per cent. Respondents with no education or incomplete primary education totaled 5.6 per cent. Only 1.3 per cent of respondents had been educated in an Islamic primary school, 4 percent in an Islamic junior high school, and 3.3 per cent in an Islamic senior high school. Respondents with general higher education totaled 5.0 per cent, while those with higher religious studies qualifications were 1 per cent. The data shows that less than 0.1 per cent of respondents had post graduate degrees in either general or religious studies.


Chart 5
Education Levels



Marital Status

Respondents' marital status was: 13.1 per cent stated that they were unmarried, 78.9 per cent were married, and 8 per cent were widows/widowers.

Chart 6
Marital Status




Active Participation in Islamic Community Organizations

A total of 7.6 per cent of respondents said that they were active in managing an Islamic community organization, 34.8 per cent said they were members, and those with no active participation were 57.6 per cent.

Chart 7


Active Participation in Islamic Community Organizations



Employment

The data shows that the greatest number of respondents, 35.2 per cent, were farmers or fishermen. Housewives represented 20.2 percent, while respondents working as traders, private/government employees or day labour were 8.9 per cent, 8.1 per cent and 7.8 per cent. Respondents who were university or school students, public servants, other, teachers/lecturers (honorary) and business people were 5.1 per cent, 3.4 per cent, 2.4 per cent, 2.3 per cent and 2.2 per cent. Unemployed respondents totaled 4 per cent.


Chart 8
Employment



Income

The majority of respondents, 56.6 per cent, had monthly incomes of less than Rp 500,000. Respondents earning Rp 500,000-1,000,000, and Rp 1,000,000-2,500,000 totaled 23.7 per cent and 15.6 per cent. Few respondents had incomes of Rp 2,500,000-5,000,000 and above Rp 5,000,000, at 2.4 per cent and 1.7 per cent.

Chart 9
Income



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Hidayatulah Jakarta, and his Masters studies in Modern Islamic Political Thinking. His Doctorial studies were in Contemporary Islamic Issues, with particular reference to the relations between Islam and literature. He is the Coordinator of the Democracy and Pluralism program and a tenured lecturer at the Faculty of Adab, Literature and Humanities of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He undertook studies into *Religion and Society: Dialogue Indonesia-USA* in April 2007 in the United States.

Winfried Weck, has been with the Konrad Adeneuer Stiftung (KAS) since 1998. He graduated from Friedrich Alexander University in Germany in 1990 with a Masters degree in Islamic Science, Political Science and Political Economy. He has a long association with the Germany's Christian Democratic Party and until 1998 he headed the party's Department of Foreign Politics. Mr. Weck then joined KAS, and subsequently spent three years as its representative in Peru. He was appointed as the KAS representative to Indonesia and East Timor in 2006-2011 and cooperated with ten partner organizations, including CSRC. He was recently appointed as the KAS Representative to Ecuador, Quito Office.



About CSRC

The Center for the Study of Religion and Culture/CSRC (Pusat Kajian Agama dan Budaya) is an institution for study and research in religious and socio-cultural fields. It was established on 28 April 2006 by a directive from the Rector of the Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah. The Center grew from the Center for Language and Culture (PBB UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1999-2006) to develop studies in the area of social matters, in response to growing demands for religious (particularly Islamic) studies and research in relation to the socio-cultural and political domains. The Center's objective is to know and understand the critical role that religion can play in contributing to the formation of a just, prosperous, strong, democratic, and peaceful social order.

The importance of this development can be observed in the growing role and influence of religion in the public sphere. Religion is not only a topic of day-to-day conversation at all levels of society and at national and international levels, but also a growing force in a public sphere swept by the currents of modernization and secularization.

One proof of the strengthening of religion in the public sphere is the growth of identity, symbols, and religiously characterized social

institutions. It must be acknowledged that the expression of Islam occupies a position of considerable strength in the nation's public sphere, however Islam is not the only entity in this sphere, and our public sphere is also enlivened by other entities. As teachings, the source of ethics, and the inspiration for the formation of social institutions, Islam frequently finds expression in a variety of ways. This is because the basis of its practice is subject to multiple interpretations coming from Muslim communities of different backgrounds. As a result, numerous interpretations and streams of Islam have grown from a diversity of sources, and the sublime teachings and values of religion are therefore frequently imbued with unique hues and nuances. Sometimes these seem to present various pictures of exclusivism, however not uncommonly they are a source of social ethics, an inspiration for the development of science and technology, mediators of social integration, and motivators of civil society's socio-economic empowerment. Islam also influences the formation of socio-political institutions, the economy and education, which make significant and positive contributions to national development. Hence the presence of Islam in the public sphere need not be a matter for concern. Just the opposite; the ethics and ethos of religion need to be appreciated by the community and universally supported, especially by the government.

By having a presence in this, CSRC aims to revitalize the role of religion. Religion should be revealed simultaneously in the form of ethics and ethos in order to lend its colour to the shaping of sound, accountable systems. Looking ahead, religion needs to be carefully transformed so it can answer the various and increasingly complex daily challenges faced by its followers, buffeted by waves of social change and globalization. Given that change takes place faster than people's capacity to change themselves, accommodating change calls for correct, robust strategies.

In accordance with its tasks and role, CSRC strives to make a contribution in the sectors of research, information and training, and to facilitate initiatives that can encourage the strengthening of civil society through socio-religious and cultural policy development. We hope that in the future Islamic institutions will develop to become centers of human productivity. In this way it is hoped that the Muslim


community can positively and constructively elevate its role in socio-political and economic life. []

About KAS

The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) was established in 1964 and is one of Germany's leading foundations. With programs in more than 100 countries, this foundation's goal is to promote democracy, the rule of law, and social systems based on a market economy. It aims not to simply transplant the models which have succeeded in Germany, but more than this to discuss and share experiences of mutual benefit with its partners abroad. In order to make a contribution to Indonesia's future, KAS cooperates closely with the government of Indonesian, non-government organizations (NGOs), the media and other bodies. Its activities focus on civic education, policy advice, political and economic dialogue, and mutual understanding between religions. []



UNIVERSITAS ISLAM NEGERI
Syarif Hidayatullah
JAKARTA – INDONESIA



The symbols of Islam have become more prominent in modern Indonesia's increasingly democratic public sphere. Expressions and orientations of Islam appear in a variety of forms. Beyond its ideological and political facets, Islam colors the public sphere through cultural symbols: head scarves, television soap opera, the cinema, works of literature, and Islamic books. The expansion of Islam in parallel with the process of democratization may at first glance appear paradoxical. However, on closer study,

it is precisely democracy itself which makes the prominence of Islamic symbols possible.

The results of this research send a positive signal that the recent prominence of Islamic symbols appearing in the public sphere is not a threat to democracy and the future of pluralism in Indonesia. In fact 80.1 per cent of Muslims in this country have moderate, cultural and pluralist leanings, and are able to adapt to the development of modern social and economic dynamics. An insistent challenge, however, comes from the 19.9 per cent of Muslims whose orientation favours ideological Islam.

For this reason, strengthening the capacity of social and political actors in developing a culture of democracy in Indonesia is the key to preserving the moderate, inclusive face of Islam in the future.



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